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THE CHARACTER OF THE QUESTIONS AND THE FITNESS
OF THE PROCESS: MENTAL HEALTH, BAR ADMISSIONS
AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Jon Bauer
During the decade since the Americans with Disabilities Act went into
effect, mental health inquiries by bar examining committees have engendered
intense controversy. Courts have reached no clear consensus as to what, if any,
questions about mental illness or substance abuse may be posed by licensing
agencies. The trend has been towards a form of "relaxed scrutiny" that authorizes
inquiries as long as they are focused on serious conditions that may interfere with
practice, and are reasonably tailored in scope and time. In this Article, Professor
Jon Bauer examines the implications of allowing disability inquiries in the lawyer
licensing process.
The Article begins with a case study of one jurisdiction's mental health
screening, and the stories of three bar applicants with mental disabilities who have
been affected by it. After analyzing the premises of different judicial approaches
in applying Title II of the ADA to mental health inquiries, Professor Bauer
examines whether the "narrow" mental health questions that many jurisdictions
have adopted, focusing on conditions such as depression, bipolar disorder,
schizophrenia, and substance abuse, can be justified. In a discussion that draws
on the psychiatric literature concerning mental disorders and treatment, the
author concludes that many of the questions currently in use cannot be justified
under the ADA, even under the premises of "relaxed scrutiny."
The remainder of the Article addresses the need for changes in the bar admis-
sions process if inquiries into applicants' disabilities are to be allowed. The ADA
is concerned not only with outcomes, but also with the processes by which decisions
are made. This can be seen most clearly in Title I of the ADA, which regulates
employment. Title I allows employers to make certain disability-based inquiries,
but only if the selection process is structured in a way that minimizes stigma and
the risk of discriminatory treatment. Title II of the ADA is less explicit, but its
* Clinical Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. J.D., Yale Law
School; B.A., Cornell University. I am grateful to my colleagues Leslie Levin, Jeremy Paul, Jim
Stark, Deborah Calloway, Tim Everett, Paul Chill, Elizabeth McCormick, and George Allen, and
also to Alice Bauer, Bruce Manning, Phil Frickey, and Lara Manzione, for their encouragement
and thoughtful comments. An embryonic version of this Article was presented at the XXIInd
International Congress on Law and Mental Health in Montreal in 1997, where I received very
helpful comments from my copanelists, Professors Stanley Herr and Philip Frickey, and from the
workshop participants.
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concept of "discrimination" is properly understood to encompass similar process-
based protections.
The bar admissions process, as currently structured, is ill-suited to handle
disability information. A section of this Article is devoted to a close examination
of how the structure, functions and history of bar admissions boards, combined
with the particularly stigmatizing nature of the disabilities that have been singled
out for scrutiny, create serious dangers of demeaning treatment in the bar
admissions process. Even if only "narrow" disability questions are allowed, and
nearly all applicants who answer "yes" are ultimately admitted, many applicants
with disabilities will experience the process as discriminatory. Professor Bauer
argues that the ADA should be construed to prohibit bar examining boards from
asking any questions about disability unless the process is restructured in a way
that minimizes stigma and the risk of discriminatory treatment. The final section
of the Article proposes specific reforms to accomplish this goal.
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INTRODUCTION
In the 1950s, George Anastaplo was denied admission to the Illinois
Bar when he refused to answer questions about whether he had ever been
affiliated with the Communist Party or other subversive organizations. In his
closing remarks to the character and fitness committee, he spoke about why
lawyers, and society, should care about the kinds of questions posed to bar
applicants:
To the extent I have not submitted, to that extent have I contrib-
uted to the solution of one of the most pressing problems that you, as
men devoted to character and fitness, must face. This is the problem
of selecting the standards and methods the bar must employ if it is to
help preserve and nourish that idealism, that vital interest in the
problem of justice, that so often lies at the heart of the intelligent
and sensitive law student's choice of career.
Questions about political affiliation have become a thing of the past, but in
the past few decades bar admission authorities have made inquiries into
treatment for mental disorders and substance abuse a routine component
of the character screening faced by bar applicants. These questions have gen-
erated intense controversy since the enactment of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act (ADA) of 1990.2 Although very few applicants are denied
1. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 104 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting George
Anastaplo). The United States Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote, upheld the decision to deny
Anastaplo admission. See id. at 96-97. George Anastaplo went on to a distinguished career as a
professor of law and political science. For his later reflections on the experience, see George
Anastaplo, Lawyers, First Principles, and Contemporary Challenges: Explorations, 19 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 353, 355-62 (1999), and George Anastaplo, What Is Still Wrong with George Anastaplo? A
Sequel to 366 U.S. 82 (1961), 35 DEPAUL L. REV. 551, 552-56 (1986).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1994). For a partial bibliography of the literature
generated by this controversy, see Pam Hollenhorst, Admission to the Bar: An Annotated Bibliography
of Law Review Articles, 1989-1997, B. EXAMINER, Nov. 1997, at 35, 36-40. See also John Gibeaut,
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admission on mental health grounds,3 opponents of mental health questions
by bar admission authorities have pointed to real and serious harms that are
inflicted by these inquiries: the humiliation felt by applicants who are forced
to disclose intensely private matters, delays in admission that often result
when investigations or hearings are triggered by an affirmative answer, and
the likelihood that the inquiries deter some law students from obtaining
counseling for mental, emotional, or substance abuse problems.
Beyond these concerns, the issue has a symbolic dimension that I think
accounts for much of the passion and energy with which it has been pursued
by advocates of disability rights. The Americans with Disabilities Act was
enacted "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."4 Like
other civil rights statutes, the ADA gives lawyers and courts a leading role
in making this promise a reality. If discriminatory attitudes infect the process
established by bench and bar to determine who may serve as a lawyer, there
is reason to doubt the legal system's fitness to carry out the ADA's mandate,
and the character of its commitment to the nondiscrimination ideal.
A first wave of litigation and advocacy has been largely successful in
eliminating the broadest mental health inquiries from bar application forms.Questions requiring the applicant to disclose whether he or she had ever
been treated or counseled for any mental health condition were common
when the ADA went into effect,5 but have been discarded by most bar
examining committees since the mid-1990s.6 These questions were relatively
easy targets. They affected large numbers of applicants, most of whom had
received counseling for stress, depression, or personal traumas. Every court
that has considered a challenge to this type of question since the passage of
Perils of 'Prozac Probes,' A.B.A. J., Feb. 2000, at 20, 20, 22 (discussing continuing controversy over
bar disability questions).
3. The imposition of conditional admission, however, is becoming increasingly common.
See infra Part III.A.3.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(b)(1) (1994) ("Findings and purposes.").
5. A survey of questions appearing on state bar application forms conducted by the National
Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE) in January 1994 found that approximately 75 percent of the
forms included a broad question about outpatient mental health treatment. Nearly all jurisdictions
also asked about mental health hospitalizations and substance abuse treatment. Most forms placed
no time limitation on the questions. See Nat'l Conference of Bar Examiners, Analysis of Questions
Regarding Addiction and Mental Health (1994) (unpublished report, on file with author); see alsoDonald H. Stone, The Bar Admission Process, Gatekeeper or Big Brother: An Empirical Study, 15 N. ILL.
U. L. REV. 331, 332-39 (1995) (reporting similar findings from the author's 1994 survey of forms in
forty-eight jurisdictions).
6. See Stanley S. Herr, Questioning the Questionnaires: Bar Admissions and Candidates withDisabilities, 42 VILL. L. REV. 635, 652 (1997) (concluding, on the basis of the author's 1996 survey
of application forms, that "inquiries concerning outpatient treatment and inpatient hospitalization
are becoming narrower and less widespread").
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the ADA has condemned it as unnecessarily broad, of little if any value in
assessing fitness to practice law, and undesirable because of its potential to
deter treatment.' The American Bar Association, in a 1994 resolution
supported by the National Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE), recom-
mended that inquiries concerning mental health should be narrowly tailored
and sensitive to applicants' privacy concerns.' In the wake of that resolution,
the NCBE dropped questions about all past mental health counseling
or hospitalizations from its own character screening form, which is used as a
model by many state jurisdictions
Bar examiners, however, have been reluctant to abandon mental health
inquiries entirely. The NCBE replaced its old broad questions with a "nar-
rowly tailored" inquiry that has been adopted, with some variations, by an
increasing number of states: "Within the past five years, have you been
7. The case law will be discussed in Part II.
8. The resolution was the product of a compromise between disability rights advocates and
bar examiners, drafted by representatives of the ABA's Commission on Mental and Physical Dis-
ability Law, the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, the National
Conference Bar Examiners, and the Association of American Law Schools (AALS). In its entirety,
the resolution reads:
BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association recommends that when making
character and fitness determinations for the purpose of bar admission, state and territorial
bar examiners, in carrying out their responsibilities to the public to admit only qualified
applicants worthy of the public trust, should consider the privacy concerns of bar admis-
sion applicants, tailor questions concerning mental health and treatment narrowly in order
to elicit information about current fitness to practice law, and take steps to ensure that
their processes do not discourage those who would benefit from seeking professional
assistance with personal problems and issues of mental health from doing so.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That fitness determinations may include specific, targeted
questions about an applicant's behavior, conduct or any current impairment of the appli-
cant's ability to practice law.
American Bar Association Bar Admissions Resolution: Narrow Limits Recommended for Questions
Related to the Mental Health and Treatment of Bar Applicants, 18 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY
L. REP. 597, 598 (1994) [hereinafter ABA Resolution] (reprinting resolution and accompanying
report). The report accompanying the resolution, like the resolution itself, is quite vague about
what, if any, questions targeting mental health conditions would be appropriate. See Mary Elizabeth
Cisneros, Note, A Proposal to Eliminate Broad Mental Health Inquiries on Bar Examination
Applications: Assessing an Applicant's Fitness to Practice Law by Alternative Means, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 401, 408-10 (1995) (critiquing ABA Resolution). The report, however, does contain some
specific guidance on what sorts of questions should not be asked: "In particular, the drafters
considered that questions of the type that ask whether an applicant has ever been treated or coun-
seled for any mental illness, or whether the applicant has ever been institutionalized for treatment
of such an illness, intrude too far .... ABA Resolution, supra, at 598.
9. The NCBE provides a character and fitness screening service that is used by some states.
Most jurisdictions prepare their own application forms, but many look to the NCBE questionnaire
as a model. In 1995, the NCBE eliminated "have you ever" questions about mental health
treatment and hospitalizations that had appeared on its character questionnaire. See Herr, supra note
6, at 645-46.
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diagnosed with or have you been treated for bi-polar disorder, schizophre-
nia, paranoia, or any other psychotic disorder?'" Most states continue to ask
about treatment for alcoholism and substance abuse, either in a time-limited
or a "have you ever" form. Questions about hospitalizations or commitments
for mental illness also continue to appear on some states' application forms.
Disability rights advocates have argued that disability-based questions
on bar application forms, even when narrowed to focus only on serious men-
tal illnesses and substance abuse, are impermissible under the ADA.
In this view, any question that focuses on the existence of a disability
impermissibly burdens and stigmatizes individuals based on their disability
status, and cannot survive the strict scrutiny mandated by the ADA.
Disability-based inquiries are not necessary, the argument runs, because
examiners can make an adequate assessment of fitness by scrutinizing the
applicant's past record of performance and behavior.
While a few courts have endorsed this strict scrutiny approach, the
trend in the decisions has been toward a more relaxed standard. A number
of courts have been willing to uphold questions that focus on serious
conditions, appear to have some utility in uncovering potential fitness
problems, and do not sweep too broadly. Bar examiners look to these deci-
sions as justification for continuing to screen applicants on the basis of
disability.
This Article explores the implications of allowing disability inquiries in
the lawyer licensing process. Part I tells the story of mental health screening
in one jurisdiction, Connecticut, and the stories of three bar applicants who
have been affected by it. These narratives shed light on the nature and struc-
ture of the institutions that screen prospective lawyers, and the treatment
that applicants with disabilities encounter and experience as discrimina-
tory." I focus on Connecticut because a wealth of material is available,
10. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, REQUEST FOR PREPARATION OF A CHAR-
ACTER REPORT 12 (1997) [hereinafter NCBE CHARACTER REPORT]. The NCBE also added
a question about the existence of any condition that "currently affects, or if untreated could affect,
your ability to practice law in a competent and professional manner." Id. at 12. In place of theformer broad question about substance abuse treatment, the NCBE substituted a question asking
whether, in the past five years, the applicant has ever raised consumption of drugs or alcohol, or any
mental disorder, "as a defense, mitigation or explanation for your actions" in any judicial, admin-
istrative or disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 12-13.
11. A growing body of scholarship has emphasized the importance of narratives to an under-
standing of discrimination and the adequacy of legal responses to it. See, e.g., CRITICAL RACETHEORY 41-92 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000) (reprinting essays by Thomas
Ross, Richard Delgado, and Patricia ). Williams); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79
CAL. L. REV. 971, 1012-51 (1991); David M. Engel & Frank W. Munger, Re-Interpreting the Effect
of Rights: Career Narratives and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 285 (2001) (using
narratives to explore the ADA's effects on the careers and consciousness of persons with disabilities).
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drawn from litigation, public hearings, and applicants who have been
willing to publicly tell their stories. Ideally, a study aimed at gaining an
understanding of how bar examiners behave towards applicants with dis-
abilities, and how those applicants perceive the process, would include
interviews of applicants, observations of hearings and review of the files in a
representative sample of cases in which the applicant disclosed a disability
on the application form.12 The secrecy of bar admissions proceedings makes
this impossible. Still, based on my experiences in speaking with dozens of
bar applicants who have been required to disclose disabilities, discussions
with those who have counseled bar applicants elsewhere, and the published
literature, I believe that the stories recounted here are reasonably represen-
tative.1 3 Certainly, they are illustrative of the potential for stigma and for
discriminatory treatment, and this in itself is relevant to determining how the
ADA should apply in this setting.
In Part IL, my focus shifts to legal doctrine, as I consider how the ADA
regulates disability inquiries by licensing boards. Title II of the ADA,4 which
applies to the activities of state and local government, does not expressly
restrict questions about disabilities. Challenges to the questions must face a
number of threshold issues relating to whether there is discrimination against
qualified individuals with disabilities-for that is what Title II prohibits-
when a licensing board seeks mental health information. Courts have been
unanimous so far in holding that the ADA applies, and that unnecessary
disability inquiries are unlawful. No federal appeals court has yet ruled on
these issues, and they are still open to dispute. My analysis agrees with the
case law up to this point: Title II should be interpreted to require licensing
agencies to justify the necessity of any disability-based questions they employ.
Because my research included interviews and the use of individually identifiable information of a
sensitive and potentially stigmatizing nature, I followed federal guidelines on the use of human
subjects in research, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2000), and obtained approval from the University of
Connecticut's Institutional Review Board. See generally Nina W. Tarr, Clierits' and Students' Sto-
ries: Avoiding Exploitation and Complying with the Law to Produce Scholarship with Integrity, 5 CLINICAL
L. REV. 271 (1998) (discussing the applicability of human subject research rules and informed
consent principles to the use of client stories in legal scholarship).
12. Cf. JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE 30-33 (1990) (describing a study of how litigants in small
claims court present their cases, and how judges respond to them, conducted through observation
of large number of trials and interviews with litigants).
13. I have played a role, as an advocate, in some of the events that I describe. As an objec-
tivity alert, I will note my involvement at appropriate junctures in the story.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,131-12,165 (1994). Title 1I remains enforceable, in both federal and
state courts, despite the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Board of Trustees of the University
of Alabama v. Garrett, 53 U.S. 356 (2001), holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars state
employees' ADA damage suits in the federal courts. See infra note 96.
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In applying the necessity test to licensing inquiries, the decisions
divide into two camps: a "strict scrutiny" approach that is fatal to nearly all
disability-based questions, and a more relaxed approach that is prepared to
uphold "narrow" mental health questions. I analyze the basic assumptions
(not always fully or clearly articulated in the decisions) that underlie each
approach. The relaxed scrutiny model focuses on whether the symptoms of
the targeted disorders may result in behaviors that pose risks to clients, and
assumes that any net gain in public protection-even if the questions
uncover only a few problem cases that otherwise would have escaped
notice-is enough to justify the questions. Although I argue that strict scru-
tiny is truer to the ADA's purposes, there is good reason to believe that the
relaxed scrutiny framework will continue to predominate in the courts.
In Part III of this Article, I question whether the new generation of
"narrow" mental health questions on bar application forms can be justified,
even under the premises of relaxed scrutiny. I look closely at the particular
conditions that examiners have singled out for inquiry-depression, bipolar
disorder, schizophrenia, substance abuse, and hospitalizations for mental
illness-and draw on the findings of medical and social science research.
My conclusion is that a number of widely used questions should not be
upheld, either because they sweep too broadly, or because they target
conditions that cannot be distinguished in a principled way from physical
disabilities (which examiners do not ask about), or because they present
particular dangers of deterring treatment that are likely to cancel out any
public protection gains. 5 Some disability-based questions may be allowable
under relaxed scrutiny, but not to the extent that many bar committees, and
some courts, have supposed.
In Part IV, I turn to An important dimension of the problem that courts,
examining committees, and commentators have generally ignored. If disabil-
ity inquiries are to be allowed in the bar admissions process, the structure
of the process needs to be changed to minimize the stigma imposed on
applicants and the risks of demeaning treatment. As the stories recounted in
Part I illustrate, the greatest harms inflicted by bar mental health questions
derive from the fact that the information goes to a committee of lawyers-
potential employers, colleagues and adversaries of the applicant-whose
task is to judge "moral character" at the same time they assess mental
fitness. Deep-seated societal prejudices about mental illness and substance
abuse inevitably intrude into a process in which bar examiners are charged
with making a highly subjective and value-laden determination. The nar-
15. Questions about depression and mental health hospitalizations also have a discrimina-
tory impact on women and certain minority groups. See infra text accompanying notes 230, 278.
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rowing of mental health inquiries to single out serious mental illnesses and
substance abuse-conditions particularly subject to fears, misconceptions,
and moral disapprobation-has intensified the stigma felt by applicants.
The employment provisions of the ADA contain a crucial insight that
must inform the interpretation of the ADA when it is applied in the com-
parable setting of occupational licensing. Title I of the ADA 6 acknowledges
that inquiries about disabilities are sometimes necessary to assess an appli-
cant's fitness, but also accounts for the dangers of stigma and bias when
disability information is allowed to enter a selection process. The statute
addresses this problem by requiring the separation of medical information
from other aspects of the selection process, evaluation of the information by
personnel with appropriate medical expertise, and strict limitations on who
else may have access to that information.
Bar examiners' questions about mental illness and substance abuse, even
if narrowly tailored, cannot be sustained under the ADA unless comparable
safeguards are in place. I examine the institutional nature of bar admissions
boards-their structure, history, functions, habits, and incentives-to show
that the process, as currently structured, is ill-suited to handle disability
information in a nondiscriminatory way. In the final section of Part IV, I
outline what a reformed bar admissions process would look like.
I. STORIES OF ONE STATE'S MENTAL HEALTH SCREENING
A. Background: The Shape of the Screening Process and the Origins
of Mental Health Questions
In Connecticut, as in most jurisdictions, a committee appointed by the
courts and made up of lawyers is responsible for determining the "morals and
fitness" of applicants to the bar, as well as for administering an examination
and ensuring that applicants have satisfied educational prerequisites. 7 The
process by which the Connecticut Bar Examining Committee (CBEC)
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111-12,117 (1994).
17. Connecticut court rules provide that the judges of the superior court will appoint a
twenty-four-member examining committee, with the membership made up of attorneys and at
least one judge. See CONN. R. SUPER. Cr. § 2-3. The committee has "the duty, power and authority
to provide for the examination of candidates for admission to the bar; to determine whether such
candidates are qualified as to prelaw education, legal education, morals and fitness; and to recom-
mend to the court for admission to the bar qualified candidates." Id. § 2-5.
On the universality of character requirements for bar admission and their administration by
committees predominantly made up of lawyers, see CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS § 15.3.2 (1986), and Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94
YALE L.J. 491, 493, 505 (1985).
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conducts its character screening is fairly typical." It starts with a detailed per-
sonal history questionnaire that applicants are required to submit when they
register for the bar examination, covering such matters as employment,
education, criminal history, and credit problems. Reference forms are also
gathered from the applicant's past employers, law school dean and personal
references.'9 After reviewing this material, the committee or its staff may
request additional records or information." If the committee finds that there
is "information weighing against a determination of good moral character,"
it must give the applicant notice and an opportunity to respond.2' If the
CBEC remains unsatisfied after reviewing any additional information
submitted by the applicant, it refers the file to a Standing Committee on
Recommendations for Admission to the Bar in the appropriate county.22 The
county committee may conduct an investigatory hearing, and sends its
findings back to the CBEC, which is free either to adopt them or to hold its
own, de novo, formal hearing on the application. 23 The hearing, conducted
before a panel of at least five committee members, ends with the issuance of
the CBEC's findings of fact and a recommendation for or against admission
that goes to the court.24 Judges will usually defer to the committee's recom-
18. The basic structure of Connecticut's screening-a questionnaire followed by more inten-
sive investigation and hearings when application review reveals problems-is typical of most
jurisdictions. See Rhode, supra note 17, at 506. The one element of Connecticut procedure that is
unusual, the involvement of a second committee in character screening, is discussed infra.
19. CONN. BAR EXAMINING COMM., APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE AS AN
ATTORNEY IN CONNECTICUT BY EXAMINATION (2001) [hereinafter CONN. 2001 APPLICATION].
20. See REGS. CONN. BAR EXAMINING COMM. art. 111-2 (2000) [hereinafter CBEC
REGS.]. The CBEC has issued regulations, pursuant to authority granted by state court rules. See
CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 2-4. Procedures and substantive standards for the committee's fitness
screening appear in Article VI of the regulations, entitled "Guidelines for Assessment of Character
and Fitness," which was enacted in 1990, and subsequently amended in minor respects. See CONN.
L.J., July 31, 1990, at 2C (notice of publication, including text of Article VI as originally enacted).
21. CBEC REGS., supra note 20, art. VI-5(b). In the early 1990s, the committee often
conducted this review through an "interview" of the applicant before one member or more of the
committee, with the applicant under oath and a court reporter transcribing the proceedings. Now, it
is often a "paper" review conducted by one member of the committee, who determines whether the
applicant should be approved or the case should proceed to a hearing. The interview procedure is
still used in some cases.
22. See id., art. VI-5(e)(i). Each Connecticut county has its own standing committee, made
up of three to seven attorneys appointed by the superior court judges. See CONN. R. SUPER. CT.
§ 2-12. Connecticut is unusual in having two separate entities involved in the character and fitness
determination.
23. See CBEC REGS., supra note 20, art. VI-5(e)(ii)-(iii). The CBEC is not required to give
any weight to the findings of the standing committee. See Scott v. State Bar Examining Comm.,
601 A.2d 1021, 1025-26 (Conn. 1992). It frequently disregards a standing committee's recom-
mendation of approval and holds its own formal hearing.
24. See CBEC REGS., supra note 20, art. VI-5(e)(iv).
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mendation." Throughout the process, the applicant bears the burden of
proving her character and fitness.2 6
The Connecticut bar application form did not include any mental
health questions until 1984.27 This was consistent with national trends.
Although character questionnaires have been a fixture of bar admissions
since the 1920s and 1930s, 28 it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that bar
examiners began to pay attention to mental health as a distinct subject of
inquiry.29 In Connecticut, some highly publicized incidents of lawyer mis-
conduct in the early 1980s, particularly a protracted scandal involving
thefts by a probate judge, combined with a sharp increase in the volume of
bar applications, gave rise to a general sense on the CBEC that more strin-
gent character screening was needed. As part of this general campaign, the
committee's staff gathered application forms from jurisdictions that were
viewed as conducting intensive background investigations, found questions
about mental health and substance abuse treatment on those forms, and
incorporated them into Connecticut's questionnaire. Mental illness had not
been an issue in the particular lawyer scandals that inspired the committee's
actions." The committee added the inquiries without discussing their
25. The court's review of a negative recommendation is limited to determining, based on the
record of the bar examining committee's proceedings, whether the committee acted arbitrarily or
unreasonably, or failed to conduct a fair and impartial investigation. See Scott, 601 A.2d at 1025.
26. See CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 2-8; CBEC REGS., supra note 20, art. VI-3.
27. See Conn. Bar Examining Comm., Summary of Substance Abuse/Mental Health Ques-
tions: 1984-1993 (June 30, 1993) (unpublished report, on file with author).
28. See Rhode, supra note 17, at 499.
29. See Michael J. Place & Susan L. Bloom, Mental Fitness Requirements for the Practice of Law,
23 BUFF. L. REV. 579, 582 (1974) (noting that as of 1974, most states' bar application forms did
not include any direct questions about the applicant's mental health); John G. Jackson, Character
Requirements for Admission to the Bar, 21 B. EXAMINER 115, 130-37 (1952) (compiling questions
drawn from various states' character and fitness questionnaires that included no inquiries about
mental health or substance abuse); Pennsylvania Questionnaires for Registration of Law Students, 1 B.
EXAMINER 74, 74-77 (1932) (reproducing Pennsylvania questionnaires, which were generally
viewed as the model for stringent character screening, and which posed no questions concerning
mental health, alcohol or drugs). By the mid-1960s, the National Conference of Bar Examiners
was asking about treatment for alcoholism and drug abuse and hospitalizations for mental illness.
See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, THE BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK 69-74 (1st ed.
1968) (reprinting NCBE's 1965 character form). Florida appears to have been the first state to delve
into outpatient mental health treatment; by 1971, it was asking, "Have you ever received regular
treatment for amnesia or any form of insanity or emotional disturbance or mental disorder?" John
Germany, Address at Panel at Recent Developments in the Character and Fitness Qualification
for the Practice of Law, in 40 B. EXAMINER 29, 33 (1971). However, as recently as 1982, most
jurisdictions restricted their mental health inquiries to substance abuse and adjudications of incom-
petency, and only 27 percent inquired about mental illness that did not result in commitment. See
Rhode, supra note 17, at 595-96. By the early 1990s, 75 percent of all jurisdictions asked about
outpatient mental health treatment. See supra note 5.
30. The factors that led to the CBEC's adoption of mental health and substance abuse
questions were explored during depositions taken as part of a later ADA lawsuit. See Deposition of
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utility or potential drawbacks, and without expert consultation. 3' A general-
ized concern with public protection and the profession's image led the
examiners to make sure that Connecticut's screening was as tough as anyone
else's.32
By the start of the 19 9 0s, Connecticut's bar application contained sev-
eral broad inquiries into mental health issues, closely modeled on the NCBE's
questions. Applicants were required to reveal whether they had ever
received treatment for any mental, emotional, or nervous disorder; whether
they had ever been hospitalized or committed to an institution (voluntarily
or involuntarily) for mental illness; whether they had ever been addicted to
alcohol or other drugs; and whether they had ever been treated for
substance abuse.3 An affirmative answer to any of these questions set the
machinery of character and fitness screening in motion. The CBECgenerally asked for all treatment records and a written report from a current
treater describing the diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment. Usually, the
applicant was required to appear for an "interview" before a panel of
committee members, conducted under oath and transcribed by a court
reporter, at which the applicant was required to answer questions about the
circumstances that led to treatment or counseling, the nature of the condi-
tion, whether and how it had affected the applicant's functioning, and so
on. Most applicants were approved at this stage, but some (usually in casesinvolving "serious" mental illnesses or substance abuse) were referred to a
county standing committee for a hearing, followed by a formal hearing
before the CBEC. Affirmative answers to the mental health questions
Raymond W. Beckwith at 52-60 (June 14, 1994), Szarlan v. Conn. Bar Examining Comm., No.3:94 CV-160 (D. Conn. 1994) [hereinafter Beckwith Deposition]; Deposition of R. David Stamm
at 10-15 (June 8, 1994), 56-57 (June 8, 1994), & 7-27 (June 9, 1994), Szarlan v. Conn. BarExamining Comm., No. 3:94 CV-160 (D. Conn. 1994) [hereinafter Stamm Deposition].Raymond Beckwith has served on the committee since 1970, and became its chairperson in 1990.David Stamm has served as the committee's administrative director since 1978.31. The committee did have a general sense at the time that substance abuse was a problem
among Connecticut attorneys, but had no such concerns about other mental health conditions.See Stamm Deposition, supra note 30, at 16-17 (June 9, 1994). Later, around 1991, the committeedid consult with a mental health professional about the wording of the mental health question,
and was advised that a broad inquiry was appropriate. See id. at 37-41 (June 9, 1994).32. I have not been able to find any documentation of what originally motivated other bar
admissions boards. The rise of mental health questions on bar application forms generally corre-
sponds with a period when the public, and the professions, were paying increased attention to mentalillness and addiction. Starting in the 1960s, improved treatments, deinstitutionalization, and the
rise of community care made people with mental illnesses more visible. This was also the era whenthe medical model of alcoholism and addiction began to gain general acceptance, and a treatment
system for addiction emerged.
33. See Conn. Bar Examining Comm., supra note 27; CONN. BAR APPLICATION FORMS (onfile with author). The reference forms sent to the applicant's employers, personal references, andlaw school dean included similar inquiries about the applicant's mental health history.
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rarely led to a denial of admission, although this occasionally occurred.
Delays were more common: During every administration of the bar exami-
nation, some applicants were admitted later than their peers as a result of the
committee's investigation of mental health issues.34
In the five-year period from 1989 through 1994, approximately 2.5
percent of Connecticut bar applicants-between thirty and fifty individuals
each year-disclosed mental health treatment on their bar application
forms.35 The percentage of applicants who actually had received mental
health treatment, and should have answered "yes" to the questions, was
undoubtedly much higher. In any given year, about 15 percent of the U.S.
adult population obtains mental health services.36 Twenty-six percent of
first-year law students surveyed at the University of Connecticut School
of Law in 1993 indicated that they had been diagnosed or received regular
treatment for a mental disorder at some point in their lives." It appears that
many bar applicants regarded the broad mental health inquiry as an
illegitimate intrusion, and resisted it by just saying "no."
38
34. See Stamm Deposition, supra note 30, at 68-139 (June 8, 199 4).
35. See Defendant's Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories at 14-15, Szarlan v.
Conn. Bar Examining Comm., No. 3:94 CV-160 (D. Conn. May 10, 1994). These figures do not
include responses to the substance abuse question. The percentage varied from year to year; the
highest response rate was in 1993, when about 4.4 percent answered affirmatively. See id.
36. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF
THE SURGEON GENERAL 408 (1999) [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT], available
at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/home.html; see also Faith Dickerson,
Psychological Counseling for Law Students: One Law School's Experience, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 82, 83-
84 (1987) (describing a four-year study of law students at University of Maryland that found that
15 percent of students utilized a campus counseling service; nearly all were diagnosed as having a
mental disorder).
37. See Affidavit of Allison Brickley, app. to Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification, Roe
v. Conn. Bar Examining Comm., No. 3:93 CV-1084 (D. Conn. Aug. 5, 1993). In June 1993,
eighty-seven first-year students responded to an anonymous survey asking the same questions that
appeared on the Connecticut bar application form at the time. Twenty-three of them (26 percent)
indicated that they had been diagnosed as having, or had received regular treatment for, a mental
disorder or emotional condition. When students were asked whether they had ever received
outpatient mental health treatment, the percentage responding affirmatively rose to 31 percent.
See id.; see also Barbara Hagenbaugh, Saying No to Mental Health Inquiries, HUM. RTS., Summer
1995, at 14, 30; Thomas Scheffey, Local Cases Bolster ADA-Based Challenges to Bar Examiners,
CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 6, 1993, at 8 (discussing survey results).
38. See also Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 437 (E.D. Va. 1995) (finding
Virginia's question about past mental health treatment ineffective because only about 1 percent of
applicants answered affirmatively, as compared with an expected response rate of 20 percent based
on national statistics). Fear of the consequences of disclosure, as well as a sense that mental
health treatment is none of the examiners' business, probably contributed to the low disclosure
rates.
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B. Challenges, Change, and Resistance
Bar applicants and disability rights advocates began to attack the inquir-
ies as discriminatory soon after the ADA went into effect. The first ADA
suit in the nation to challenge bar mental health inquiries was filed in
Connecticut in 1992 by an applicant who refused to answer the query about
outpatient mental health treatment. 9 The plaintiff withdrew his suit after
failing the Connecticut bar examination. In 1993, another applicant filed a
similar court challenge, but dropped it, and agreed to answer the question,
after a federal judge failed to schedule a preliminary injunction hearing
early enough to avoid delays in his bar admission.0 A third federal lawsuit
was filed in 1994 by a recent law graduate named Chrysler Szarlan.4" Her
motion for a preliminary injunction was supported by an affidavit from an
expert witness, Dr. Howard Zonana, director of the Law and Psychiatry
Division at the Yale medical school, which encapsulated the major themes
of the case against mental health inquiries: there is no evidence that such
questions have predictive value; the application form's numerous inquiries
about applicants' past behavior provide a better basis for predicting future
conduct; the questions impose a stigma and treat persons with mental dis-
orders differently than non-disabled applicants and those with physical dis-
abilities; and the questions undermine lawyer fitness by deterring
prospective lawyers from seeking treatment.42 The United States Department
39. See Verified Complaint, Doe v. Conn. Bar Examining Comm., No. 2:92 CV-634 (D.Conn. July 24, 1992); Thomas Scheffey, Applicant Claims Bar Query Violates ADA, CONN. L. TRIB.,
Aug. 10, 1992, at 1.
40. See Verified Complaint, Roe v. Conn. Bar Examining Comm., No. 3:93 CV-1084 (D.
Conn. May 26, 1993); Scheffey, supra note 37, at 16.
41. See Verified Complaint, Szarlan v. Conn. Bar Examining Comm., No. 3:94 CV-160(D. Conn. Feb. 1, 1994); Thomas Scheffey, Are the Bar Examiners' Mental-Health Questions Illegal?,
CONN. L. TRIB., June 6, 1994, at 26.
In Szarlan and the Roe lawsuit that proceeded it, the plaintiffs were represented by the CivilRights and Disability Law Clinics of the University of Connecticut School of Law. Tanina Rostain,
my colleague on the clinical faculty at the time, and I were the primary attorneys. Ordinarily,
clinic cases are litigated by law students, but we decided not to assign these cases to students
because we did not want to put our students, the vast majority of whom apply to the Connecticut
bar, in the awkward position of suing the examiners who would soon be deciding their admissions.42. See Affidavit of Howard V. Zonana, M.D., Szarlan v. Conn. Bar Examining Comm.,No. 3:94 CV-160 (D. Conn. Jan. 28, 1994). Dr. Howard Zonana was coauthor of a proposed
ABA resolution and report that urged the elimination of all mental health inquiries from bar
application forms. See ABA COMM'N ON MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY LAW, REPORT ONRESOLUTION CONCERNING INQUIRIES INTO MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT OF BAR APPLICANTS(1994) [hereinafter ABA COMM'N REP.] (on file with author). This proposal was later withdrawn
in favor of a compromise resolution, acceptable to the bar examiners, that was adopted by the
ABA House of Delegates in August 1994. See supra note 8.
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of Justice moved to join the case as amicus curiae on the plaintiffs' side.43
The court scheduled a hearing on the plaintiffs preliminary injunction
request for August 1994.
Until the eve of the Szarlan trial, the CBEC remained firmly commit-
ted to its broad mental health inquiry. In statements to the press and
memoranda to committee members, the CBEC's chair, Raymond Beckwith,
argued that the committee should await guidance from the courts, the
NCBE and the ABA before considering any changes." He suggested that
bar applicants did not generally find the questions objectionable, since only
a handful out of the many thousands who had filled out the application
form over the years had ever complained."
The committee's position changed abruptly in July 1994 after a status
conference was held before the federal judge who would preside over the
trial. During the conference, the judge asked the bar examiners' lawyer,
with a note of incredulity in his voice, "Do you mean to say that if I ever
saw a therapist, even if it was for something like marriage difficulties, I'd
have to disclose it on this form?, 46  The judge proposed that the CBEC
suspend its use of the mental health treatment question and hold public
hearings on the issue of what, if any, questions should appear on the applica-
tion form concerning applicants' mental health histories. The committee
soon accepted this proposal.47
43. See United States' Motion for Leave to Participate as Amicus Curiae, Szarlan v. Conn.
Bar Examining Comm., No. 3:94 CV-160 (D. Conn. July 7, 1994).
44. See Scheffey, supra note 37, at 8 (quoting Raymond Beckwith); Memorandum from
Raymond W. Beckwith, Chair, Conn. Bar Examining Comm., to all CBEC Members 2 (Sept.
23, 1993) [hereinafter Beckwith Memorandum] (on file with author); see also Scheffey, supra note
41, at 26 (noting that after the Szarlan suit was filed, CBEC voted down a motion to delete the
mental health treatment question by a margin of eleven-to-three).
45. See Beckwith Memorandum, supra note 44, at 1. Four years earlier, in a letter to the bar
examining committee expressing concern about the scope of the mental health questions, the
chief justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court had pointed out the obvious fallacy in reasoning
from a lack of complaints: "Applicants to the bar will, of course, not be in a position to contest
your regulations, or resist waiving their rights, lest they jeopardize their legal careers from the
start." Letter from Chief Justice Ellen A. Peters, Conn. Sup. Ct., to R. David Stamm, Admin. Dir.,
Conn. Bar Examining Comm. (Jan. 5, 1990) (on file with author).
46. The quote is approximate, based on my recollection of the conference, but I am confi-
dent it conveys the substance of the judge's question. It received the candid response that yes, the
question did often require such disclosure.
47. See Letter from Ralph Gregory Elliot, Tyler Cooper & Alcorn, to Judge Alan H. Nevas,
U.S. Dist. Ct. (July 22, 1994) (on file with author) (confirming terms of interim agreement). The
lawsuit was placed on hold pending the results of the public hearings. See id.
The bar examiner's decision to settle may have been influenced by the fact that the first three
judicial opinions on ADA challenges to licensing inquiries, issued in late 1993 and in the first few
months of 1994, had found broadly framed mental health questions inappropriate. See Med. Soc'y
of N.J. v. Jacobs, No. 93-3670, 1993 U.S. Dist. WL 413016 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1993); In re Applications
of Underwood & Piano, No. BAR-93-21, 1993 WL 649283 (Me. Dec. 7, 1993); In re Petition of
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Following two public hearings held in the fall of 1994 and the review
of written submissions from psychiatrists, mental health organizations, state
agencies, bar applicants, admitted attorneys, a law school dean, and the
U.S. Department of Justice,45 the CBEC voted to eliminate its question
about outpatient mental health treatment question and to replace it with
the following:
Since you became a law student, have you ever had an emotional dis-
turbance, mental illness or physical illness which has impaired or
would impair your ability to practice law or to function as a student
of law?
49
The committee kept its "have you ever" questions about hospitalization for
mental illness and treatment for substance abuse, which had not been
challenged in the Szarlan litigation."0 The CBEC's action led to the settle-
Frickey, 515 N.W.2d 741, 741 (Minn. 1994). Opposition to the questions had also been growing
on other fronts. In February 1994, the Connecticut Bar Association's Human Rights andResponsibilities Section and Committee on Disability Law issued a report calling for the
elimination of mental health inquiries from the bar application form. See REPORT ON PROPOSED
CBA RESOLUTION CONCERNING INQUIRIES INTO MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT OF BARAPPLICANTS (1994) (on file with author, who was also the principal author of this report). TheDean of the University of Connecticut School of Law, Hugh C. Macgill, attacked the mental
health questions as "atavistic and discriminatory, primitive and pointless." Scheffey, supra note41, at 26 (quoting Hugh Macgill). Behind the scenes, the chief justice of the Connecticut
Supreme Court and the judiciary's chief court administrator urged the CBEC's chair to consult
with a psychiatric expert-something that the committee had not done since the ADA went into
effect-about the utility of its mental health questions. When this meeting occurred, in the
spring of 1994, the psychiatrist suggested that the committee's questions were considerably
broader than necessary, and uncovered a great deal of "ancient and/or trivial" information not
relevant to determining current fitness. Beckwith Deposition, supra note 30, at 151 (June 14,
1994); see id. at 131-52.
48. See CONN. BAR EXAMINING COMM., TRANSCRIPTS OF HEARINGS ON MENTAL
HEALTH QUESTIONS AND HEARING EXHIBITS (Sept. 21 & 28, 1994) (on file with author). With
one exception (the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, which sent a letter urging the continued use
of broad mental health inquiries), all of the comments urged the committee to stop asking about
mental disorders and mental health treatment. See id.
49. Letter from Ralph Gregory Elliot, Tyler Cooper & Alcorn, to Judge Alan H. Nevas,
U.S. Dist. Ct. (Dec. 16, 1994) (on file with author) (confirming actions taken by committee afterpublic hearings). The new question was modeled on an inquiry that appeared in guidelines forphysician screening endorsed by the American Psychiatric Association. See id.; Testimony ofJames H. Scully, Jr., M.D., Deputy Med. Dir. and Dir. of the Office of Educ., Am. PsychiatricAss'n, in CONN. BAR EXAMINING COMM., supra note 48; see also Herr, supra note 6, at 684-85
n.211 (discussing settlement); Aldina Vazao, Examiners Suspend Mental Health Question, CONN. L.
TRIB., Aug. 15, 1994, at 9.
50. The CBEC retained its question about mental health hospitalizations despite the fact
that much of the testimony it received at the public hearings was directed against that question as
much as the outpatient treatment inquiry. The ABA's report, issued in August 1994 with the
support of the NCBE, had cited questions asking whether applicants had ever been hospitalized
for mental illness as an example of inappropriate and overbroad inquiries. See ABA Resolution, supra
note 8, at 598. Although the CBEC's chair had previously said that Connecticut should look to
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ment of the federal lawsuit with a consent decree that permanently enjoined
the examiners from asking applicants whether they had ever received
outpatient mental health treatment. The examiners were not, however,
required to stick with the new question quoted above.51 In 1996, they
replaced it with a question that the NCBE had recently started using:
"Within the past five years, have you been diagnosed with or have you been
treated for bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia, paranoia, or any other psychotic
disorder?" 2
In the meantime, another ADA lawsuit had led to a significant change
in Connecticut's admissions procedures. In 1993, an applicant, proceeding
under the pseudonym Anonymous, filed suit in federal district court to
challenge the CBEC's decision to deny him admission." On his 1990
Connecticut bar application, Anonymous disclosed that he was receiving
treatment for bipolar disorder. 4 Documentation submitted by Anonymous's
physicians stated that his condition was responsive to treatment, he was not
experiencing manic episodes that might impair his judgment, and he was fit
to practice law. A county standing committee interviewed the applicant and
unanimously recommended his admission. The CBEC conducted its own
formal hearing and, without obtaining any expert evaluation, found him
unfit. Anonymous's lawyers argued that the ADA required a modification
the NCBE and ABA for guidance, see supra text accompanying note 44, he would later, in the
course of defending the hospitalization question, dismiss the ABA Resolution as "without much
clout one way or the other." Alex Wood, Aspiring Lauryers Won't Be Asked About Depression, J.
INQUIRER (Manchester, Conn.), Oct. 21, 2000, at 26 (quoting Mr. Beckwith).
51. See Stipulation and Order of Dismissal, Szarlan v. Conn. Bar Examining Comm., No.
3:94 CV-160 (D. Conn. June 26, 1994). The consent decree barred the defendant from reviving
the inquiry challenged in the lawsuit ("Have you ever been treated as an outpatient for any men-
tal, emotional or nervous disorders?") or from asking any "substantially similar question on the
subject covered by that question." Id. at 1-2.
52. CONN. BAR EXAMINING COMM., APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE AS AN
ATTORNEY IN CONNECTICUT BY EXAMINATION 15 (1996); see also supra text accompanying
notes 8-10. Ironically, Connecticut's short-lived question about functional impairments since
starting law school was being praised as a national model just when the examiners were getting rid
of it. See Stuart C. Gauffreau, The Propriety of Broadly Worded Mental Health Inquiries on Bar
Application Forms, 24 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 199, 211 (1996).
53. See Complaint, Anonymous v. Conn. Bar Examining Comm., No. 3:93 CV-1227 (D.
Conn. June 21, 1993). My description of the facts is based on the allegations of the complaint, and
assumes their truth. See also John D. McKenna, Note, Is the Mental Health History of an Applicant a
Legitimate Concern of State Professional Licensing Boards? The Americans with Disabilities Act vs. State
Professional Licensing Boards, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 335, 335-36, 344-46 (1995) (describing facts
and arguments in Anonymous); Thomas Scheffey, Mentally Ill Lawyer Fights Barriers to Practice,
LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 9, 1993, at 4.
54. Bipolar disorder, also known as manic-depressive illness, will be discussed in Part III.B.2.
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of bar admissions policies to allow for the granting of a conditional license,
with continued monitoring after admission, in appropriate cases."
Spurred by the lawsuit, the bar examining committee soon proposed,
and the Connecticut judges adopted, a new court rule authorizing the
CBEC, "in light of the physical or mental disability of the candidate, [to]
recommend an applicant for admission ... conditional upon the applicant's
compliance with conditions prescribed by the committee relevant to the
disability and the fitness of the applicant." 6 Connecticut thus joined about a
dozen states that have established conditional licensing programs for
attorneys, and has used the conditional admissions procedure an average of
about two times a year.58
Mental health inquiries on the Connecticut bar application form have
recently become the subject of renewed controversy. On the application
form for the July 2000 examination, the CBEC broadened the scope of the
questions by adding "clinical depression" to the list of disorders that appli-
cants were required to disclose. 9 Depression is far more common than other
55. The Anonymous litigation has had a tortuous history, and is still going on as of this
writing. The original federal court action was dismissed on federal abstention grounds. See Ruling
on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Anonymous v. Conn. Bar Examining Comm., No. 3:93 CV-1227(D. Conn. Nov. 5, 1993). The ADA suit was then re-filed in state court. See Complaint,
Anonymous v. Conn. Bar Examining Comm., No. CV-94-0534160-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 8,1994). While the state litigation was pending, the bar examining committee conducted a new
fitness hearing. This time, the committee denied Anonymous admission for different reasons,
citing his failure to pay child support and a memo that he had sent to Connecticut's chief court
administrator, complaining of the bar examiners' discriminatory conduct, as evidence of his lack
of good moral character. In the state court lawsuit, Anonymous contends that these grounds werepretextual. See Thomas Scheffey, Applicant Charges Bar with Discrimination, CONN. L. TRIB., Aug.
14, 2000, at 8. A decision dismissing the suit on procedural grounds is currently on appeal. See
Memorandum of Decision Re: Motion to Dismiss and Scope of Review, Anonymous v. Conn. Bar
Examining Comm., No. CV-94-0534160-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 6, 2000).
56. CONN. L.J., July 19, 1994, at 6C-7C (publishing this rule amendment, effective Oct. 1,1994); see CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 2-9; see also CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 2-11 (stating proceduresfor removal or modification of conditions and monitoring of compliance by counsel to the state-
wide grievance committee). The conditional admission rule was enacted independent of any
resolution of the Anonymous case, but there can be little doubt that it was the lawsuit that triggered
action. The examiners had discussed the possibility of a conditional admission program before the
Anonymous suit was filed, at a February 1991 meeting (shortly after the ADA was enacted), but asthe minutes of the meeting state, "no action was proposed or taken." Stamm Deposition, supra
note 30, at 160-61 (June 9, 1994).
57. Conditional licensing programs, and their relevance to the permissibility of mental
health questions under the ADA, will be discussed in Part III.A.3.
58. See Interview with Daniel Horwich, Statewide Bar Counsel, in Hartford, Conn. (Apr.
27, 2000) (stating that since 1995, nine applicants had been conditionally admitted).
59. CONN. BAR EXAMINING COMM., APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE AS AN
ATTORNEY IN CONNECTICUT BY EXAMINATION 14 (2000) [hereinafter CONN. 2000APPLICATION]. The committee may have gotten the idea from other states' forms: Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, and Virginia had added depression to their lists. See infra note 210.
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conditions targeted by the application form,6" and the CBEC's action struck a
chord with the bar and the public. The president pro tempore of the
Connecticut State Senate, Kevin Sullivan, sent a strongly worded letter to
the examining committee requesting the immediate suspension of all
questions dealing with past diagnosis or treatment for mental conditions or
substance abuse." The Connecticut Bar Association took a public stand
against the questions," as did several mental health organizations.63  Two
recently admitted attorneys, Rose Gower and Kathleen Flaherty, who had
been required to disclose mental health hospitalizations and treatment on the
application form, filed ADA complaints against the bar examining
committee with the U.S. Department of Justice, and decided to publicly
discuss their experiences to increase awareness of the harm caused by the
questions." The issue generated a flurry of newspaper articles and editorials,• 65
most of it critical of the examiners' practices.
60. The nature of depression, and its prevalence, will be discussed in Part III.B.1.
61. See Letter from Sen. Kevin B. Sullivan, Conn. Senate, to Raymond W. Beckwith, Chair,
Conn. Bar Examining Comm. (May 31, 2000) [hereinafter Sullivan Letter] (on file with author).
"The inclusion of these intrusive and invidious questions," Senator Sullivan wrote, undermines
the "progress [that] is being made to protect privacy, remove the stigma of mental illness and raise
awareness that treatment works." Id. at 1. He added, "Those charged with setting standards and
setting an example for others should know better and do better." Id.
62. In a letter to the bar examining committee, the Connecticut Bar Association's president
argued that the questions deter applicants from obtaining needed treatment and run counter to
the trend of court decisions and the ABA's 1994 resolution calling for "narrow tailoring." Letter
from William F. Gallagher, Pres., Conn. Bar Ass'n, to Raymond W. Beckwith, Chair, Conn. Bar
Examining Comm. (June 12, 2000) (on file with author). The goals of the questions, he said,
could be better served by putting resources into attorney education, rehabilitation, and discipline.
See id.
63. Starting in 1998, the CBEC had received a number of requests from mental health
organizations and advocates (including myself) to eliminate or further narrow the remaining
mental health and substance abuse questions. See Letters to Raymond W. Beckwith, Chair,
Conn. Bar Examining Comm., from Sheila B. Amdur, Pres., Nat'l Alliance for the Mentally Ill-
Conn. (NAMI-CT) (July 5, 2000); Jon Bauer (May 13, 1998 & June 8, 2000); Lawrence
W. Berliner, General Counsel, Conn. Office of Prot. and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities
(June 12, 1998); Tracy J. Carroll, Executive Dir., NAMI-CT (Aug. 24, 1998); Janet VanTassel,
Executive Dir., Conn. Legal Rights Project, Inc. (Feb. 19, 1999) (on file with author).
64. Applicants who had previously challenged the committee's practices had either pro-
ceeded under a pseudonym or, like Chrysler Szarlan, used their real name but did not disclose the
nature of their mental health condition or treatment. Rose Gower and Kathleen Flaherty, after
careful consideration, decided to speak openly about their experiences and mental health condi-
tions, using their real identities, because they decided that this was the most effective way to fight
the stigma of mental illness and bring about change. See Advice of Counsel: Courage and the Bar
Committee, CONN. L. TRIB., Nov. 6, 2000, at 27 (praising Ms. Flaherty's courage in speaking pub-
licly, and expressing the hope that it would help to end unjust treatment of bar applicants with
mental disabilities).
65. See Advice of Counsel, supra note 64; Associated Press, Bar Candidates Grilled on Mental
Health, WATERBURY REPUBLICAN-AM., June 10, 2000, at 5A; Associated Press, Lawyer Sues over
Disability Question, NEW HAVEN REG., June 24, 2000, at A4; Editorial, Bar Applicants Not on Trial,
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The CBEC beat a tactical retreat. It dropped the reference to clinical
depression from the application form for the February 2001 examination,
but otherwise left the questions unchanged.66 In comments to the press, the
committee's chair, Raymond Beckwith, attributed the decision to concern
about the question's awkward phrasing, which had implied (incorrectly)
that depression is a "psychotic disorder." He said that the examiners would
study the matter further and might resume asking about depression in the
future. Otherwise, he strongly defended the committee's mental health
inquiries. He noted that few applicants had complained about the ques-
tions, and that in any event, character and fitness screening is inherently
intrusive, delving into "many areas of people's lives which I'm sure they
would not want inquired into."68 He argued that such inquiries are needed
because "[l]awyers and doctors can have serious consequences on their
patients and clients."69 The examiners also appeared to view the availabil-
ity of conditional admissions as proof that the inquiries were appropriate
and nondiscriminatory.
So the story stands at present. After eliminating, in response to litiga-
tion, the broadest possible question (requiring disclosure of any and all
mental health treatment or diagnosis of mental disorder), Connecticut
HARTFORD COURANT, June 15, 2000, at A20; Editorial, A Depressing Change in the Bar
Exam, CONN. L. TRIB., June 12, 2000, at 26; Editorial, Drop the Questions, REC. J. (Meriden,
Conn.), June 16, 2000; Editorial, Ensuring Attorneys' Fitness to Practice, ADVOCATE(Stamford, Conn.), June 26, 2000, at A12; Editorial, Prejudice Against Mental Illness, HARTFORD
COURANT, Sept. 14, 2000, at A12; Adam Gorlick, Bar Association's Questions Under Fire, REC. J.(Meriden, Conn.), June 10, 2000, at 2; Elizabeth Hamilton, Question of Fairness, HARTFORD
COURANT, Sept. 10, 2000, at Al; Judson Hand, Lawyers Must Pass Character Test, Too, STAR-
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Nov. 12, 2000, at 2; Norman Pattis, Nuts to Bar Exam Committee: Could
Anyone Pass This Test?, CONN. L. TRIB., Sept. 25, 2000, at 35; Thomas Scheffey, Bar Exam Adds
Controversial Query About Depression, CONN. L. TRIB., May 15, 2000, at 1 [hereinafter Scheffey,
Bar Exam]; Thomas Scheffey, Just a Crazy Thing to Ask?, CONN. L. TRIB., July 3, 2000, at 1;
Robert Whitman, Bar Questions Demean, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 19, 2000, at A9.
66. See Editorial, Kudos to Bar Exam Committee, CONN. L. TRIB., Oct. 16, 2000, at 28;
Elizabeth Hamilton, Bar Strikes Psychiatric Query, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 26, 2000, at A4;
Metro Briefing, Hartford: Depression Removed from Survey, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2000, at B4; Mental
Health Issue Defused, ASSOCIATED PRESS ST. & LOC. WIRE, Oct. 23, 2000; Thomas Scheffey,
"Clinical Depression" Query Deleted from Bar Exam Form, CONN. L. TRIB., Oct. 16, 2000, at 1;
Wood, supra note 50, at 25.
67. See Hamilton, supra note 66 (citing Mr. Beckwith); Scheffey, supra note 66. The unfor-
tunately worded question had referred to "clinical depression or any other psychotic disor-
der/condition." CONN. 2000 APPLICATION, supra note 59, at 14.
68. Hamilton, supra note 65 (quoting Mr. Beckwith); see Scheffey, Bar Exam, supra note 65.
69. Hamilton, supra note 65 (quoting Mr. Beckwith).
70. See id.; Wood, supra note 50. In defending the CBEC's mental health questions, Mr.
Beckwith noted that the availability of conditional admission meant that the committee did not
have to "choose between the quick and the dead" by either denying admission, on the one hand,
or ignoring a mental health problem, on the other. Id. at 26.
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remains firmly committed to its (fairly broad) version of narrower mental
health inquiries. It continues to ask applicants whether they have ever been
hospitalized for mental illness, have ever been treated or counseled for sub-
stance abuse, or within the past five years have been diagnosed or treated
for specified mental disorders.7" I now turn to the individual stories of three
Connecticut bar applicants who have been affected by these inquiries.
C. Three Applicants' Stories
1. James Roe
James Roe (a pseudonym)72 was admitted to the Connecticut bar in
1993. His disclosure of a past hospitalization on his bar application form did
not result in a denial or any delay in his admission. Yet he perceived the
requirement of disclosure itself, and the screening that followed, as humili-
ating and discriminatory. He described his experience in written testimony
that he submitted at the 1994 public hearings held by the bar examining
committee. I will let him speak for himself by quoting at length from his
testimony:
I am currently a member of the Connecticut Bar and I am
writing to you under the pseudonym, James Roe, so as to protect my
identity.... In May, 1993, I graduated from [law school and then
served] as a law clerk in a[n] ... Appellate court. I am currently
employed as an associate in a prestigious law firm ....
[When I submitted my Connecticut bar application] I was
required to inform the Committee whether I had ever been diag-
nosed as having, received regular treatment for, or been hospitalized
for "mental illness or emotional disorder." I had been voluntarily
hospitalized for mental illness for approximately one month in 1985
and had received some form of mental health treatment for approxi-
mately nine years. Thus, I answered the committee's inquiries in the
affirmative. Additionally, as required by the application, I provided
a report from my treating psychiatrist setting forth my diagnosis and
a report from a psychologist who I had seen for many years for
psychotherapeutic treatment. Both of these reports made clear that I
71. See CONN. 2001 APPLICATION, supra note 19, at 14. Approximately 3 percent of
Connecticut bar applicants, or about forty people a year, answer one of these questions
affirmatively. See Gorlick, supra note 65 (including an estimate provided by CBEC chair Beckwith).
72. James Roe, together with two other bar applicants, filed a motion to intervene in the
Szarlan litigation, but the case was resolved before the intervention motion had been ruled on. See
Motion to Intervene and Be Joined as Plaintiffs, Szarlan v. Conn. Bar Examining Comm., No.
3:94 CV-160 (D. Conn. May 4, 1994). Tanina Rostain and I were his attorneys. He is not the
"Richard Roe" who filed a separate lawsuit against the bar examiners in 1994. See supra note 40.
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suffered no current impairment that would affect my ability to func-
tion as a lawyer....
In the fall of 1993, I received a certified letter that summoned
me before a panel of the Committee to be interviewed .... The let-
ter specifically stated that the interview would concern my mental
health history. I was given exactly one week to prepare for this
interview and was told that I could be represented by counsel if I
desired. I was shocked, and extremely worried by this letter.
I could not understand why, after having provided the Commit-
tee with so much information about my current fitness to function as
a lawyer, I was required to appear in front of a panel to further
explain my mental health history. I was severely embarrassed and
humiliated that I would have to retell this deeply personal aspect of
my history to a group of strangers.
Of course, I procured counsel and became extremely anxious
about the upcoming interview.... In addition, I became extremely
angry that after having spent so much time receiving help for and
overcoming my mental and emotional problems that a group of
strangers had the audacity to question my fitness and moral charac-
ter. I could not understand how there could be any logical link
between one's moral character and a mental health problem. ...
I arrived at the [interview location] a half-hour before my
scheduled interview. I was shocked to see a group of other applicants
who were also waiting to be interviewed. I felt embarrassed that the
receptionist had a list of the interviewees in plain view at her desk
and that I knew some of the other people who were waiting to be
interviewed. I was further embarrassed because at least one of the
interview rooms was a glass office in which from the waiting area,
one could see the applicant being interviewed. I expected that these
interviews would be conducted in an extremely discreet and confi-
dential manner. I was shocked to see that this would not be the case.
After waiting for over an hour and one-half, I was escorted with
my counsel into the glass office to be interviewed by two members of
the committee and [its administrative director]. I was asked to relate
my entire mental history. I was asked to detail the diagnoses that had
been made about me and describe any medications that I had taken.
I was subject to detailed questioning about this very intensely
personal aspect of my life. Furthermore, I could tell from the ques-
tions that were being asked and from the questions that followed
from these responses that the two lawyers who were interviewing me
had no training, experience or knowledge about mental illness or
emotional disorders. I expected that at least one of the members of the
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panel who interviewed me would be a psychologist or a psychiatrist,
but that did not occur.
The interview lasted over one-half hour. It seemed to me that it
had lasted a lifetime. I was extremely anxious and embarrassed. I felt
that I had been psychologically raped by strangers who did not have
the slightest idea what mental or emotional illness involved, or what
it was like to hospitalize myself almost nine years before this date
so that I could receive treatment for my disease. At the end of the
interview, the panel simply thanked me for my attendance and coop-
eration, informed me that this was simply an informal interview and
stated that they hoped to get back in touch with me in a week.
I left the interview with my counsel who informed me that I had
nothing to worry about. However, I felt horribly humiliated and anx-
ious because I knew that my professional fate had been placed in the
hands of other attorneys who had no special training, experience or
knowledge of mental health. I was also embarrassed because as I left
the glass interview office and walked through the reception area to
the front door of the ... office, I could see and feel the eyes of other
applicants and other persons upon me. I began to wonder how many
of these people had or were going to go through this horrible
experience.
I was lucky in that, by the next day, the Committee had sent a
letter to my counsel that the "Character and Fitness Panel of the
Connecticut Bar Examining Committee voted unanimously to find
Uames Roe] of good moral character and fitness to practice law in
Connecticut." However, I still suffered intense embarrassment, dis-
tress and anguish at being required to reveal the highly personal and
private details of my mental health history to strangers as a precondi-
tion to being admitted to the bar....
I hope that this recounting of my experience with the Committee
will convince you of the absurdity of this inquiry into a Connecticut
bar applicant's mental health history. I do not understand why those
of us who have received mental health treatment are singled out for
this type of inquiry. I doubt that people who are diabetic, have heart
conditions, cancer or AIDS, epilepsy and other illnesses or problems
are treated in a similar manner.
3
One aspect of James Roe's experience was unique to the fall of 1993:
The CBEC conducted interviews of applicants with all sorts of character and
fitness problems (for example, mental health, credit problems, criminal
73. James Roe, Testimony Submitted to Conn. Bar Examining Comm. (Sept. 30, 1994)
[hereinafter Roe Testimony] (on file with author). Footnotes appearing in the original document
have been omitted. Mr. Roe has authorized the use of his testimony in this Article.
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convictions) in a single location, at half-hour intervals, in a setting where the
applicants could all see each other. This "cattle call" approach generated
intense negative publicity,74 and after this, interviews were scheduled in a
more discreet manner." In all other respects, Roe voiced themes that one
hears in the accounts given by many applicants affected by bar mental
health questions, then and now: distress at being forced to disclose highly
personal, stigmatizing information; a perception that the inquiry associates
mental illness with a defect in moral character; concern that others in the
legal community will have access to the information; dismay that evalua-
tions are conducted by attorneys who lack mental health expertise.
2. Rose Gower76
At the age of seventeen, during the summer after her graduation from
high school, Rose Gower spent two weeks in the hospital for treatment of
major depressive disorder. Over the next seven years, she went to college at
Wesleyan University, worked in several jobs, and graduated from the
University of Maine School of Law in 1998. There were no blemishes on her
record of educational achievement or employment. After law school, she
was admitted to the Maine bar (the application form there did not ask
about mental health treatment or hospitalizations)77 and then moved to
Connecticut after being offered a job as a Connecticut Superior Court law
clerk. In February 1999, she took the Connecticut bar exam. On the bar
application, she was required to respond affirmatively to the question that
asked, "Have you ever been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to an
74. See Joseph Calve, The Peters Principle, CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 6, 1993, at 35; Joseph Calve,
Tongue-in-Cheek Awards '93, CONN. L. TRIB., Jan. 3, 1994, at 22. Joseph Calve described the scene
as follows:
[Tihe poor round-upees had to mill about together as they awaited the hot lights and ora-
torical rubber hoses of the examiners. Many of them knew one another, this being a small
state.... Oh, to be a fly in some of those psyches as they awaited the call. "That guy looks
like a mother-murderer." "That one's a drunk." "That one there's definitely a head case."
Id.; see also Scheffey, supra note 37, at 8.
75. See Stamm Deposition, supra note 30, at 117 (June 8, 1994).
76. The following account is based, with Ms. Gower's consent, on documents contained in
her bar admission file and information that she provided in interviews. Citations to particular docu-
ments within the bar admissions file, which are not publicly available, are omitted throughout this
part. Other sources are noted.
77. In 1993, the Maine Supreme Court had ordered the elimination of questions that asked
about past diagnosis or treatment for any mental disorder. See supra note 47.
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institution for mental, emotional or nervous disorders?"78 As required, she
described her diagnosis and identified the hospital, and authorized the bar
examiners to obtain copies of her medical records.
In April 1999, Ms. Gower received a letter from the CBEC informing
her that she had passed the bar examination, but that the committee would
be conducting a further inquiry into her application. After hearing nothing
for another five months, she wrote to the committee's staff to ask what was
holding up her admission. In September, she received a letter informing
her that the committee had reviewed her application back in May and
determined that medical records should be requested. The hospital had not
yet provided the records. Finally, in November, the records arrived. After
reviewing them, the committee e-mailed a follow-up question: "Since your
treatment at the [hospital], have you been engaged in any out-patient
treatment programs?" Ms. Cower replied that she had received counseling,
on-and-off, as needed, but had received no further treatment of a medical
nature, nor had she taken any mood-altering medications since the time of
her hospitalization. The CBEC asked her to elaborate on the circumstances
of her treatment. Ms. Gower wrote back as follows:
Dear Committee Members:
I have received your request for further information concerning
my mental health. I will attempt to provide sufficient detail. While I
was a patient at [the hospital] following the death of my grandfather,
the death of a classmate, and the attempted suicide of [somebody
close to me], among other things, I was very briefly placed on an anti-
depressant, but I became physically ill and the doctors discontinued
administration of the drug. Other than that very brief time (literally
a matter of days) I have never taken any drugs related to my mental
health.
When I was at college, I sought therapy after I was raped. I also
sought therapy once or twice a semester thereafter. I am currently in
therapy because I am very strong now, and I want to confront issues
I was unable to deal with while I was younger. I believe in health
maintenance, both mental and physical, and I pay constant attention
to my well-being.
There is no more information I can provide to you. I am, quite
honestly, shocked that admission as a patient while I was a minor has
provoked such intense scrutiny. I have provided all information that
is necessary to a decision on my fitness to practice in this state. If the
78. CONN. BAR EXAMINING COMM., APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE AS AN
ATTORNEY IN CONNECTICUT BY EXAMINATION 14 (1999).
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state of Connecticut wishes to deny admission to one of its own law
clerks because I, unlike many, have made efforts to maintain my men-
tal health and have recognized when I required help, so be it.
Consider my application complete, and please issue your decision
as soon as possible.
Yours,
Rose M. Gower
The committee did not find this information sufficient. It asked for the
names and addresses of Ms. Gower's current therapist and the therapists she
saw while in college. Apparently not satisfied by Ms. Gower's assurance that
she had not taken any drugs related to her mental health, the committee
asked her to list all medications that she had been on since the time of her
hospital stay. Rather than risk a denial of admission, Ms. Gower complied.
On April 3, 2000, she provided the committee with the therapists' names
and addresses and wrote, "The only medications I have taken since [my
hospitalization] are antibiotics, antihistamines, contraceptive pills, and,
rarely, over-the-counter medications such as ibuprofen, Tylenol, Pamprin, and
cold medications." On May 25th, the CBEC sent a letter to Ms. Gower's
most recent therapist, requesting a "report, narrating the following in detail:
diagnosis, motivation for seeking treatment, treatment modality, duration
of treatment, frequency of visits and prognosis at the time of discharge," and
all records, including progress notes. The therapist sent back a brief report
confirming that Ms. Gower had recently completed a five-month course of
once-a-week psychotherapy to deal with mild symptoms of depression. 9
In the meantime, Ms. Gower had retained counsel, who wrote to the
CBEC.0 The letter pointed out that Ms. Gower's admission had now been
delayed for more than a year. During this time, Ms. Gower had been pro-
moted to a supervisory position in the legal research office for Connecticutjudges, as a result of her excellent performance as a law clerk. She had been
offered, and would soon begin, a clerkship with a justice of the Maine
Supreme Court. On June 12, 2000, the CBEC finally recommended her for
admission to the Connecticut bar.
79. The report described some personal events that led Ms. Gower to seek treatment, noted
that no medication was prescribed and that Ms. Gower's work performance was never impaired, and
stated that treatment ended by mutual agreement after symptoms of depression had been
dramatically reduced. The therapist ignored the committee's request for copies of treatment records.
80. I appeared as counsel for Ms. Gower at that time, and I continue to represent her in the
complaint pending with the U.S. Department of Justice.
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Ms. Gower filed an ADA complaint with the U.S. Department of
Justice"' and decided to speak publicly about her experiences. She was upset
not only by the delay in her admission, but by the intrusiveness of the
repeated demands for records and information, and by the tenor of distrust
in the committee's dealings with her. "The whole experience was very
insulting and invasive," she told the Hartford Courant.s" "I was hoping they
would understand and see how long ago this was and that it isn't relative to
my ability to practice law .... I'm proud that I got the treatment I did. I'm
not ashamed of it. This is not something I want held against me.""
3. Kathleen Flaherty
84
Kathleen Flaherty experienced the onset of bipolar disorder in October
1990, while she was a first year student at Harvard Law School. Bipolar dis-
order is characterized by episodes of mania and depression, often separated by
long periods of remission. At law school, Ms. Flaherty showed some of the
classic symptoms of a manic episode: racing thoughts and speech, grandiose
fantasies. A psychiatrist recommended hospitalization, but Ms. Flaherty, not
recognizing that she was ill, refused. After she made a statement to the
effect that she would throw herself off the roof of a building if people didn't
get off her back, she was involuntarily committed."s She was hospitalized for
two months, and placed on medication. After leaving the hospital, she
continued to receive medication and outpatient psychotherapy. She resumed
her studies at Harvard in 1991.
For Ms. Flaherty, as for many others with this illness, treatment was very
effective. She did not experience any further manic episodes. The medica-
tion did not prevent her from having occasional episodes of depression, but
when these occurred she recognized the symptoms and voluntarily hospital-
ized herself for brief periods in 1992 and 1994. Her condition did not affect
her performance in law school or in her summer jobs. In 1995, after gradu-
ating from law school, Ms. Flaherty decided to move to Ireland, and wanted
to try living without medication. Her doctor advised against it, but worked
81. See Complaint of Discrimination, Gower v. Conn. Bar Examining Comm. (U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Civ. Rts. Div., Disability Rts. Sec. June 22, 2000).
82. Hamilton, supra note 65 (quoting Rose Gower).
83. Id.
84. The following account is based, with Ms. Flaherty's consent, on documents contained
in her bar admission file, transcripts of her hearings and conditional admission, and information
that she provided to me in an interview. Citations to particular documents within the bar admis-
sions file, which are not publicly available, are omitted throughout this part. Other sources are
noted.
85. The commitment was made on the basis of a threat to self; there were no statements or
behaviors indicating a threat to others.
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with her to taper off her dosage. s6 Ms. Flaherty soon had another episode of
depression; she returned to the United States and once again briefly
hospitalized herself. She learned from this experience that she would need to
maintain her treatment indefinitely.
Ms. Flaherty took a job in Connecticut as an advocate with a state
agency serving people with disabilities, and soon moved on to a position
with Legal Services. Although she had already been admitted to the bars of
New York and Massachusetts, she hesitated to apply in Connecticut, and
passed up one administration of the bar exam, because she was concerned
about the mental health questions on the Connecticut form. When she
applied, she had to disclose her hospitalizations and treatment for bipolar
disorder.s7 In the fall of 1996, she received a letter from the CBEC inform-
ing her that she had passed the examination but was not being recommended
for admission at this time. She was referred to a county standing committee
for a hearing on her character and fitness.
The first hearing, held in March 1997 before a panel of four lawyers, got
off to a bad start. As the hearing was about to begin, Ms. Flaherty overheard
one panel member mutter to herself, while reading through the file, "Are
you violent?" After a few preliminary background questions, the questioning
took on an inquisitorial tone, and the witness flashed resentment in response:
PANEL CHAIR: Do you know why you are before our Committee?
MS. FLAHERTY: I am before this Committee because I had to answer
questions disclosing my mental health history.
PANEL CHAIR: Can you tell us something about that?
MS. FLAHERTY: That I have a diagnosis of manic depression, and
I have been treated both voluntarily and involuntarily in the hospi-
tal. And this Committee makes a decision, unlike the Bar in
Massachusetts and New York.
86. The doctor advised her that some people can go off medication and do well, but that the
odds were against it.
87. Ms. Flaherty was required to answer yes to three questions, all of which are still on the
Connecticut application form: one asking whether the applicant has ever been hospitalized for
mental illness; another asking about diagnosis with, or treatment for, bipolar disorder or other
specified conditions during the past five years; and a third that asks whether the applicant cur-
rently has any condition or impairment "which in any way currently affects, or if untreated could
affect, your ability to practice law in a competent and professional manner?" CONN. 2001
APPLICATION, supra note 19. Ms. Flaherty felt obliged to respond affirmatively to the last ques-
tion because if she stopped receiving treatment (which she had no intention of doing), she might
experience manic episodes that could affect her judgment and her competence to practice.
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PANEL CHAIR: You're admitted-
MS. FLAHERTY: I am admitted in Massachusetts, and I am admitted
in New York.
PANEL CHAIR: That's right.
PANEL MEMBER: Is it your position that you had notified the Bar,
that is New York and Massachusetts, as to your condition?
MS. FLAHERTY: They were both notified. I had to answer questions
as to whether I have ever been a party in a legal action. Because I
was committed, I had to answer yes to that question. But neither of
those Bars do any type of interrogation to the extent Connecticut
does.
PANEL MEMBER: For better or for worse?
MS. FLAHERTY: But you guys really catch the people who have got-
ten help, as opposed to missing all the people who haven't gotten
help. So it's for better or for worse.
PANEL CHAIR: What are your problems?
MS. FLAHERTY: There has never been a question of anything. I got
treated. I am under a doctor's care. I haven't had any problem. I have
been in the hospital a number of times, but it has never been-I am
taking a medication-
PANEL MEMBER: Is [the medication] mind altering?
Ms. Flaherty went on to describe the mood-stabilizing effect of her medica-
tion, and recounted the history of her hospitalizations and treatment. The
tone now improved somewhat. One of the panelists expressed sympathy at
the difficulty of having to come and talk about these matters, and stressed
that the committee's concern was "strictly limited" to determining whether
her medical condition "may affect in a material way your ability to practice
law." He spoke at length about the stressful nature of law practice, and then
asked Ms. Flaherty to "give me some comfort level by discussing and explain-
ing to me in your own words why I need not concern myself with that?" She
responded by explaining that ever since the time of her first hospitalization,
she had been dealing successfully with stress in school and at work, and had
sought help whenever she needed it. The same panelist them pressed her
further:
I'm not satisfied that you completely answered my question. You have
given me a couple of examples, but can you embellish ... in terms of
future situations. You talked a little bit about the past, but I think you
would agree with me that in the future you will be facing various
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pressure situations that may be long-term in nature; such as, for exam-
ple, being on trial for a period of time.
Ms. Flaherty, at a loss as to what more she could say, asked for a break.
When the hearing resumed, she responded:
Honestly, I can't predict.... I would imagine that something at
some point could possibly interfere with my ability to practice law
effectively. But I also admit that possibly I could be hit by a bus tomor-
row. I don't know. I take my medication, and I am under a doctor's
care. There has been nothing in the last couple of years since I have
been back on medication steadily that has ever interfered with my
ability to do any job that I have ever had.
Several panelists then suggested that an assessment from her most recent
treatment providers, and letters from her employers, might be helpful, and
proposed that the hearing be adjourned, until Ms. Flaherty provided that
information. It was also suggested that she come back with counsel when the
hearing resumed.
Ms. Flaherty submitted letters from her doctors confirming her treatment,
current fitness, and good prognosis, as well as glowing recommendations
from her employers. When the hearing resumed, about a month later, she
came represented by her uncle, a prominent Connecticut attorney well-
known to the committee members. Things went much better. The panel's
chairperson started by expressing satisfaction with the doctors' reports, and
offered an apologia for the committee's role:
Our problem is we have to look at her present condition and deter-
mine whether in our opinion she is capable to practice law in the
State of Connecticut because we owe a duty to the public. So that's
what we were looking for and didn't mean to embarrass her in any
way at our last meeting. We are sorry that other states would let her
in without this inquiry.
Another panelist sought, and received, Ms. Flaherty's assurance that if
admitted, she would not discontinue her medication against medical advice.
Her counsel pointed out that "she has a far greater motivation to take her
medicine than simply her admission to the bar, which is for her own good
health and her own good functioning." The hearing concluded, and the
county committee soon transmitted to the CBEC its recommendation,
without reservation, that Kathleen Flaherty be admitted to the Connecticut
bar.
The CBEC exercised its prerogative to disregard the county committee's
recommendation and conduct its own, de novo, fitness hearing. A hearing
notice was sent to Ms. Flaherty informing her that the hearing would address
her bipolar disorder and "applicant's candor and credibility." (Although
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there had been no issue of Ms. Flaherty lying about anything, the CBEC's
hearing notices routinely include the latter ground, on the theory that evi-
dence of dishonesty on the application form might emerge during any
hearing.)" Ms. Flaherty appeared before a panel of five lawyer-members of
the CBEC on August 6, 1997. The panel's chairperson opened the hearing
with a reminder that the burden of proof is on the applicant, and invited
Ms. Flaherty and her counsel to make a presentation. Ms. Flaherty narrated
her history of illness and treatment, and stated that she had learned from
her 1995 experience that going off medication against medical advice was
"a very big mistake," one she would never repeat. Her counsel wrapped up
the presentation by pointing out,
In view of... the questions being asked of applicants for the bar, it's
interesting to note that there are many, many conditions that are
potentially as problematical ... that don't receive any scrutiny at all,
and we submit that the situation here is analogous to someone with
diabetes or a significant heart problem, where if you don't take
your... medication, you can get into serious trouble. It has poten-
tially serious consequences for the clients you would repre-
sent .... It's kind of an open secret that there are people walking
around with all kinds of conditions for which they've never sought
any treatment. They're not even asked about those subjects as they
come to apply to the bar.
He then invited questions from the panel.
The questioning that followed was polite, but extensive. Two panel
members confessed ignorance about the nature of bipolar disorder and asked
Ms. Flaherty to explain some of its basic features. This led to an exchange
in which the questioner unwittingly employed a derogatory stereotype:
MS. FLAHERTY: [Blipolar just means you are between two poles, you
can get manic or you can get depressed. I have a tendency to lean
toward the depression side. So anybody, you know, even just in a gen-
eral nature of getting depressed, it interferes with your ability
to sleep, eat, just go about your day. But at this point, you know, eve-
rybody has little highs and lows, and I'm like a normal person now,
you know, you have highs and lows.
PANEL MEMBER: The manic would be the more destructive end of it,
if that's fair?
88. A third ground was also specified in the hearing notice: that Ms. Flaherty's employment
in positions with the job title of "attorney" prior to her admission to the Connecticut bar raised
concerns about unauthorized practice of law. This had come up, briefly, at the county commit-
tee's hearing, but the panel quickly concluded that Ms. Flaherty had never held herself out as an
attorney and the fault, if any, lay with her employers. It was addressed briefly again in the CBEC
hearing, to the same effect.
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MS. FLAHERTY: I don't think destructive is a fair word. I think it's just
more overblown. You have too much of a personality, whereas if you
are depressed you might not have any personality at all. Manic, you're
just in people's faces. You talk a lot. You talk fast. You don't shut up.
Other topics of questioning included the effects of her medication, whether
her disorder had ever caused her to engage in behavior threatening or harm-
ful to others, and whether she was able to recognize the onset of symptoms
and get help prior to a crisis occurring. One questioner acknowledged,
apologetically, that "the nature of this hearing must feel very inva-
sive .... [F]or you this is just torture, I know, so bear with me."
A month after the hearing, the panel issued findings of fact with a rec-
ommendation of conditional admission. As conditions, Ms. Flaherty would
be required to continue with her current therapies or any successor regime
recommended by her treating psychiatrist, and to twice a year submit to the
statewide grievance committee, which monitors conditional admissions
in Connecticut, an affidavit from herself and her treating psychiatrist
confirming that she is in compliance. The panel's decision reasoned that,
"Ms. Flaherty is currently fit to practice law in Connecticut but only
because of her current therapies." Its findings of fact, however, articulated
no basis for believing that she could not be trusted to continue her
treatment on her own. The findings expressly noted, and apparently cred-
ited, her testimony that she "has learned that she cannot, unilaterally, take
herself off her medication and.., has no intention of doing so."
Ms. Flaherty responded to the recommended decision with a letter to
the CBEC, expressing her reluctant willingness to accept conditional
admission, but requesting that a definite time period be set for the expira-
tion of conditions. She received a terse response from the committee's
assistant administrative director, noting that "it is not the Bar Examining
Committee's policy to attach automatic expiration dates to the proposed
conditions," and referring her to a court rule that allows a conditionally
admitted lawyer to apply to the court to "remove or modify the conditions
previously imposed as circumstances warrant."
89
The formal imposition of admission with conditions took place in
October 1997 in a closed-door proceeding before a Connecticut superior
court judge. The judge expressed satisfaction that
a number of people have been admitted [conditionally]-and so far
with very happy results, because some of these people or maybe all of
these applicants would not have been admitted to the bar prior to the
change in the Practice Book rule a few years ago and permitting this.
89. CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 2-11(a).
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The judge and the parties then repaired to open court for Ms. Flaherty's
swearing in. In his swearing-in speech, the judge bemoaned the public's
"exaggerated or false" criticisms of the legal profession.9"
Three years later, Ms. Flaherty, now a staff attorney with Connecticut
Legal Services, filed an ADA complaint with the U.S. Department of
Justice9 and decided to speak publicly about her condition and treatment.
She feels an intense stigma from the requirement that she submit an affidavit
and doctor's report to the grievance committee every six months: "They
treat me like I'm defective because I have a medical condition."92 She found
the inquiries and multiple hearings that preceded her admission intrusive
and degrading. She was disturbed that she bore the burden of proving that
her disorder did not render her unfit, and by the fact that "[pleople who by
their own admission did not understand the diagnosis or the illness asked
me to explain it to them." She felt that the questioning "delved unneces-
sarily into very painful personal matters" and inappropriately called her
candor into question.93 It also had tangible consequences; during the year-
long delay in her admission she had to pass up opportunities to apply for jobs
that required being a member of the Connecticut bar.94
With these stories as backdrop, I now turn to what the Americans
with Disabilities Act, and courts interpreting it, have to say about whether
the inquiries faced by Roe, Gower, Flaherty, and many others constitute
unlawful discrimination. I will return to these stories in Part IV of this Arti-
cle, when discussing how the structure of the bar admissions process contrib-
utes to discrimination against applicants with disabilities.
II. LICENSING INQUIRIES UNDER TITLE II OF THE ADA
A. Title II, Disability Inquiries, and the Necessity Test
In the near-decade since the ADA went into effect, ten decisions, all
from federal district courts and state tribunals, have addressed whether, and
90. Anxiety about the profession's public image is a recurring theme in the discourse of courts
and bar examiners relating to the admission of applicants with mental illness or substance abuse
disorders. See infra Part IV.C.3.
91. See Complaint of Discrimination, Flaherty v. Conn. Bar Examining Comm. (U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Civ. Rts. Div., Disability Rts. Sec. Aug. 1, 2000).
92. Hamilton, supra note 65 (quoting Kathleen Flaherty).
93. Kathleen M. Flaherty, Testimony Submitted to the Presidential Task Force on Employ-
ment of People with Psychiatric Disabilities (May 24, 2000) (on file with author).
94. See id.
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to what extent, the law prohibits bar examiners or other licensing boards
from asking mental health questions." The cases are nearly uniform in find-
ing that Title II of the ADA applies to the activities of state examining
boards, and that disability inquiries in the licensing process must be justified
by a showing of necessity. To get this far requires the resolution of a num-
ber of interpretive issues. Is there any discrimination when a licensing board
is merely asking questions? If there is discrimination, is it disability-based,
and is it directed against the qualified individuals with a disability who are
protected under the statute?
96
95. Only four of these decisions were full rulings on the merits of ADA challenges to bar
application questions. See Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1995);
Applicants v. Tex. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, No. A-93-CA-740-SS, 1994 WL 923404 (W.D. Tex.
Oct. 11, 1994); In re Applications of Underwood & Piano, No. BAR-93-21, 1993 WL 649283
(Me. Dec. 7, 1993); In re Petition & Questionnaire for Admission to the R.I. Bar, 683 A.2d 1333
(R.I. 1996). Another decision on the merits came in a case involving an ADA challenge to
questions on a judicial screening form. See Doe v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 906 F. Supp. 1534,
1540-45 (S.D. Fla. 1995). One state court ordered the elimination of broad mental health
questions without reaching the ADA issues. See In re Petition of Frickey, 515 N.W.2d 741, 741
(Minn. 1994). In three other cases, courts expressed opinions about the ADA issues in rulings on
motions. See O'Brien v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, No. 98-0009-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4344, at
*8-*10 (E.D. Va. Jan. 23, 1998); Ellen S. v. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 859 F. Supp. 1489, 1495
(S.D. Fla. 1994); Med. Soc'y of N.J. v. Jacobs, No. 93-3670, 1993 WL 413,016, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct.
5, 1993). One federal court held that disability inquiries posed to a bar applicant's references did
not violate the ADA, and addressed the legality of application form inquiries in dicta. See
McCready v. I11. Bd. of Admissions to the Bar, No. 94-C-3582, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 791, at
"19-*23 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 1995).
96. Federalism issues can also be raised as a defense. Bar examiners, as an arm of the judi-
ciary, are a part of state government. In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,
121 S. Ct. 955 (2001), the Supreme Court held that Title I of the ADA falls outside the scope
of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers, and that Eleventh Amendment
doctrine prevents the federal courts from hearing Title I damage suits against states. The court's
reasoning would seem to apply to Title II as well. However, private individuals may still sue state
officials in federal court in actions seeking injunctive relief. See id. at 968 n.9. Thus, federal court
lawsuits seeking to enjoin bar examiners from asking disability-based questions are unaffected by
Garrett. The United States also has the authority to file Title II suits on behalf of aggrieved
individuals. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,133 (1994); 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.170-.178 (2000). Such actions are
not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, even if monetary relief is sought. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at
968 n.9. In the past, the U.S. Department of Justice has taken an active role in enforcing the
ADA against bar examiners. See Kate M. Nicholson & Sheila M. Foran, Using the ADA to Open
Gateways to the Professions, CONSUMER & PERS. RTS. LITIG. NEWSL. (ABA Section of Litigation),
May 1995, at 3, 6-10 (discussing the U.S. Department of Justice's role as amicus in four federal
lawsuits challenging application form questions).
The Eleventh Amendment also does not stand as a barrier to federal court lawsuits against
bar examiners brought by individuals under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)
(1994), which mirrors Title II in substance. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (1994); Jim C. v. United
States, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that a Rehabilitation Act provision
waiving state immunity is valid exercise of congressional Spending Clause powers); Stanley v.
Litscher, 213 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 2000). If a bar examining board is part of a judicial department
that receives any form of federal financial assistance, it will be subject to suit under the Rehabilita-
tion Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (1994);Jim C., 235 F.3d at 1082.
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1. The Starting Point-Title I and Its Regulations
Title II of the ADA applies to state and local governments. Its central
substantive provision simply reads,
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
Abstention principles will prevent some disability discrimination suits against bar examiners
from being heard in federal court. Several courts have dismissed cases under the doctrine of Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87 (1983), on the ground that
the federal ADA claims are "inextricably intertwined" with a state court's judgment (that is, the
admissions decision), and must be raised and litigated in the state courts. See, e.g., Dale v. Moore,
121 F.3d 624, 626-28 (11th Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Kansas, 888 F. Supp. 1073, 1078-85 (D. Kan.
1995). The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Feldman, however, allows federal courts to exercise
jurisdiction over suits that challenge a bar committee's general rules or practices. See Feldman, 460
U.S. at 486. In cases in which the central issue is the legality of standard questions on the appli-
cation form, rather than discretionary determinations made while processing a particular
individual's application, federal courts have allowed ADA claims to proceed. See Roe # 2 v. Ogden,
253 F.3d 1225, 1232-33 (10th Cit. 2001); Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 861 F. Supp. 512, 518-19
(E.D. Va. 1994); Ellen S. v. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 859 F. Supp. 1489, 1495 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
Bar applicants' claims under Title II of the ADA can also be pursued in state courts. An appli-
cant denied admission because of a refusal to answer a disability question can raise the ADA issue
in an appeal. Applicants can also sue bar examiners directly in state court, under the ADA or a
state's own antidiscrimination laws, as long as the state's sovereign immunity doctrine does not bar
state courts from hearing a claim of this type. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Erickson v.
Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cit. 2000) (holding that a litigant whose federal ADA suit
against a state university was dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment may proceed in state court:
"Having opened its courts to claims based on state law, including its own prohibition of disability dis-
crimination by units of state government.... Illinois may not exclude claims based on federal law").
All that I have said above depends on the assumption that Title I1, although not supported by
the Fourteenth Amendment, remains valid legislation under the Commerce Clause. The U.S.
Supreme Court's recent Commerce Clause decisions can be read to support an argument that all
or some of Title I1 is unconstitutional, period. See James Leonard, The Shadows of Unconstitutionality:
How the New Federalism May Affect the Anti-Discrimination Mandate of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 91, 148-76 (2000); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Americans with
Disabilities Act, Bar Examinations, and the Constitution: A Balancing Act, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1997,
at 6, 12-13. Although the ultimate outcome is unclear, there are strong arguments that the
ADA's application to bar examiners is constitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court has invalidated
federal legislation that singles out state or local government and "commandeers" it to carry out
federal policy, see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992), but it has also emphasized that Congress may directly regulate state
activities that affect interstate commerce, particularly when the statutory scheme imposes similar
restrictions on private parties engaged in similar activities. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141,
148-51 (2000) (upholding statute imposing privacy procedures on state motor vehicle depart-
ments). In prohibiting bar examiners from discriminating on the basis of disability, Title II directly
regulates a state licensing activity that clearly affects interstate commerce. Bar examiners control
access to a profession that is a major player in national and international markets. While Title II
itself applies only to public entities, the ADA as a whole imposes similar nondiscrimination
requirements on private entities engaged in activities comparable to those of bar examiners,
including private testing services that administer professional licensing or certification examinations,
see 42 U.S.C. § 12,189 (1994); 28 C.F.R. § 36.309 (2000), and employment agencies or employers
that screen job applicants. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111(2), 12,112(a) (1994).
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participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.
97
The statute defines "public entity" to include "any State or local gov-
ernment [and] any department, agency ... or other instrumentality of a
State... or local government."98 The implementing regulations issued by the
attorney general99 indicate that coverage extends to activities of the state
judicial branch and to state licensing programs.'" Courts have uniformly
held that bar examiners, who act as arms of the state judiciary in licensing
attorneys, are covered by Title 1I. l10
The only provision in the Title II regulations that directly addresses
licensing prohibits public entities from administering a licensing program
"in a manner that subjects qualified individuals with disabilities to dis-
crimination."'12 The regulations also include a section that addresses dis-
crimination in the "eligibility criteria" used for government programs
97. 42 U.S.C. § 12,132 (1994).
98. Id. § 12,131(1).
99. The ADA instructs the attorney general to issue regulations implementing Title II's
nondiscrimination requirements. See id. § 12 134(a). The attorney general's regulations, 28 C.F.R.
pt. 35 (2000), were issued in July 1991. A number of courts have held that under the principle
of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984),
these regulations are entitled to controlling weight. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Or. Dep't of Justice,
170 F.3d 1169, 1172-73 (9th Cit. 1999); Doe, 906 F. Supp. at 1540; Petersen
v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 818 F. Supp. 1276, 1279 (W.D. Wis. 1993). The U.S. Supreme
Court, without reaching the issue of whether the attorney general's regulations are entitled to
Chevron-level deference, has held that the U.S. Department of Justice's views "warrant respect" and
may properly be looked to for guidance in interpreting Title II. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581,
598 (1999).
100. The regulations prohibit discrimination in the administration of "a licensing or certifi-
cation program." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(6) (2000). The Section-by-Section Analysis that the
U.S. Department of Justice published as a preamble to the regulations states that "Title II cover-
age ... includes activities of the ... judicial branches of State and local governments." 56 Fed.
Reg. 35,696 (July 26, 1991), reprinted in 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 476 (2000).
101. See supra note 95; see also In re Petition of Rubenstein, 637 A.2d 1131, 1136 (Del.
1994). As a basis for arguing that Title II does not apply to them, bar examiners have invoked
Supreme Court decisions holding that federal legislation should not be construed to reach tradi-
tionally sovereign functions of state government unless the statutory language is "unmistakably
clear." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991) (construing narrowly the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 to avoid invalidating state laws on mandatory retirement of judges).
Two federal district court decisions have rejected this argument, finding that the language of Title I1
is sufficiently clear in covering all state activities, including those of the judiciary. See Doe, 906
F. Supp. at 1539; Ellen S., 859 F. Supp. at 1494-95. These rulings are bolstered by the Supreme
Court's recent statement that the "public entity" definition in Title II "plainly covers state
institutions without any exception... " Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998)
(holding that Title II applies to state prisons).
102. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(6) (2000).
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or services. This rule "prohibits policies that unnecessarily impose require-
ments or burdens on individuals with disabilities that are not placed on
others."'' 3
2. Is Asking Discrimination?
Nearly all of the courts that have addressed ADA challenges to
licensing questions have reached the conclusion that inquiries about
disabilities may constitute discrimination under Title I.104 This is not self-
evident, as neither Title II nor its implementing regulations specifically
prohibit disability questions. In contrast, Title 1, the employment title of
the ADA, defines discrimination to include medical examinations and
inquiries, and contains detailed provisions restricting when and how
employers may seek disability information. 5 Attorneys for the National
Conference of Bar Examiners argued, shortly after the ADA went into
effect, that
bar applications are not employment applications and therefore are
not covered by Title I of the ADA. Title II, which does apply to bar
admissions, contains no comparable provision on pre-decision
inquiries. Obviously, Congress knew how to forbid such inquiries
and did so in Title I-but just as obviously declined to extend the
ban to the public services covered under Title ll."6
The ADA's legislative history, however, indicates that Congress left
specific examples out of Title 11 in order to emphasize its breadth, not to
103. Section-by-Section-Analysis, 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 488 (2000). The regulation
itself states:
A public entity shall not impose or apply eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen
out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully
and equally enjoying any service, program, or activity, unless such criteria can be shown
to be necessary for the provision of the service, program or activity being offered.
Id. § 35.130(b)(8).
104. See supra note 95. The closest thing to an exception is the order issued by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in In re Petition of Frickey, 515 N.W.2d 741, 741 (Minn. 1994), in which the court
expressed "doubt as to the application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to the [mental
health] questions at issue." Id. Nonetheless, the court used its supervisory power over bar admissions
to eliminate questions about mental health treatment from the bar application form, finding that
the questions were unnecessary to protect the public and deterred law students from seeking counsel-
ing. See id.
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d) (1994).
106. Stephen Fedo & Kenneth H. Brown, Character and Fitness Review: Is It Legal to Ask About
Addiction and Mental Disabilities?, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1992, at 40, 41. The authors of this article
were special counsel to the National Conference of Bar Examiners.
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restrict its scope. Instead of listing prohibited types of discriminatory prac-
tices, as it did elsewhere in the ADA, 10 7 Congress deliberately left Title II's
antidiscrimination mandate open-ended to facilitate its application to all the
disparate activities of state and local government.0 8 For this reason, courts
have refused to infer from Title 11's silence on the subject that Congress
meant to allow public entities to ask whatever they want.'"
The ADA's legislative history also contains a more direct indication
that application form questions were among the practices Congress had in
mind when it used general language prohibiting discrimination. Title III, the
public accommodations title of the ADA, includes a provision that prohibits
the use of unnecessary "eligibility criteria" that interfere with the equal
enjoyment of services by people with disabilities."'  A nearly identical
provision appears in the Title II regulations governing public entities."'
Discussing this section, a Senate report states,
It... would be a violation for [a public accommodation] to
invade.., privacy by trying to identify unnecessarily the existence of
a disability, as, for example, if the credit application of a department
store were to inquire whether an individual has epilepsy, has
ever.., been hospitalized for mental illness, or has other disability." 2
Applying Title II to mental health questions on an application form does
not stretch the statute beyond what Congress had in mind."3
107. Titles I and III of the ADA contain specific examples of the types of discrimination that
are prohibited in employment and in the sale of goods and services to the public. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12,112, 12,182 (1994).
108. The report of the House Education and Labor Committee states: "The Committee has
chosen not to list all the types of actions that are included within the term "discrimination", as
was done in titles I and 11I, because this title essentially simply extends the anti-discrimination
prohibition ... to all actions of state and local governments." H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 84
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367.
The legislative history in fact goes further, and expresses an affirmative intent to incorporate
into Title II a prohibition of the specific types of discriminatory practices that are listed in Titles I
and 1I. The implications of this for Title II's interpretation will be discussed infra Part IV.B.
109. See Ellen S. v. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 859 F. Supp. 1489, 1493 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Med.
Soc'y of N.J. v. Jacobs, No. 93-3670, 1993 WL 413016, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1993).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 12,182(b)(2)(A)(i) (1994).
111. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (2000); see also supra note 103 (quoting regulation).
112. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 62 (1989). Similar statements appear in the House reports. See
H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 105 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 388; H.R. REP.
No. 101-485(111), at 58 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 481. Oddly, these portions of
the legislative history are not discussed in any of the court decisions addressing the ADA's
applicability to licensing inquiries.
113. Title 11's application to disability questions also finds support in the interpretations that
Congress and administrative agencies have given to other statutes that prohibit disability dis-
crimination without specifically mentioning inquiries. The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988
prohibits discrimination based on handicap in the sale or rental of housing, while allowing landlords
to exclude tenants who would pose a "direct threat" to health or safety or cause substantial property
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If the statutory scheme does not preclude the application of Title II to
disability inquiries, the question remains whether, and under what circum-
stances, asking amounts to discrimination. In one sense, application form
inquiries treat all applicants alike: Everyone, with or without a disability, is
required to answer the same questions. However, as all of the courts to
address the issue have found, whenever licensing agencies conduct additional
investigation of applicants who answer affirmatively, such as by requiring
them to release medical records, provide a therapist's letter, or appear at a
fitness hearing, there is discrimination in the straightforward sense that
applicants who answer "yes" are subjected to burdens not imposed on those
who answer "no... 4 Inquiries about mental disorders or substance abuse also
discriminate in the sense that they require applicants with these conditions,
damage. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1), (9) (1994). The legislative history states that this "direct threat"
provision was "not intended to give landlords and owners the right to ask prospective tenants and
buyers blanket questions about the individuals' disabilities ... [or] require the applicant or tenant
to waive his right to confidentiality concerning his medical condition or history." H.R. REP. No.
100-711, at 30 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2191. HUD regulations accordingly
interpret the Fair Housing Act to prohibit any "inquiry to determine whether an applicant ... has
a handicap or... as to the nature or severity of a handicap." 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c) (2000); see
Cason v. Rochester Hous. Auth., 748 F. Supp. 1002, 1008-09 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the
housing authority's inquiries into applicants' mental disabilities violated federal law). Regulations
issued to implement the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994), also interpret that
statute's general prohibition of discrimination by federal funding recipients to include pre-hiring
questions about the existence, nature or extent of a handicap. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.14 (2000); see
also Doe v. Syracuse Sch. Dist., 508 F. Supp. 333, 336-37 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (discussing the history
of the regulation and affirming it as a reasonable interpretation of the statute).
114. See Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 442 (E.D. Va. 1995); Ellen S., 859
F. Supp. at 1494; Jacobs, 1993 WL 413016, at *7-*8; In re Applications of Underwood & Piano,
No. BAR-93-21, 1993 WL 649283, at *2 (Me. Dec. 7, 1993); see also Theriault v. Flynn, 162 F.3d
46, 49 (1st Cir. 1998) (endorsing Clark's conclusion that it is discriminatory for a licensing agency to
impose additional eligibility requirements based on the existence of a disability). In Jacobs, the
first decision to apply the ADA to licensing inquiries, the court held that mental health questions
on an application form, standing alone, do not discriminate, and refused to grant a preliminary
injunction because the plaintiffs had not established that the medical licensing board would be
conducting any further investigation of applicants who answered "yes." See Jacobs, 1993 WL 413016,
at *8, * 11. However, the court indicated that it would find an ADA violation if any additional
investigation or screening took place. See id. at *5-*7. No other court has had to face this issue,
because it is usually quite clear that a licensing board intends to do something with the infor-
mation-otherwise, why would it ask? Cf. Ellen S., 859 F. Supp. at 1494 n.7 (criticizing the Jacobs
court's distinction between asking and investigating as "flawed").
One federal judge has held that disability questions posed to an applicant's references, rather
than to the applicant himself, do not discriminate because they are "noncoercive and [impose] no
additional burden on the applicant." McCready v. 11. Bd. of Admissions to the Bar, No. 94-C-
3582, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 791, at *19-*20 (N.D. I1. Jan. 23, 1995). This distinction makes
little sense. The only reason that a bar committee would ask references about an applicant's dis-
abilities would be to subject the applicant to additional investigation based on an affirmative
answer.
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unlike other applicants, to reveal personal and sensitive medical information
as a condition of having their applications processed."'
3. Is It Discrimination Based on Disability?
"Disability" is defined in the ADA as "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of ... [an]
individual;" or having "a record of such impairment;" or "being regarded as
having such an impairment.""' 6 The interpretation of this three-pronged
definition has become a Serbonian bog." 7 Fortunately, we don't need to
wade in too deeply to pull out a few pertinent points.
The Title II regulations make clear that any diagnosable mental disorder
or substance abuse condition is a "physical or mental impairment."... Such
conditions will nearly always have some effect on a major life activity, such
as caring for one's self, working, learning, thinking, interacting with others,
sleeping, or having sexual relations."9 However, courts have turned the
statutory requirement that the limitation on major life activities be
"substantial" into a major hurdle. Even in cases in which the plaintiff has a
serious condition, such as bipolar disorder or alcoholism, and the illness
115. See Doe v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 906 F. Supp. 1534, 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1995)
(stating that "the forced disclosure of information relating to disabilities ... is a form of discrimi-
nation because it... impos[es] disproportionate burdens on [the disabled]"); Charles L. Reischel, The
Constitution, the Disability Act, and Questions About Alcoholism, Addiction, and Mental Health, 61 B.
EXAMINER, Aug. 1992, at 10, 19 ("[Mental health and substance abuse inquiries] discriminate in
that they invade the privacy only of those with such disabilities, subjecting them to the
embarrassment provoked by such invasions."); cf. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 598-601 (1999)(explaining that unjustified isolation of the mentally ill in institutions is discriminatory because
people without mental disabilities can generally obtain needed medical care in the community,
while people with mental disabilities are forced to enter institutions to meet their medical needs;
and because such treatment "perpetuates unwarranted assumptions" about people with disabilities
and imposes a "stigmatizing injury").
116. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2) (1994).
117. Milton described, in hell, "A gulf profound as that Serbonian bog / Betwixt Damiata
and Mount Casius old, / Where armies whole have sunk." JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST BK. II, 11.
592-94 (1667), reprinted in JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST BOOKS I AND II 659 (A.W. Verity
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 4th ed. 1962).
118. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2000) (defining "physical or mental impairment" to include "[any
mental or psychological disorder ... drug addiction, and alcoholism").
119. Caring for oneself, learning, and working are listed as examples of major life activities
in the Title II regulations. Id. § 35.104 (defining "major life activities"). The list in the regulations
is not exclusive, and any important activity of ordinary life may qualify as "major." See Bragdon
v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637-39 (1998) (holding that reproduction is a major life activity).
Thinking, interacting with others, sleeping, and sexual relations have been recognized by courts as
"major life activities" under the ADA. See, e.g., McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d
1226, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1999); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 307 (3d Cir.
1999).
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has produced consequences as severe as hospitalization or job loss, decisions
go both ways as to whether the "disability" threshold is satisfied.'2°
When a public entity puts questions about mental conditions or sub-
stance abuse on an application form, and imposes additional burdens on
those who respond affirmatively, its discrimination affects a group that
includes people who do not have a "disability," along with those who do.'2'
120. See, e.g., Taylor, 184 F.3d at 306-11 (holding that a jury could find that the plaintiffs
bipolar disorder was a disability); Hoeller v. Eaton Corp., 149 F.3d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding
that a plaintiffs bipolar disorder was not a disability, although it "was undoubtedly a difficult
condition to live with"); Schneiker v. Fortis Ins. Co., 200 F.3d 1055, 1061-62 (7th Cit. 2000)
(holding that a plaintiff who was hospitalized and could not return to her former position because
of major depression was not disabled); Pritchard v. S. Co. Serv., 92 F.3d 1130, 1132-34 (1 1th Cir.
1996) (holding that a jury could find that the plaintiff's depression was a disability); Bilodeau v.
Mega Indus., 50 F. Supp. 2d 27, 34-38 (D. Me. 1999) (holding that the plaintiffs hospitalization
for alcoholism was not enough to establish that she had a record of disability); see also Deborah
Landan Spranger, Comment, Are State Bar Examiners Crazy?: The Legality of Mental Health
Questions on Bar Applications Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 255, 281-
84 (1996) (arguing that most of those affected by bar mental health questions do not meet the
ADA's definition of disability). See generally Douglas A. Blair, Employees Suffering from Bipolar
Disorder or Clinical Depression: Fighting an Uphill Battle for Protection Under Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1347 (1999).
The U.S. Supreme Court's recent decisions in Sutton v. United Air Lines Inc., 527 U.S. 471
(1999), and Murphy v. United Parcel Service Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999), which hold that the effects
of any corrective measures must be considered before determining whether there is a substantial
limitation of major life activities, create further difficulties for plaintiffs with mental disorders that
are effectively controlled by medication. See Robb v. Horizon Credit Union, 66 F. Supp. 2d 913,
918 (C.D. Il1. 1999) (finding that a plaintiff with depression who would not be able to function
without medication does not have a "disability," because when medicated, she can function).
121. One might argue that everyone who responds affirmatively to a mental health inquiry
has a "disability" under the "regarded as" prong of the definition: The applicant's impairment,
even if it does not actually substantially limit a major life activity, is "treated by a public entity as
constituting such a limitation." 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2000). Bar examiners regard everyone with
the targeted conditions as being potentially incapable of practicing law. They ask the questions so
that they can identify and exclude such persons. Those who are denied admission are substantially
limited in the major life activity of working, because they are excluded from a broad range of jobs
(the many lawyer jobs that require bar admission). See Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs,
226 F.3d 69, 83-84 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the inability to practice law constitutes
substantial limitation of the major life activity of working).
The problem with this argument is that bar examiners do not presume that everyone who
answers "yes" is unfit to practice; they just believe that further investigation will lead to evidence
of unfitness in some cases. Regarding someone as being potentially substantially limited in major
life activities is not quite the same thing as regarding that person as having a disability. See Krocka
v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 515 (7th Cit. 2000) (holding that the fact that a police depart-
ment required a police officer with depression to undergo a medical evaluation and submit to
monitoring does not show that it regarded him as disabled); Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 861
F. Supp. 512, 517 (E.D. Va. 1994) ("If the defendants regarded [the plaintiff] as disabled and
unable to practice law, they would have denied her application. Instead they have merely insisted
that she answer their mental health inquiry, so that they can make a decision as to whether she
can practice law or not."), vacated by 861 F. Supp. 519 (granting reconsideration after plaintiff
submitted further evidence showing that she had a disability).
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Title II prohibits only actions taken "by reason of ... disability.' '12 Is the dis-
crimination here disability-based? The decisions in the licensing inquiry
cases assume, without much discussion, that it is,'23 but the problem is con-
ceptually difficult.
2 1
The answer lies in distinguishing the issue of motivation (is the dis-
crimination based on disability?) from the issue of standing (is the plaintiff a
person with a disability who is entitled to sue?). 12' Bar examiners' mental
health inquiries target disabilities, even if they overshoot their mark. For
example, a question about diagnosis or treatment of bipolar disorder requires
an affirmative answer from 100 percent of applicants with bipolar disorder
who meet the ADA's "disability" definition, even though it also affects
some who fall short of the "disability" threshold. And it is precisely for the
purpose of uncovering the more serious cases, the ones that probably do
satisfy the ADA's "disability" definition, that bar examiners ask the
question.' Moreover, it would severely undermine the ADA's purposes if a
defendant could avoid liability by arguing that its conduct targets everyone
122. 42 U.S.C. § 12,132 (1994).
123. See Ellen S. v. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 859 F. Supp. 1489, 1494 (S.D. Fla. 1994)
(rejecting, with little discussion, bar examiners' argument that they could not be discriminating based
on disability when they did not know whether or not the plaintiffs were disabled); Med. Soc'y of N.J.
v. Jacobs, No. 93-3670, 1993 WL 413016, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1993) (concluding that the
challenged questions inquire into disabilities simply because "each question asks for information regard-
ing physical or mental impairments").
124. Application of the disparate impact theory might obviate the need to show that the dis-
crimination is disability-based. Under the disparate impact model of proof, a practice that is facially
neutral, but disproportionately harms members of a protected group, is unlawful unless justified by
business necessity. Mental health questions on application forms clearly have a disparate impact:
Persons who have an ADA-protected mental disability are more likely to be required to answer
"yes" than those who do not. However, in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299-301 (1985),
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a showing of disparate impact does not suffice to make out a
case of disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act unless the challenged practice
deprives people with disabilities of "meaningful access" to a program or benefit. The ADA has
been read to incorporate this approach. See Hunsaker v. Contra Costa County, 149 F.3d 1041,
1043-44 (9th Cit. 1998) (holding that a welfare agency practice of imposing additional eligibility
requirements on applicants who fail a substance abuse screening test does not violate ADA under
disparate impact theory because it does not deprive plaintiffs of meaningful access to welfare bene-
fits); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 44 (1989) (stating that Title II should be interpreted consistent with
Alexander v. Choate).
125. Technically, this is not a matter of standing, but of whether one of the substantive
requirements of a claim under the ADA-membership in the protected class--is satisfied. See Roe v.
Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1228-29 (10th Cit. 1997).
Nonetheless, many courts refer to it as a standing issue, and for convenience, I will do the same.
126. As a leading bar examiner put it, the goal is to "zero in on raging and risky, chronic and seri-
ous mental health areas that contraindicate that the applicant meets the minimum qualifications
for the practice of law." Erica Moeser, Personal Matters-Should Bar Applicants Be Asked About
Treatment for Mental Health? Yes: The Public Has the Right to Know About Instability, A.B.A. J., Oct.
1994, at 36.
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with a mental impairment. An action based on generalizations about people
with a particular illness discriminates against those within that class who have
a "disability," and cannot be meaningfully distinguished from disability
discrimination.1
27
Not everyone who is forced to answer "yes" to a disability-based question
will have standing to challenge it. Courts in the ADA licensing cases have
required plaintiffs to prove (often through evidence submitted under seal)
that their impairments were severe enough to meet the "disability" threshold.'28
This can mean that a question cannot be challenged by those to whom its
application is most irrational and offensive-for example, an applicant who
is forced to disclose that she receives counseling (but is not otherwise
impaired in her day-to-day functioning) as a result of an incident of childhood
sexual abuse. However, the statutory language makes it clear that being an
"individual with a disability" is an essential element of a Title II claim.'29 If this
sometimes produces absurd results, the fault lies in the "substantially limits"
test, which often denies protection to those whose impairments should be
least relevant to a decisionmaker
30
127. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Enforcement Guidance on Pre-Employment
Inquiries Under the Americans with Disabilities Act 4 (Oct. 10, 1995), reprinted in Fair Empl. Prac. Man.
(BNA) 405:7191, :7192 (stating that ADA provisions prohibiting pre-employment inquiries about
disabilities extend to "questions that are likely to elicit information about a disability," including
questions such as "Have you ever been treated for mental health problems?"); Downs v. Mass. Bay
Transp. Auth., 13 F. Supp. 2d 130, 138 (D. Mass. 1998) (approving and following the approach of
EEOC Guidance); cf. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282-86 (1987) (rejecting, in light of the
purposes of disability discrimination statutes, the argument that discrimination based on contagious-
ness is distinguishable from discrimination based on disability).
128. See Doe v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 906 F. Supp. 1534, 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1995)
(stating that the plaintiffs disability was established by affidavit filed under seal); see also Clark v. Va.
Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 441 (E.D. Va. 1995). But see Clark, 861 F. Supp. 512, 516-17
(E.D. Va. 1994) (finding plaintiffs original proffer of evidence insufficient to establish that she is a
person with a disability).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 12,132 (1994); see also supra text accompanying note 97 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12,132 (1994)). In contrast, the provisions in Title I that restrict disability-based inquiries by
employers are susceptible to the interpretation that one does not need to be a person with a disability
to state a claim, see 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(2)-(4) (1994), and several courts of appeal have held that
a showing of disability is not required. See Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 969-70
(8th Cir. 1999); Fredenburg v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Health Servs., 172 F.3d 1176, 1181-82
(9th Cit. 1999); Griffin v. Steeltek, Inc., 160 F.3d 591, 593-94 (10th Cir. 1998). As the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit noted in its decision, it makes little sense to require people to "iden-
tify themselves as disabled to prevent potential employers from inquiring whether they have a dis-
ability." Id. at 594.
130. See Cheryl L. Anderson, "Deserving Disabilities": Why the Definition of Disability Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act Should Be Revised to Eliminate the Substantial Limitation Requirement, 65
Mo. L. REV. 83 (2000); Lisa Eichhom, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The
Failure of the "Disability" Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1405
(1999); cf. Catherine J. Lanctot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and Per Se Prejudice: How Individualizing
the Determination of "Disability" Undermines the ADA, 42 VILL. L. REV. 327 (1997) (arguing that an
49 UCLA LAW REVIEW 93 (2001)
4. Is It Discrimination Against Qualified Individuals with Disabilities?
Title II protects only individuals with disabilities who are "qualified,"
which the statute defines as the ability to meet "the essential eligibility
requirements for.., the participation in programs or activities provided by
a public entity," with "reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices"
if required.' The essential purpose of a bar licensing program is to protect
the public from incompetent or unethical practitioners. Examiners have
argued that mental health inquiries do not discriminate against qualifiedindividuals with disabilities because they are used to help determine
whether the applicant's condition would pose a risk to the public-in other
words, whether the applicant is qualified. The questions themselves, the
argument runs, are an "essential eligibility requirement," and an applicant
who refuses to answer is not qualified.
The decisions rightly reject this reasoning as circular. Title II's protec-
tions would be meaningless if a public entity could define essential eligibility
requirements in any way it chose; courts must engage in some scrutiny of
whether these criteria are necessary to accomplish the program's purpose.132
If a practice that imposes discriminatory burdens on people with disabilities
is not really needed to assess whether applicants would pose a risk to the pub-
lic, it rests on the "generalizations or stereotypes" that the ADA prohibits.'33
Whether disability inquiries discriminate against qualified individuals
with disabilities thus turns on whether the questions can be shown to be
necessary to the licensing agency's function of determining fitness to prac-
tice. This, as previously discussed, is also the approach suggested by the Title
individualized approach produces irrational and inconsistent results, and that courts instead shouldfocus on whether the plaintiff has a condition that, in general, is "substantially limiting"); MirandaOshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L. RFv. 27, 111-37 (2000)(arguing that the "regarded as" prong of the ADA's disability definition should be construed to reach
all discrimination based on stereotypes about impairments, regardless of whether the defendant
thinks that the plaintiff is "substantially limited" in major life activities).
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,131(2); 12,132 (1994).
132. See Clark, 880 F. Supp. at 442; Med. Soc'y of N.J. v. Jacobs, No. 93-3670, 1993 WL
413016, at *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1993).
133. The quotation is from a passage in the U.S. Department of Justice's commentary on theTitle II regulations that addresses what "essential eligibility requirements" means when considera-
tions of safety are involved. "The determination that a person poses a direct threat to the health or
safety of others may not be based on generalizations or stereotypes about the effects of a particulardisability. It must be based on an individualized assessment .... 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 483(2000). Several of the bar inquiry decisions rely heavily on this passage when analyzing the "quali-fied" issue. See Clark, 880 F. Supp. at 441-42; Applicants v. Tex. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, No.A-93-CA-740-SS, 1994 WL 923404, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1994); In re Petition & Questionnaire
for Admission to the R.I. Bar, 683 A.2d 1333, 1335 (R.I. 1996).
136
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II regulations, which prohibit disability-based eligibility criteria "unless such))134
criteria can be shown to be necessary ....
Courts in the licensing inquiry cases all agree that necessity is the test,
but have markedly different notions of what necessity means. Two basic
approaches have emerged in the decisions: a strict approach that effectively
dooms nearly all disability-based inquiries, and a more relaxed standard that
opens the door to "narrowly tailored" questions.
B. Applying the Necessity Test
Disability rights proponents have argued that there is no need for licens-
ing questions that focus on an applicant's disabilities because potential fitness
problems can be discerned through questions about the applicant's conduct.
35
Bar applications probe the applicant's educational and employment history,
criminal record, military service, disciplinary proceedings, defaults on financial
obligations and other matters with excruciating thoroughness. 36 (I will refer to
questions of these types as "behavioral" inquiries.) Examiners can also directly
ask about any limitations on the applicant's ability to practice; for example,
"Do you currently have any condition that would impair your ability to prac-
tice law?" (I will refer to these as "self-assessment" questions.)'
37
134. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (2000), quoted in full supra note 103. The Title II technical assis-
tance manual published by the U.S. Department of Justice also states that public entities are prohibited
from making "unnecessary inquiries into the existence of a disability." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
§ 11-3.500 (1992 & 1994 Supp.), reprinted in Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:51, :62-63. As an illus-
tration, the manual states that a medical licensing board would be in violation of Title II if it required
applicants to disclose whether they have ever had physical or mental disabilities and conducted more
rigorous investigations of applicants who answered affirmatively. See id.
135. See, e.g., Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Ask About Conduct, Not Mental Illness:
A Proposal for Bar Examiners and Medical Boards to Comply with the ADA and Constitution, 20 J. LEGIS.
147 (1994).
136. See Rhode, supra note 17, at 593-97 (summarizing the results of a survey of questions
appearing on bar application forms); Stone, supra note 5.
137. A number of jurisdictions include self-assessment questions on their forms, either in place
of, or in addition to, questions asking about specific disabilities. For examples, see Clark, 880 F.
Supp. at 439-40 n. 18, In re Petition & Questionnaire for Admission to the Rhode Island Bar, 683 A.2d
1333, 1337 (R.I. 1996), and Herr, supra note 6, at 651.
Self-assessment questions are not disability-based to the extent that the requirement of dis-
closure is triggered by the existence of a current performance impairment, rather than by the exis-
tence of a disability per se. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(2)(B) (1994) (stating that employers may
inquire about the ability of job applicants to perform job-related functions). But see Hilary Duke,
Note, The Narrowing of State Bar Examiner Inquiries Into the Mental Health of Bar Applicants: Bar
Examiner Objectives Are Met Better Through Attorney Education, Rehabilitation, and Discipline, 11 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 101, 122 (1997) (arguing against the use of self-assessment questions because, like
disability-based questions, they may deter applicants from seeking mental health treatment).
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In addition, opponents of mental health questions generally concede that
when behavioral inquiries produce evidence of conduct that casts doubt on the
applicant's fitness, and there is reason to believe that the conduct was caused
by substance abuse or mental illness, examiners may have a legitimate need toinvestigate the disability issues. For example, if an applicant attributes an inci-
dent of academic misconduct during law school to a mental disorder, and
says that the problem is now under control, or if an applicant has several
drunk driving convictions, it may be appropriate for examiners to ask about
diagnosis and treatment, request medical records, or refer the applicant for an
evaluation. (I will refer to these kinds of behavior-triggered inquiries as
"second-level" questions.) 38
No one disputes that there are some individuals who are unfit to practice
law, or who need monitoring, as a result of mental health or substance abuse
problems. But if behavioral, self-assessment, and second-level questions can
identify the problem cases, disability-based questions are superfluous. 139 The
case for "necessity," then, is relative. It requires a showing that examiners can
do a better job of predicting unfitness with disability-based questions than
by relying on the alternatives. The application of this test raises both empiri-
cal and normative problems. What kind of evidence is needed to establish
predictive value? If a disability inquiry adds any utility, is its use a "neces-
sity," or is a more substantial showing of need required? The decisions fall into
two basic camps, which I will call "strict" and "relaxed" scrutiny. 4'
A self-assessment question used by the NCBE and by some states, including Connecticut, asks
not only about the applicant's current ability to practice law, but also about the existence of any
condition which "if untreated could affect" the applicant's ability to practice. NCBE CHARACTER
REPORT, supra note 10, at 12; CONN. 2001 APPLICATION, supra note 19, at 14. This formulation
reaches applicants with disabilities who are receiving treatment and fully capable of functioning as
lawyers. As such, the question is disability-based, and can be challenged under the ADA.138. Dr. Howard Zonana, who has testified as an expert for the plaintiffs in several ADA chal-
lenges to mental health questions on bar application forms, has acknowledged the need for such
second-level questions. See Clark, 880 F. Supp. at 436 & n.9 (summarizing Dr. Zonana's testimony
on this issue).
139. Many medical licensing boards and hospitals screening doctors for attending privileges have
not found it necessary to ask questions about diagnosis or treatment for mental disorders on their
application forms. Instead, they rely on the combination of conduct, self-assessment, and second-levelquestions. See Letter from Howard Zonana, M.D., Dir., Conn. Mental Health Ctr., Law andPsychiatry Div., to Raymond W. Beckwith, Chair, Conn. Bar Examining Comm. (Oct. 24, 1994)
(on file with author).
140. The fault lines between the strict and more relaxed approaches to Title l1's "necessity" test
are similar to the issues that have divided courts in applying the "business necessity" defense todisparate impact claims under Title VII. Should courts insist on empirical proof that a screeningpractice is predictive of successful job performance, or should they defer to the employer's plausiblejudgments? If a practice has some utility, is its use a "necessity," or is a stronger showing of need
required? See, e.g., Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1999).
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1. Strict Scrutiny
One court has squarely held, and a couple more have suggested, that
virtually all disability-based inquiries on application forms violate Title I.141
One strand in these decisions is an insistence on empirical validation. The
subjective judgment of bar examiners that disability questions are helpful is
not enough: The case for effectiveness must be made through hard evidence
that the questions have predictive value. Also lurking in these decisions is the
idea that "necessity" means more than utility. If disability-based questions
don't add much to the ability of examiners to screen out unfit practitio-
ners, they aren't necessary, even if the questions occasionally provide useful
information.
The empirical evidence theme sounds strongly in a 1996 decision of the
Rhode Island Supreme Court. 4 Acting on an ACLU challenge to questions
that required bar applicants to disclose hospitalizations for mental health
reasons, certain mental health outpatient treatment, and drug or alcohol
addiction within the past five years, the court appointed a lawyer-physician
as a special master to gather information and make recommendations.' The
court endorsed the special master's determination that the challenged
questions violated the ADA, and limited the bar examiners to asking about
any current condition that, in the applicant's own assessment, would affect
her ability to practice law.'
141. See Med. Soc'y of N.J. v. Jacobs, No. 93-3670 (WGB), 1993 WL 413016 (D.N.J. Oct. 5,
1993); In re Applications of Underwood & Piano, No. BAR-93-21, 1993 WL 649283(Dec. 7, 1993);
In re Petition & Questionnaire for Admission to the R.I. Bar, 683 A.2d at 1333.
142. See In re Petition & Questionnaire for Admission to the R.I. Bar, 683 A.2d at 1333.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 1335-37. The special master, in her report, considered and rejected the alter-
native of a question focused on specific serious disorders such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder,
on the grounds that such a question "probably violates the Americans with Disabilities Act because
it inquires into diagnosis and status as opposed to behavior and function." Report of Patricia Ryan
Recupero, J.D., M.D., Special Master, at 17 (1996) [hereinafter R.I. Special Master Report] (on file
with author). The new questions adopted by the Rhode Island Supreme Court read as follows:
Question 26: Are you currently using narcotics, drugs or intoxicating liquors to such an
extent that your ability to practice law would be impaired[?]
Question 29: Are you currently suffering from any disorder that impairs your judgment or
that would otherwise adversely affect your ability to practice law?
In re Petition & Questionnaire for Admission to the R.I. Bar, 683 A.2d at 1337. The court also
approved the continued use of a question requiring applicants to disclose any current illegal drug use,
on the ground that the ADA specifically excludes current illegal drug use from the definition of "dis-
ability." See id.
Disability-based questions, the court held, are illegal under the ADA
unless they can be shown to be necessary for the protection of the public.
Empirical proof of the questions' predictive value was required:
[T]he burden is on those who propose to ask the questions to show an
actual relationship such that (1) applicants with mental-health-and
substance-abuse-treatment histories actually pose an increased risk to
the public, (2) the admission process has effectively protected the public
by using [the challenged questions] to identify those persons with
mental-health- or substance-abuse-treatment histories who are a dan-
ger to the public, or (3) attorneys who have become a danger to the pub-
lic in their practice of law, when retrospectively reviewed, could have
been identified with any degree of reliability by such questions. 45
The court endorsed the special master's findings that "there is no empirical
evidence demonstrating that lawyers who have had psychiatric treatment
have a greater incidence of subsequent disciplinary action... ," and that "most
disciplinary problems and grievance issues arise after an attorney has been
in practice for a number of years, and in nearly all such cases no indicators of
future difficulties manifested themselves at the time of original licensure.' 46
The court noted that it is difficult even for mental health professionals to make
accurate predictions, and the fact that "the initial screening in most bar-
examining committees is performed by lay individuals with no mental-health
training" exacerbates the questions' lack of predictive value. 141
At the end of its decision, the Rhode Island court suggested that even
if the questions had some predictive value, the necessity test would require
more. Examiners may have to sacrifice some useful information for the sake
of the ADA.4s A similar theme appears in a 1994 order of the Minnesota
Supreme Court striking application form questions about mental health treat-
ment and hospitalizations. Mental health questions are unnecessary, the court
reasoned, because "questions relating to conduct can, for the most part, elicit
the information necessary for the Board of Law Examiners to ... protect the
public from unfit practitioners ....
145. In re Petition & Questionnaire for Admission to the R.I. Bar, 683 A.2d at 1336.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. The court stated that:
Clearly, it can be argued that the [new self-assessment questions ordered by the
court] ... provide little or no relevant information about behavior that might translate to
an inability to practice law. Nevertheless, the committee's investigation must afford to
applicants the protections guaranteed under the ADA and preserve the privacy rights of all
applicants.
Id. at 1337.
149. In re Petition of Frickey, 515 N.W.2d 741 (Minn. 1994) (emphasis added). The court,
exercising its supervisory powers, acted on a petition submitted by deans and faculty members of
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A strong version of the necessity test also underlies Medical Society of
New Jersey v. Jacobs, the first of the ADA licensing inquiry decisions, which
concluded (albeit in dicta) that only behavior-based inquiries are permissi-
ble under Title I.50 Instead of framing the issue as whether disability-based
questions have any marginal utility, the court asked whether screening can
be "effective" without them.'' Under this approach, as long as conduct-
based questions do a reasonably good job of identifying applicants who are
unfit as a result of mental health or substance abuse problems, disability-
based questions are not a "necessity," even if they might uncover a few cases
of unfitness that otherwise would go undetected.
The strict scrutiny approach is fatal to mental health questions, because
there is simply no empirical evidence that applicants' mental health histories
are significantly predictive of future misconduct or malpractice as an attor-
ney. No prospective validation study, tracking the future careers of bar
applicants with and without specified factors in their backgrounds, has ever
been attempted." 2 Only one retrospective study has been conducted, and it
provides no evidence of any correlation between attorney misconduct and
previous mental health treatment. 3 (The study does, however, suggest that
the three Minnesota law schools. The decision ducked the issue of whether the ADA applies to bar
admissions, but reasoned that the questions are unnecessary and inflict harm by deterring law
students from seeking counseling. See id.
150. See Med. Soc'y of N.J. v. Jacobs, No. 93-3670, 1993 WL 413016 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1993).
The case was subsequently resolved by a stipulation that eliminated mental health and substance
abuse questions from New Jersey's medical licensing forms, with the exception of some narrowly
focused questions on current illegal drug use and the existence of any condition which, in the
applicant's own assessment, would impair or limit her ability to practice medicine. See Stipulation
& Agreement Between Parties, Med. Soc'y of N.J. v. Jacobs, No. 93-3670, 3 Am. Disabilities Cas.
(BNA) 1278, 1279-80 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 1994) (including a settlement agreement appended to the
court's decision awarding attorney's fees).
151. The court stated that:
mThese additional burdens [on applicants with disabilities] are unnecessary. The Court is con-
fident that the Board can formulate a set of effective questions that screen out applicants
based only on their behavior and capabilities. For example, the Board is not foreclosed
by Title II from screening out applicants based on their employment histories; based on
whether applicants can perform certain tasks or deal with certain emotionally or physically
demanding situations; or based on whether applicants have been unreliable, neglected
work, or failed to live up to responsibilities.... The essential problem with the present
questions is that they substitute an impermissible inquiry into the status of disabled appli-
cants for the proper, indeed necessary, inquiry into the applicants' behavior.
Jacobs, 1993 WL 413016, at *7.
152. See Rhode, supra note 17, at 556. See generally Alan M. Dershowitz, Preventive Disbar-
ment: The Numbers Are Against It, 58 A.B.A. J. 815 (1972).
153. See Carl Baer & Peg Corneille, Character and Fitness Inquiry: From Bar Admission to Pro-
fessional Discipline, B. EXAMINER, Nov. 1992, at 5. The Minnesota State Board of Law Examiners
conducted a retrospective study of the bar application forms filed by fifty-two attorneys who were
later disciplined for professional misconduct. The study's authors concluded that persons whose
application forms revealed past problems (for example, arrests, employment termination, academic
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preadmission substance abuse may have some predictive value.)' Research
on the prediction of violence and criminal behavior, an area that has been
intensively studied, 5' provides little basis for placing much confidence in the
ability of mental health professionals, let alone bar examiners, to predict the
future conduct of persons with mental disorders. The preponderance of recent
studies show, at best, "a modest, better-than-chance level of accuracy" in pre-
dicting violence in persons with serious mental illnesses.'56 The rates of false
positives (the percentage of people predicted to be violent who turn out not
to be) are very high, ranging in many studies from 40 to 80 percent.'7
probation, financial problems, substance abuse, mental health treatment) were significantly more
likely to be disciplined as attorneys than applicants whose preadmission histories did not include
such conduct. See id. at 8. In the aggregate, the study provides some support for this conclusion:
50 percent of disciplined attorneys, as compared with 20 percent of all bar applicants, had prob-
lematic application forms. See id. at 7. However, the small sample size makes it impossible to draw
statistically significant conclusions about the relationship between discipline and any particular type
of preapplication conduct. See Patrick L. Baude, An Essay on the Regulation of the Legal Profession and
the Future of Lawyers' Characters, 68 IND. L.J. 647, 654-55 (1993) (commenting on the findings and
limitations of the Minnesota study).
The Minnesota study provides no support at all for the notion that individuals with mental
health treatment histories are more likely than others to engage in misconduct as attorneys. Only 3.8
percent of the disciplined attorneys (two out of fifty-two) had received mental health treatment
prior to their admission. See Baer & Corneille, supra, at 7. This is actually lower than the rate of mental
health treatment among all bar applicants. Although the Minnesota study's authors do not indicate
the overall percentage of bar applicants with mental health treatment histories, based on national
statistics and studies from other states, that percentage is likely to be 15 percent or more. See supra
notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
154. 1 will discuss these findings in the section on substance abuse inquiries, infra Part IIl.B.5.
155. An extensive review of this complex body of research can be found in John Monahan, The
Scientific Status of Research on Clinical and Actuarial Predictions of Violence, in 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 7-2.0 (David L. Faigman et al. eds.,
1997 & Supp. 2000).
156. Id. § 7-2.2.1[2], at 317; see also id. § 7-2.1.1[2], at 308-11; id. § 7-2.2.1[2], at 316-17. Even if
such predictions can be made with a certain degree of accuracy, this does not mean that informa-
tion about mental illness contributes to the accuracy of the predictions. A recent analysis of the
data from many studies concludes that the accuracy of predictions of crime or violence for persons
with mental disorders depends on consideration of the same risk factors that apply in the general
population: criminal history, antisocial personality, substance abuse, and family dysfunction. "Clini-
cal or psychopathological variables were either unrelated to recidivism or negatively related."
James Bonta et al., The Prediction of Criminal and Violent Recidivism Among Mentally Disordered
Offenders: A Meta-Analysis, 123 PSYCHOL. BULL. 123, 139 (1998). This suggests that, with the pos-
sible exception of substance abuse, information about diagnosis and treatment for mental disorders
would not enhance the accuracy of bar examiners' predictions of bar applicants' future behavior.
157. See Deidre Klassen & William A. O'Connor, A Prospective Study of Predictors of Violence in
Adult Male Mental Health Admissions, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 143, 144-45, 152 (1988). The false
positive problem stems from the fact that the vast majority of people with serious mental disorders
will not engage in violent or criminal acts. See Monahan, supra note 155, § 7.2.2.1, at 315 (finding
that at least 90 percent of those with current serious mental disorders are not violent). Although
data is lacking, it is reasonable to assume that this is also the case in the bar admissions context: most
applicants who are required to answer "yes" to bar examiners' mental health questions will not engage
in serious acts of professional misconduct after admission. When predicting conduct that has a low
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Disability inquiries fail the strict scrutiny test for a second reason as well.
As we will see in the next part, bar examiners deem applicants unfit on the
basis of information produced by a mental health question only in an extraor-
dinarily small number of cases. The minimal utility that examiners can claim
for the questions fails to satisfy the strong version of "necessity" that under-
lies the strict scrutiny approach."8
2. Relaxed Scrutiny
In 1994, in Applicants v. Texas State Board of Law Examiners,'59 a federal
judge rejected an ADA challenge to an application form question requiring
disclosure of any diagnosis or treatment for "bipolar disorder, schizophrenia,
paranoia or any other psychotic disorder" during the past ten years.160 The
court endorsed the "necessity" test and agreed with prior decisions finding
that broad inquiries into all past mental health treatment violate the
ADA. 16 However, it held that narrowly framed questions focusing on "seri-
ous mental illnesses" that may affect a person's ability to practice law are
"necessary to ensure the integrity of the Board's licensing procedure" in
performing its basic function of ensuring that admitted attorneys "are capable
of practicing law in a competent and ethical manner."'62 Federal courts in
Virginia, Florida and Illinois have also endorsed disability-based questions
that are limited to certain serious disorders with limited time frames.
overall incidence, even a highly accurate prediction instrument will yield high rates of false positives.
See Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry J. Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness:
Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084, 1089-91 (1976); Dershowitz, supra note
152, at 816-18.
The following example illustrates why this is so. Assume that a clinician can predict, with an 80
percent rate of accuracy, whether a bar applicant with a past diagnosis of mental illness will engage
in professional misconduct as an attorney. Also assume that 10 percent of such applicants will engage
in misconduct after admission. Thus, out of every 1000 people our clinician interviews, 100 will com-
mit an act of misconduct. With her 80 percent accuracy rate, our clinician will correctly identify eighty
of the 100 applicants who will commit misconduct. But what about the 900 applicants who will not
engage in misconduct? Our clinician will correctly identify 720 of them (80 percent of 900). This
means, however, that she will incorrectly label 180 of these individuals as future wrongdoers. The false
positive rate can be calculated by dividing the number of erroneous predictions of misconduct (180)
by the total number of predictions of misconduct (180 plus eighty, or 260). The false positive rate
here is 69 percent. Despite our clinician's overall 80 percent accuracy rate, when predicting that
particular individuals will engage in misconduct, she is wrong 69 percent of the time.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 148-151.
159. No. A-93-CA-740-SS, 1994 WL 923404 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1994).
160. Id. at *6.
161. See id. at *6-*7.
162. Id. at *9.
163. U.S. District Judge James C. Cacheris has ruled on two ADA challenges to questions on
Virginia's bar application form. In Clark v. Virginia Board of Bar Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D.
Va. 1995), he struck down, after a full trial, a question that required applicants to disclose all mental
144 49 UCLA LAW REVIEW 93 (2001)
These courts employ approach an approach that I will call "relaxed
scrutiny." Instead of requiring evidence that preapplication mental health
conditions correlate with future performance problems, they are willing to
rely on a commonsense notion that the symptoms of some mental disorders
can interfere with a person's ability to practice law. Some disorders are
characterized by chronic or recurrent symptoms-for example, hallucina-
tions, delusions, paranoia, abuse of drugs or alcohol-that, if active and
uncontrolled, may pose a risk of harm to clients or the public.'64 Anecdotal
evidence of disciplinary cases in which mental health problems led to mis-
conduct underscores the connection.65 Viewed from this perspective, it seems
legitimate for examiners to seek some assurance from medical experts that
an applicant's condition is currently under control.
Examiners can also try to ascertain whether the applicant is committed
to controlling the risks in the future. As the Texas Applicants court put it,
Although a past diagnosis of the mental illness will not necessarily
predict the applicant's future behavior, the mental health history is
health treatment or counseling in the past five years. Although parts of the decision resonate with
the "strict scrutiny" approach and suggest that behavior-based inquiries are sufficient to ensure effec-
tive screening, the court also intimated that narrower, diagnosis-based questions might be justified.
See id. at 435-36, 444, 446. A "relaxed" approach to empirical validation also underlies the Clark
court's analysis of the mental health question's effectiveness. See infra note 167.
Three years later, in O'Brien v. Virginia Board of Bar Examiners, No. 98-0009-A, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4344 (E.D. Va. Jan. 23, 1998), Judge Cacheris made it clear that he would approve
a Texas-style question. After Clark, Virginia had narrowed its mental health questions to focus on a
list of specified disorders, including substance abuse, schizophrenia, major depression, bipolar dis-
order, and antisocial personality disorder. See id. at *8. In denying a preliminary injunction, Judge
Cacheris stated that the new question was narrowly tailored and served the public interest, and that
the plaintiff was unlikely to succeed with his ADA claim on the merits. See id. at *9.
The Florida decision involved a challenge to a questionnaire that required applicants for state
judgeships to disclose all past mental health and substance abuse treatment, and many physical
impairments as well. The court granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that the questions vio-
lated the ADA because they were overbroad and unnecessary. See Doe v. Judicial Nominating
Comm'n, 906 F. Supp. 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1995). At the same time, it strongly endorsed Applicants v.
Texas State Board of Law Examiners and stated that "reasonable, narrowly-drawn" disability questions
would satisfy Title II's necessity test. See id. at 1541-42.
In the Illinois case, a federal district court judge held that inquiries posed to a bar applicant's
references did not violate the ADA. See McCready v. Ill. Bd. of Admissions to the Bar, No. 94-C-
3582, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 791 (N.D. 11. Jan. 23, 1995); see also supra note 114 (discussing the
court's reasoning). In dicta, the court strongly endorsed the Texas Applicants court's approach to
application form inquiries. See id. at *20-*21.
164. See Clark, 880 F. Supp. at 436; Texas Applicants, 1994 WL 923404, at *2-*3.
165. See Doe, 906 F. Supp. at 1545 (finding that the necessity for substance abuse questions
was shown by recent history demonstrating "that drug addiction can render a judicial officer vul-
nerable to corruption and breach of the public trust"); Clark, 880 F. Supp. at 436 ("[Rlecent cases
of acute mental disability among lawyers which have resulted in license suspensions" support the
conclusion that "untreated mental or emotional illness may result in injury to clients" and that
some form of mental health inquiry is necessary.).
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important to provide the Board with information regarding the appli-
cant's insight into his or her illness and degree of cooperation in con-
trolling it through counseling and medication.
66
A court can feel comfortable deferring to examiners' fitness determinations
when their role is defined in this way: Even if they are not mental health
experts, making judgments about attitude and responsible behavior is bar
examiners' stock-in-trade.
This outlook invites a much less stringent approach to empirical vali-
dation. If the decisions of bar examiners can be accorded a presumption
of correctness, a question's effectiveness can be measured by how often it pro-
duces information that the examiners themselves deem relevant to their
fitness decisions. Thus, in Texas Applicants, the court found that a study
conducted by the Texas Board established the utility of a mental health
inquiry. 67 The study showed that, over a seven-year period, nineteen appli-
cations were identified by the Board's staff as involving serious mental
health concerns, and thirteen of these cases would have gone undetected in
the absence of a mental health question on the application form. 66  There
166. Texas Applicants, 1994 WL 923404, at *3. The preamble to the NCBE's mental health
questions similarly suggests that the crucial issue is the applicant's attitude and behavior in dealing
with disability:
The mere fact of treatment for mental health problems or addictions is not, in itself, a basis
on which an applicant is ordinarily denied admission in most jurisdictions, and boards of
bar examiners routinely certify for admission individuals who have demonstrated per-
sonal responsibility and maturity in dealing with mental health and addiction issues.
NCBE CHARACTER REPORT, supra note 10, at 12.
167. See Texas Applicants, 1994 WL 923404, at *4-*5. In Clark, the court employed a similar
approach by assessing the effectiveness of Virginia's mental health question by reference to how
often it produced information that affected fitness decisions. The question failed even this lax stan-
dard. Over a five-year period, forty-seven applicants had responded affirmatively to a question
about mental health treatment. In only two of these cases did the Board conclude that the appli-
cant's mental health history raised serious issues about current fitness, and neither case resulted in
the denial of a license. See Clark, 880 F. Supp. at 434-35, 437.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals also assessed the need for mental health inquiries
by reference to their impact on admissions decisions. In 1992, the court ordered the removal of a
broad mental health question from the D.C. application form because, in the admission committee's
experience, the question "rarely, if ever, brought to light a serious fitness question that was not high-
lighted by other information (concerning litigation, employment, encounters with legal authori-
ties, academic or bar discipline, etc.)." Reischel, supra note 115, at 10-11. A substance abuse inquiry
was retained because the committee found that affirmative answers were "not infrequently associ-
ated with conduct raising very serious fitness problems." Id. at 11 (describing the basis for the court's
unreported action); see also id. at 20.
168. See Texas Applicants, 1994 WL 923404, at *4-*5. This finding led the court to conclude
that behavior-based questions alone are insufficient: "Although relying on past behavior in other
areas may reveal behavior relevant to mental fitness, the evidence reflected that in the majority of
cases already reviewed by the Board, this was not the case." Id. at *7. The court reasoned that
behavior- and performance-based questions will fail to detect some cases in which mental illness affects
current fitness because of the limited employment history of many law students, the reluctance of
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were five cases in which the mental health question yielded information
that led to a result other than the unconditional admission of the applicant.6 9
Note that this is an extremely small pay-off rate. The mental health ques-
tion produced outcome-affecting information an average of 0.7 times per
year in a state that gets well over two thousand bar applications annually.'
To courts in the "relaxed scrutiny" camp, however, uncovering even a few
cases of unfitness is enough to satisfy the necessity test. A lofty conception
of the legal profession informs this approach. In Texas Applicants, the court
posed a series of rhetorical questions that linked the necessity of mental
health questions to the importance of lawyers' responsibilities:
Although a negative light is often cast upon the legal profession in the
information that the general public receives and hears, in reality, lawyers
serve the important role in our society of assisting people in the man-
agement of the most important of their affairs.... Lawyers counsel
individuals contemplating everything from divorce, bankruptcy, and
the disposal of assets to the institutionalization of a loved one. Is it nec-
essary that the Board inquire whether an applicant has been diagnosed
or treated for bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, paranoia, or other
psychosis before licensing the individual to assume these responsibil-
ities? Before licensing the individual to write wills, manage trusts set
up for minors and disabled individuals, or draft contracts affecting
references to provide negative information, and the difficulties of deciding what kinds of past prob-
lems should trigger further scrutiny of an applicant's current mental fitness. See id. at *8 & n.15.
Nor would it be sufficient to ask applicants whether they suffer from any condition that would impair
their performance as an attorney; this type of question would be more likely to produce dishonest
responses and miss those "who do not recognize or understand the nature and extent of their illness."
Id. at *7; see also Doe, 906 F. Supp. at 1541-42 (endorsing Texas Applicants' conclusions on the inade-
quacy of behavior-based and self-assessment questions).
169. Over the seven-year period, there were a total of eight cases involving mental health issues
that ended in an outcome other than unconditional admission. In five of those eight cases, the Board
would not have been aware of any problem in the absence of a mental health inquiry. Only one of these
applicants was actually denied admission. Two withdrew after a hearing was scheduled, one was granted
a conditional license requiring continuing mental health counseling, and one had been given a hearing
with the results still pending at the time of the court's decision. See Texas Applicants, 1994 WL 923404,
at *5.
The number of cases in which substance abuse affected the outcome was much larger. See Jack
W. Marshall, Probationary Licensure in Texas, B. EXAMINER, May 1997, at 31, 36 (explaining that
over a seven-year period, probationary licenses were granted to about fifty applicants based on sub-
stance abuse concerns). Substance abuse questions were not challenged in the Texas Applicants case,
so no statistics are available on how many of these applicants were identified through questions focusing
on diagnosis and treatment, as opposed to behavioral questions.
170. See Admission to Bar by States-1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998, B. EXAMINER, May
1999, at 15 (number of applicants admitted by examination in Texas per year ranged from 2487 to
3372). One might, however, argue that even such small gains add significant utility in the context of
a screening system that is geared towards excluding a tiny number of applicants. Nationwide, only
about one in 500 bar applicants are refused admission on character grounds each year. See Rhode,
supra note 17, at 516.
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parties' rights and finances? Before licensing the individual to represent
a parent in a proceeding to determine if the parent will maintain or
lose custody of a child? Before licensing the individual to represent
a [sic] individual charged with a crime who faces [the] loss of liberty
or even life?1
71
Bar examiners, the court wrote, have an "awesome responsibility" to the public
that requires them to make "every effort" to ensure that admitted attorneys
will not pose a danger to their clients.17 1 Under this necessity test, in contrast
with the one envisioned in the "strict scrutiny" cases, the stakes are too high
to sacrifice even small amounts of screening effectiveness for the sake of the
ADA.
The "relaxed scrutiny" approach gives the ADA its due by insisting that
inquiries be narrowly tailored.'73 Just as the decisions are willing assume a com-
monsense connection between the symptoms of certain "serious" disorders and
law practice as a basis for concluding that inquiries are necessary, they reject
questions that sweep in conditions that seem obviously irrelevant to a person's
ability to function as a lawyer.'74 Thus, the "relaxed" cases uniformly find that
171. Texas Applicants, 1994 WL 923404, at *8.
172. Id. The subject of bar admissions has often evoked paeans to the bar's high calling
from judges. The rhetoric of Justice Felix Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), is particularly florid but not atypical:
One does not have to inhale the self-adulatory bombast of after-dinner speeches to affirm that
all the interests of man that are comprised under the constitutional guarantees given to "life,
liberty and property" are in the professional keeping of lawyers.... From a profession charged
with such responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high
sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibil-
ity, that have, throughout the centuries, been compendiously described as "moral
character." . . . ITihe profession itself, through appropriate committees, has long had a vital
interest, as a sifting agency, in determining the fitness, and above all the moral fitness, of
those who are certified to be entrusted with the fate of clients.
Id. at 247-48.
173. See Doe, 906 F. Supp. at 1542-44 (holding that while status-based questions about dis-
ability are necessary, overinclusive questions that require disclosure of matters irrelevant to current
fitness are inconsistent with the ADA's goals of eradicating discrimination and stereotypes); Texas
Applicants, 1994 WL 923404, at *9 (stating that the Board's "narrowly focused question" burdens
persons with disabilities "in the least intrusive, least discriminatory manner possible" and thus strikes the
"appropriate balance" between public protection and "the goal of the ADA to integrate those defined
as mentally disabled into society").
174. The court in Doe v. Judicial Nominating Commission gave these examples of mental health
treatment that would be irrelevant to an applicant's fitness: "hospitalization or treatment resulting
from personal traumas such as ... loss of a loved one," or counseling obtained by a person who
"as a child, had been psychologically abused by an alcoholic parent and thereafter, as an adult,
sought ... therapy to resolve lingering vestiges from this problem." Doe, 906 F. Supp. at 1543-45.
Questions that ask about all diagnosis and treatment for mental disorders do indeed reach
an extraordinarily broad range of conditions affecting large numbers of people. Conditions classi-
fied as mental disorders by the American Psychiatric Association include insomnia, sexual dysfunctions,
phobias such as fear of heights or insects, adjustment disorders (which may be diagnosed whenever
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inquiries requiring disclosure of all mental health treatment or counseling
are overinclusive and hence fail Title 1I's necessity test."' The decisions also
condemn as overbroad inquiries that lack a reasonable time limitation. 176 But
if a question zeroes in on "serious" mental health conditions or substance
abuse, and does not go too far back in time, a court that accepts the assump-
tions of the relaxed scrutiny approach may be willing to uphold it.
III. CAN "NARROW" MENTAL HEALTH QUESTIONS BE JUSTIFIED?
A. Relaxed Scrutiny: Some Problems and the Need for Refinement
I will not attempt, in this Article, a detailed analysis of the relative merits
of the two basic approaches that have emerged in the case law. My own view
is that strict scrutiny is truer to the ADA's purposes.'77 Any gains to public
protection that accrue from disability questions on application forms are
uncertain but certainly small, while the questions clearly inflict hurt and
a person shows greater-than-usual distress, usually lasting no more than six months, in response to a
traumatic experience), and bereavement. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASs'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 405-11, 493-538, 553-57, 623-27, 684-85 (4th ed. 1994)
[hereinafter DSM-IV]. Large nationwide studies have found that nearly 50 percent of Americans have
experienced a diagnosable mental disorder at some point in their lives, and that at any one point in
time about 22 percent of the population has a mental disorder, 28 percent if substance abuse
disorders are included. See Ronald C. Kessler et al., Lifetime and 12-Month Prevalence of DSM-III-R
Psychiatric Disorders in the United States, 51 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 8 (1994); Darrel A. Regier
et al., The de Facto US Mental and Addictive Disorders Service System, 50 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY
85, 88 (1993).
175. See O'Brien v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, No. 98-0009-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4344, at
*6-*7 (E.D. Va. Jan. 23, 1998); Doe, 906 F. Supp. at 1542-45; Texas Applicants, 1994 WL 923404,
at *7.
176. See Doe, 906 F. Supp. at 1545 (explaining that a question to judicial applicants about past
substance abuse "at minimum .... must be subject to reasonable time limitations" in order to comply
with the ADA); Texas Applicants, 1994 WL 923404, at *3, *7, *9 (approving a ten-year time frame
for questions because the period between active episodes of symptoms of schizophrenia or bipolar
disorder may be as much as ten years); Reischel, supra note 115, at 10 (describing a decision of the
D.C. Court of Appeals to limit substance abuse and hospitalization questions to a five-year period).
177. The strict scrutiny approach better serves the ADA's stated purpose of providing "a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities," 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(b)(1) (1994), and accords with the Congressional findings that
individuals with disabilities are a "discrete and insular minority" who have faced a history of pervasive
discrimination, segregation, and political powerlessness. Id. § 12,101(a)(2), (7); see Michael L. Perlin,
The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes Be Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15,
16-17 (1993-1994). Requiring a strong and compelling showing of necessity when the state
imposes burdens on the basis of an individual's disability status is also consistent with the approach
taken under Title VII to overtly discriminatory classifications that are based on gender, national
origin, or religion. See Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200-01 (1991) (stating
that the "bona fide occupational qualification" defense for overtly discriminatory policies must be
narrowly and stringently construed).
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inconvenience, and reinforce status-based stereotypes. Nonetheless, the
relaxed approach has been accepted by an increasing number of courts.' In
an era of "ADA backlash," this trend is likely to continue. 9 The approach
also accords with the traditional deference that courts have shown to bar
admission authorities."' The necessity of probing serious mental health
conditions before unleashing new lawyers on the public will strike many
courts as a matter of "common sense.,181
For present purposes, however, let us accept the central assumptions
of the relaxed scrutiny framework. To recap, these are: (1) The validity of
an inquiry can be established by showing that it (a) focuses on disorders
which, when active and uncontrolled, are likely to impair a lawyer's per-
formance in ways that potentially endanger clients, and (b) yields informa-
tion that exam-iners have deemed relevant to their fitness decisions, and
that would not have been discovered in the absence of the disability ques-
tion. (2) A question that produces any net gain in public protection-even
the exclusion of a few unfit applicants-is necessary. (3) Questions must not
178. Since the Texas Applicants decision in 1994, only the Rhode Island Supreme Court has
opted for the strict approach, while federal courts in Virginia, Florida, and Illinois have embraced the
relaxed position. See supra notes 141, 163. However, no federal appeals court has yet ruled on the
legality of an application form inquiry under Title II of the ADA. It is still possible that a strict scru-
tiny approach will prevail.
179. See generally Symposium, Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Impli-
cations for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2000). The ABA's Commission
on Mental and Physical Disability Law acknowledged which way the wind was blowing when, in
1998, it prepared a proposed resolution and report for the ABA House of Delegates on the subject
of mental health inquiries on judicial screening forms. Four years earlier, the Commission had taken
a strong stand against all mental health questions on bar application forms. See ABA COMM'N REP.,
supra note 42. This time, it conceded that certain mental health conditions "that no longer are
present or have been treated successfully may be so serious and create such a risk of inappropriate
judicial behavior or judicial incompetence that they deserve to be further scrutinized." ABA
Comm'n on Mental & Physical Disability Law, Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities,
Judicial Division, Recommendation to the House of Delegates, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY
L. REP. 266, 268 (1998).
180. See, e.g., Tang v. Appellate Div. of N.Y. Sup. Ct., 487 F.2d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 1973).
181. See, for example, the rhetorical questions posed by the court in Texas Applicants, quoted
supra text accompanying notes 170-172, and that court's statement that "[i]t is ludicrous... to
propose" that the ADA prohibits questions on bar application forms about serious mental
illnesses. Texas Applicants, 1994 WL 923404, at *9; see also McCready v. Ill. Bd. of Admissions to
the Bar, No. 94-C-3582, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 791, at *22 (N.D. I11. Jan. 23, 1995) (repeating the
Texas Applicants court's statements).
This is not an argument for the relaxed approach, just an explanation of its appeal. What seems
intuitively obvious often is rooted in prejudice and unfounded assumptions. In the realm of mental
health law, particularly, judges have frequently disregarded empirical evidence in favor of myth-
perpetuating "ordinary common sense." See Perlin, supra note 177, at 29-32. As Judge Guido Calabresi
has pointed out, "unthinking reliance on intuition" in dealing with persons with disabilities is
"among the barriers that the Rehabilitation Act [and later the ADA] was designed to overcome."
Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1995).
150 49 UCLA LAW REVIEW 93 (2001)
be overbroad (that is, should not sweep in conditions that fail to satisfy the
first criterion), and must be limited to a reasonable time frame.
In the discussion that follows, I will try to show that even under the
premises of relaxed scrutiny, many of the "narrow" disability inquiries that
frequently appear on bar application forms cannot be justified under the
ADA. Before I turn to the specific topics that examiners ask about, I need
to touch on three additional issues--deterrence of treatment, the failure to ask
about physical disabilities, and the availability of conditional admissions-
that must be considered if the relaxed scrutiny approach is to be applied in a
principled way.
1. Deterrence of Treatment
The public protection rationale for allowing a disability inquiry makes
sense only if the question produces a net gain in public protection. The cal-
culus must include public protection costs as well as benefits. Disability
questions can discourage prospective applicants from obtaining needed treat-
ment. To avoid the embarrassment of disclosure and the prospect of hearings,
delays, and possibly even a denial of admission, a law student experiencing
serious mental health difficulties or problems with alcohol or drugs may not
seek help for the problem. Even if the student does see a counselor, the
knowledge that examiners will seek treatment records may make her unwilling
to disclose the full extent of her problems or discuss sensitive personal
information, thereby undermining the effectiveness of treatment. The end
result is likely to be the admission of some applicants who are less well-
prepared to deal with the stresses of law practice, and more likely to pose a
danger to clients.182
It is impossible to establish with precision how often bar inquiries pre-
vent or interfere with treatment,"" but there is strong evidence that the
deterrent effect is real. The Surgeon General's 1999 report on mental health,
reviewing studies on the role of confidentiality in mental health treatment,
182. For a detailed discussion of why mental health inquiries are likely to discourage and
interfere with the effectiveness of treatment, at significant cost to lawyer fitness, see Stephen T.
Maher & Lori Blum, A Strategy for Increasing the Mental and Emotional Fimess of Bar Applicants, 23
IND. L. REV. 821, 830-46 (1990).
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the absence of confidentiality assurances is
likely to deter people from obtaining mental health treatment. In holding that a therapist-patient
privilege should apply in federal court proceedings, the Court reasoned that effective mental health
treatment is undermined by the possibility of disclosures and that the public will suffer if people holding
stressful jobs with important public responsibilities (in that case, police officers) are deterred from
obtaining counseling. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-11 & n.10 (1996).
183. See Maher & Blum, supra note 182, at 832 (discussing some of the methodological
problems in designing a study of deterrence).
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concluded that "[a]vailable research supports [the] assumptions [that] people
will be less likely to seek needed help ... and, once in treatment, less
likely to disclose sensitive information about themselves if they believe that
the information may be disseminated outside the treatment relationship." '184
A large national survey of law students, sponsored by the Association of
American Law Schools (AALS) Special Committee on Problems of Substance
Abuse, provides more direct evidence that bar inquiries have an impact on law
students' willingness to seek help for alcohol and drug problems:
In the Law Student Survey, students were asked whether they would
seek assistance from a law school or university substance abuse pro-
gram if they believed that they had a substance abuse problem. Only 10
percent answered an unqualified yes. But 41 percent responded that
they would seek assistance if they were assured that bar officials would
not have access to the information. Another question asked students
whether they would refer to counseling or treatment a fellow law stu-
dent whom they considered to have a problem. Only 19 percent
indicated an unreserved yes, but another 47 percent answered yes if
assured that bar officials would not have access to the information.
These answers, together with considerable anecdotal evidence, indicate
that law students' concerns about confidentiality probably reduce
significantly not only the number of students willing to self-refer but
also the number who would report an impaired colleague.s'
Many law school faculty members, administrators, and counselors have
described encounters with law students who decided not to seek help for
mental health or substance abuse problems out of fear of what would need
to be reported to the bar examiners.'
184. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 440-41; see also id. at 8. In a 1993 Harris
survey, 7 percent of respondents reported that they had actually refrained from seeking medical
care for a problem because of concern that information about their treatment might harm their employ-
ment or other opportunities. See id. at 440-41.
185. Report of the AALS Special Committee on Problems of Substance Abuse in Law Schools, 44 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 35, 55 (1994) [hereinafter Report of the AALS Special Committee]. The survey was
distributed in 1991 to all students enrolled at nineteen law schools that were selected to provide a repre-
sentative sample of the national law school population. Surveys were returned by 3388 students, about
25 percent of those to whom the survey was sent. See id. at 40.
186. See Deposition of Dean Paul R. Marcus at 7-10 (May 25, 1994), Clark v. Va. Board of Bar
Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1995) (No. C.A. 94-211-A) (containing a law school dean's
testimony that a "sizeable number" of students have indicated to him, after learning that counsel-
ing might need to be disclosed on bar application form, that they were not likely to seek counsel-
ing); Michael Distelhorst, The Problematic Nature of a Confidentiality Differential in Cases of Law
Practitioner Versus Law Student Chemical Dependency, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1993, at 24 (reporting
that one of the first questions asked by law students contemplating seeking help is the extent of
confidentiality, and that the author, a law professor who frequently counsels students with chemical
dependency problems, is often unable to persuade students to get help because they fear having to
disclose it to bar examiners); Hagenbaugh, supra note 37, at 14, 30 (quoting a law school professor on
49 UCLA LAW REVIEW 93 (2001)
The issue of deterrence has been discussed in some of the ADA bar
inquiry decisions, but only in those cases where the court applied the strict
scrutiny approach or struck down a broad question that required the disclo-
sure of all mental health counseling. 8 ' The decisions that endorse inquiries
focusing on "serious" mental disorders or substance abuse, under the relaxed
scrutiny framework, ignore the issue entirely. This is indefensible. An
approach that rests on the overriding importance of protecting the public
from unfit lawyers must seriously grapple with the question of whether the
gains in public protection achieved by identifying some potentially unfit
applicants are offset by the costs to lawyer fitness of discouraging preadmis-
sion treatment. As we shall see, for at least two of the conditions that bar
examiners frequently target, substance abuse and depressive disorders, there
are particularly strong reasons for believing that inquiries will deter a sig-
nificant number of people from obtaining treatment during their law school
years, at considerable cost to fitness. These harms should weigh against a
finding of "necessity" when examiners can only point to rare instances in
which the question succeeded in uncovering potentially unfit applicants who
otherwise would have passed undetected.
an encounter with a student who was deterred from seeking treatment, and a university counseling
director who often hears law students express confidentiality concerns); Petition of Professor
Philip P. Frickey et al., In re Petition for Order of This Court Directing the State Board of Law
Examiners to Delete Questions 4.22, 4.23 and 4.24 from the Application for Admission to Bar of
Minnesota at 6 (Mar. 10, 1994) (on file with author) (describing the incident of a student who,
when a professor expressed concern about her apparent depression, responded that "she will consider
counseling after she has safely been admitted to the bar," and another incident in which a student
disclosed to a professor "that she ... has for the past year been avoiding seeking professional help
because she is afraid of putting herself in the position of having to disclose mental health
treatment in her bar application"); Jane Thierfeld Brown & Ellen Rutt, The Changing Nature of Law
School Students with Disabilities: A Growing Challenge, POSTSECONDARY DISABILITY NETWORK
NEWS (A.J. Pappinikou Ctr. on Special Educ. and Rehabilitation, Univ. of Conn.), Spring 1999,
at 6 (stating the observations of a law school disability coordinator and dean for student affairs that
many students with disabilities go to great lengths to conceal their status out of fear that bar examin-
ers will become aware of their conditions); Letter from Dan Larson, M.D., to Prof. Philip P. Frickey
(Nov. 10, 1992) (on file with author) (reporting that the director of a student mental health
clinic at the University of Minnesota has seen a significant number of professional students "who
have voiced concerns and some of whom have refused treatment such as with antidepressant
medications for fear of the impact on future applications"); Letter from Patricia la Plante, Ph.D.,
to Prof. Philip P. Frickey (Nov. 10, 1992) (on file with author) (reporting that a number of law
students declined to use counseling services at Hamline University after learning of the disclosure
requirement on the bar application form).
187. See Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 437-38 (E.D. Va. 1995); In re
Petition of Frickey, 515 N.W. 2d 741 (Minn. 1994); In re Petition & Questionnaire for Admission
to the R.I. Bar, 683 A.2d 1333, 1336 (R.I. 1996).
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2. Underinclusiveness: The Failure to Inquire About Physical Disabilities
Bar examiners, by and large, do not ask applicants about physical disabili-
ties. A provision of the Code of Recommended Standards for Bar Examiners,'8
adopted in 1987, expressly places the subject off-limits, stating that "the
physical disability of the applicant is not relevant to character and fitness for
law practice and should not be considered."'' 9 Critics of mental health inquir-
ies have charged that a sole focus on mental disorders is discriminatory:
[T]he fact that bar examiners collect only information on treatment or
counseling for a mental or emotional disorder rather than all medical
conditions is discriminatory on its face. Other medical conditions
can have a bearing on fitness to practice law, since physical illnesses
or conditions can affect the ability to concentrate, to complete work in
a timely manner and adhere to deadlines and otherwise to serve
clients. Yet, examiners seek information only about treatment for
mental or emotional conditions, a practice that plainly and invidi-
ously discriminates against those having undergone this form of medical
intervention.190
188. Am. Bar Ass'n et al., Code of Recommended Standards for Bar Examiners, in NCBE & ABA
SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR
ADMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS (2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/publications/
Compguide2000/cgcode.html. The Code of Recommended Standards, issued jointly by the NCBE,
ABA and AALS, was initially adopted in 1959, revised in 1980, and revised again in 1987 with the
addition of the current character and fitness standards.
189. Id. at standard 15; see also Daniel C. Brennan, Defining Moral Character and Fitness, B.
EXAMINER, Nov. 1989, at 24, 28 (providing interview guidelines for New York Character and Fitness
Committee advising committee members to avoid asking about or commenting on an applicant's
physical disability).
Deborah Rhode's 1982-1983 survey of inquiries on bar application forms found that only 10 per-
cent of American jurisdictions asked questions about physical ailments. See Rhode, supra note 17,
at 595. The number has probably declined further since then, although as of the mid-1990s, physical
disability questions appeared on a few states' application forms. See Herr, supra note 6, at 648 n.63
& 649 n.69. North Carolina's form asked whether applicants had ever been "impaired" as a result of
any "medical, surgical, or psychiatric condition." Id. at 648 n.63. Kentucky's form included, "Are
you currently, or have you been, within the last 5 years, (a) diagnosed with or, (b) treated for any
physical condition (for example stroke, head injury, dementia, brain tumor, heart disease) that has
resulted in significant memory loss, significant loss of consciousness or significant confusion?" Id. at
649 n.69.
190. ABA COMM'N REP., supra note 42, at 4; see also Coleman & Shellow, supra note 135, at
157-58 (arguing that the failure of boards to ask about physical conditions reflects prejudice and a
basic misunderstanding of mental illness); Herr, supra note 6, at 642 (noting that "state bars do not
ask questions about physical conditions that might pose a risk to fitness to practice, such as narco-
lepsy or chronic fatigue syndrome"); Florence W. Kaslow, Moral, Emotional and Physical Fitness for
the Bar: Pondering (Seeming) Imponderables, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1982, at 38, 44--45 (noting the impor-
tance of physical health to the "energy, vitality and clarity of thought" needed for effective client
representation, and the absence of questions about physical maladies on bar application forms).
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The ADA bar inquiry decisions have largely ignored this issue, 9' but the
argument cannot be easily dismissed. According to courts that adhere to the
relaxed scrutiny approach, examiners are justified in asking about illnesses
characterized by symptoms that are likely to interfere with law practice. In par-
ticular, they need to inquire to assess the applicant's insight into the condi-
tion and degree of cooperation in controlling it, in order to gauge whether the
applicant is capable of and committed to minimizing the risks to clients.'92
These justifications apply equally well to numerous physical conditions of a
chronic, recurrent or progressive nature that are likely to interfere at some
point with a lawyer's ability to meet client responsibilities, such as cancer,
heart disease, AIDS, multiple sclerosis, or chronic fatigue syndrome.
Both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct'93 and the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility'94 require that an attorney not undertake or continue a
representation when a physical or mental condition would prevent him or her
from providing competent representation.'95 In the case of physical disabilities,
examiners presume that applicants will live up to their ethical obligations.
They do not use the existence of a physical disability as a trigger for probing
whether the applicant has behaved responsibly in managing the condition,
and can be trusted to take appropriate steps to protect clients if it interferes
with performance in the future.'96 Bar application forms that single out mental
disorders and substance abuse reflect a presumption that only applicants
with these conditions cannot be trusted to abide by their ethical responsibil-
ity, and require further scrutiny to assess whether they are capable of, and com-
mitted to, doing so. The distinction is invidious and discriminatory, unless
the particular conditions that examiners single out for scrutiny have some
distinguishing feature that justifies the difference in treatment.
This distinction can be justified only if examiners restrict their inquiries
to conditions with symptoms that not only may interfere with a lawyer's ability
to practice-in that sense, bipolar disorder is no different than chronic heart
191. The only exception is Clark v. Virginia Board of Bar Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va.
1995). The court mentioned, in passing, that in contrast with mental health conditions, the Virginia
application "does not... inquire into physical disabilities which may impair one's ability to practice
law." Id. at 432-33. It drew no conclusions from this.
192. See Applicants v. Tex. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, No. A-93-CA-740-SS, 1994 WL 923404,
at *3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1994).
193. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1983).
194. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1981).
195. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(2), 1.1 (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101, EC 1-6 (1981).
196. Cf. Sarah O'Neill Sparboe, Comment, Must Bar Examiners Accommodate the Disabled in the
Administration of Bar Exams?, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391, 423-24 (1995) (arguing that appli-
cants with learning disabilities should be admitted to the bar because they can be trusted to abide by
ethical rules requiring lawyers to handle only matters that they are competent to handle).
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disease-but that also are likely to prevent an individual from recognizing
and dealing appropriately with an inability to function. The presence of such
symptoms might justify a special concern about how the applicant has acted,
and is prepared to act, to treat and control the illness. As we will see, some of
the conditions targeted in application form inquiries may meet this test (for
example, substance abuse, because of the denial that characterizes it; mania
in bipolar disorder), while others (depression, hospitalizations) cannot.1 97
3. Conditional Admissions
In 1967, the Supreme Court of Nevada dealt with the appeal of Melvin
Schaengold, who was denied admission by the Nevada bar examiners because
he had been hospitalized three times for depression and suicide attempts, and
was found by an evaluating psychiatrist to have a current diagnosis of "psycho-
sis characterized by a loosening of the thinking processes under pressure."'98
The court said,
We are impelled to rule for Mr. Schaengold mainly because of the
uncertainty which inheres in evaluating mental and emotional dis-
turbances. Psychiatry is far from being an exact science. A mental or
emotional disturbance requiring treatment is not an uncommon
experience for many successful business and professional people. We
fear that a grave injustice may result if we were to approve the Board's
recommendation. The price of error is too great.19
The point remains true today. A current or recent diagnosis with a
serious mental disorder cannot support a prediction about the applicant's
future behavior, as even the court in Texas Applicants acknowledged." If the
197. Some physical disabilities also meet this test. A number of general medical conditions,
including epilepsy, Huntington's disease, and hyperthyroidism, can cause psychotic symptoms such
as hallucinations or delusions. See DSM-IV, supra note 174, at 139-51, 306-10; see also Harris v. H &
W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 522 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (noting that Graves' disease can cause mood
swings, confusion, and psychosis); SYDNEY WALKER 1ll, A DOSE OF SANITY: MIND, MEDICINE AND
MISDIAGNosIs 39-41 & passim (1996) (describing cases of psychotic symptoms caused by physical
illnesses). Bar examiners can be charged with underinclusiveness for failing to ask about physical
disorders that can produce symptoms similar to those associated with the mental disorders that they
do ask about. The relative rarity of psychotic symptoms associated with some of these physical
disorders might, however, justify a decision not to ask about them.
198. In re Petition of Schaengold, 422 P.2d 686, 686-87 (Nev. 1967). The Nevada Board also
pointed to incidents of "poor emotional control" that it found corroborative of mental unfitness: two
years prior to his application he had assaulted his girlfriend, during the admissions process he pre-
sented a book with an "acerbic inscription" to the Board's chairperson, and during the hearing he
looked like he was "on the verge of losing self-control." Id. at 687.
199. Id. at 688.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 152-157, 166.
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information cannot support a denial of admission, it is hard to see how examin-
ers can be justified in asking about it.
There is, however, an alternative to denial. Fourteen states have rules
authorizing the admission of applicants on a conditional basis."' Typically,
these programs establish a probationary period during which the applicant
must comply with conditions such as avoiding disciplinary problems, pro-
viding periodic reports from a treatment provider confirming compliance with
treatment recommendations, or abstaining from alcohol and drug use. The
conditions are generally confidential, so that the attorney appears fully licensed
in the eyes of clients and colleagues." 2
The justifications for mental health inquiries offered by the relaxed scru-
tiny approach are more plausible when conditional admissions are available.
Although future behavior cannot be predicted with confidence, examiners may
be warranted in concluding, in some cases, that there is a high level of current
risk and that monitoring can help to alleviate it. The inevitable false positive
errors are more tolerable when the consequence of error is monitoring rather
than exclusion.
Conditional admission is not without its problems. It places significant
burdens on lawyers with disabilities. When conditions are imposed without
sufficient basis, or for an unreasonably long time period, conditional admission
is degrading and sc atory. As bar examiners acknowledge, their task
201. Conditional admissions are available in Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana,
Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, and
Texas. See NCBE & ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDuc. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, supra note 188,
at chart 2. California does not provide for conditional admission, but has an abeyance program that
suspends the processing of an application until the applicant has successfully completed a period of
treatment. See Jerome Braun, Dependency and Admission to the Bar: Abeyance as an Alternative to Denial,
B. EXAMINER, Feb. 1995, at 11-12. Texas is unique in that a statute prohibits the bar examiners from
denying admission solely based on a chemical dependency problem, and requires them to confer a pro-
bationary license in such cases. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 82.030, 82.038 (Vernon 1995).
202. For descriptions of various conditional admission programs, see Thomas A. Pobjecky, The
Florida Board of Bar Examiners: The Constitutional Safeguard Between Attorney Aspirants and the Public,
18 NOVA L. REv. 1313, 1329-30 (1994), Jennifer C. Clarke, Conditional Admission of Applicants to the
Bar: Protecting Public and Private Interests, B. EXAMINER, May 1995, at 53, 63-66, and Marshall, supra
note 169, at 31, 34-35,.
203. Kathleen Flaherty's case is a good example. Twice a year, she is required to submit affidavits
from her doctor and herself detailing her treatment regimen and establishing that she is complying with
it. There is no time limit on the conditions. The bar examiners' rationale for imposing these condi-
tions-that Ms. Flaherty's fitness depends on her treatment-would justify a lifetime conditional
admission for virtually every applicant with bipolar disorder. See supra Part I.C.3; see also Jerome Braun,
Some Thoughts on Alcoholism and Admission to the Bar, B. EXAMINER, May 1988, at 7, 11 (arguing that
conditional licensure should not be "so long as to be punitive or unreasonably burdensome on the
individual").
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is to assess current fitness, and not to speculate about the possibility of future
changes in the applicant's behavior.2" That is also what the ADA requires." 5
If an applicant is currently in stable recovery from substance abuse, or is
receiving effective treatment for a mental disorder, and there are no particular
reasons to doubt the applicant's willingness and ability to continue on that
path, the applicant should be admitted unconditionally. Conditional admis-
sion should be reserved for situations in which current fitness is questionable
and there is a genuine need for monitoring: for example, an applicant who has
recently abused alcohol or drugs and has not yet shown a stable course of
recovery, or an applicant with a recent episode of mania or psychosis that
resulted from a failure to take medication.
Although the use of conditional admission is not always justified, its avail-
ability should be a prerequisite to allowing disability-based questions on bar
application forms, even under the relaxed scrutiny approach. The issue has
been ignored in the decisions, however, and some courts have upheld mental
health inquiries in jurisdictions that fail to provide for conditional admission."6
204. The 1994 ABA Resolution, drafted and adopted with the NCBE's participation and support,
emphasizes that mental health questions must be "germane to the applicant's current qualifications to
practice law." ABA Resolution, supra note 8, at 598. The NCBE's application form asserts that when
examiners deny admission based on mental illness, it is because the applicant's "ability to function is
impaired in a manner relevant to the practice of law at the time that the licensing decision is made."
NCBE CHARACTER REPORT, supra note 10, at 12; see also NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR
EXAMINERS, THE BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK 73:8302 (Stuart Duhl ed., 3d ed. 1991) [hereinafter
BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK] (stating that examining boards should not consider themselves respon-
sible for assuring the public that an applicant who, at the time of admission, "is doing what is necessary
to maintain his recovery" will not relapse in the future, because "[fitness ... relates to the applicant's
integrity and character today").
205. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(11), at 73-74 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 356
(explaining that under ADA, decisions to deny employment on medical grounds must reflect a reliable
prediction that there is an "imminent" threat of harm); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n,
Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app.
§ 1630.2(m) (2000) (stating that determination of whether an individual with a disability is qualified
"should be based on the capabilities of the individual with a disability at the time of the ... decision,
and should not be based on speculation that the employee may become unable in the future"); U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 134, § 11-3.500 (explaining that inquiries by a medical licensing board
concerning applicants' disabilities would violate Title II unless "limited to conditions that currently
impair one's ability to practice medicine"); cf. Koshinski v. Decatur Foundry Inc., 177 F.3d 599, 603
(7th Cir. 1999) ("It would be hard to imagine, for example, that a court would sanction an employer's
decision to fire a qualified employee simply because his degenerative heart disease makes a future heart
attack inevitable.").
206. See generally O'Brien v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, No. 98-0009-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4344
(E.D. Va. Jan. 23, 1998); McCready v. 11. Bd. of Admissions to the Bar, No. 94-C-3582, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 791 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 1995).
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B. Assessing the Inquiries Under the Relaxed Scrutiny Framework
The call for "narrowly tailored" mental health inquiries has led most bar
examining boards to abandon questions that required applicants to reveal all
past counseling for mental health issues. The National Conference of Bar
Examiners and jurisdictions that follow its lead have honed in on bipolar disor-
der, paranoia, schizophrenia, and psychotic disorders as the specific conditions
that warrant inquiry, and a number of states have added clinical depression to
this list. The vast majority of jurisdictions continue to ask broad questions
about diagnosis or treatment for substance abuse. Questions requiring disclo-
sure of hospitalizations for mental illness also remain on some application
forms."'
The relaxed scrutiny cases generally endorse inquiries into "serious" men-
tal illnesses that may affect law practice, but offer little specific analysis of how
particular disorders relate to the criteria that may justify inquiries. In this part,
I examine whether the premises of relaxed scrutiny can actually support the
kinds of questions that examiners are asking. On close analysis, many of the
current crop of questions are overbroad, or present particular dangers of deter-
ring treatment that are likely to negate their utility, or underinclusively target
conditions that are not significantly different from physical disabilities in the
nature of the risk posed. Some of the questions also have a discriminatory
impact on women or on racial minorities. Questions focused on psychotic
disorders are defensible under the relaxed scrutiny framework, but inquiries
about depression and about mental health hospitalizations are not. Bipolar
disorder and substance abuse are closer calls; at the very least, inquiries into
these conditions need to be considerably narrower than the versions currently
extant, if they are to be allowed at all.
Two sources that I draw on extensively in this section warrant specific
mention. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 8 published
by the American Psychiatric Association, in its fourth edition (DSM-IV), is
the standard manual in the United States for the diagnosis of mental disorders.
207. Some states also ask about a laundry list of conditions that Congress exempted from
ADA protection: kleptomania, pathological or compulsive gambling, pedophilia, exhibitionism,
and voyeurism. See Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 439 n.18 (E.D. Va. 1995);
Herr, supra note 6, at 649-50 n.69 (reprinting questions from Kentucky). At least three states
also ask about antisocial personality disorder. See Roe # 2 v. Ogden, No. 99-M-967, at 5 (D. Colo.
July 7, 2000), rev'd, 253 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2001) (Colorado); Herr, supra note 6, at 649-50 n.69
(Florida and Kentucky). While not specifically exempted from ADA coverage, this condition is marked
by "a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others." DSM-IV, supra note
174, at 649. One court has expressed doubt that it should be considered a disability, "as opposed
to a complex of traits associated with antisocial conduct." Stanley v. Litscher, 213 F.3d 340, 342 (7th
Cir. 2000).
208. DSM-IV, supra note 174.
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I also frequently refer to the Surgeon General's 1999 report on mental health
(Surgeon General's Report), which provides a detailed, up-to-date summary of
scientific research on mental illnesses and treatment.
209
1. Depression
While not included in the NCBE's question, a number of states ask appli-
cants about diagnosis or treatment for major depressive disorder, or "clinical
depression." '  This inquiry has a broad impact. Major depression affects
nearly one in five Americans during their lifetimes, and between 5 percent and
10 percent of the population in any given year.21' Because severe cases of
depression often are treated in a hospital setting, questionnaires that ask about
mental health hospitalizations also force many applicants to disclose a depres-
sion diagnosis. 2
Bar examiners have justified asking about clinical depression by pointing
out that it is a serious illness that can interfere with an attorney's ability to
carry out responsibilities on behalf of clients."' Those observations are true
209. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 59-67 (discussing Connecticut's "clinical depression" ques-
tion); see also Roe # 2, No. 99-M-967, at 5 (quoting Colorado question); O'Brien, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4344, at *8 (quoting Virginia question); Clark, 880 F. Supp. at 439 n.18 (quoting Florida and Delaware
questions); Herr, supra note 6, at 649 n.69 (quoting Kentucky question). Some forms refer to "major
depressive disorder," and others to "clinical depression." The two terms are essentially synonymous. Major
depressive disorder is the official diagnostic category in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV), while the term "clinical depression" is frequently used to distinguish major depression
from less severe disorders such as "dysthymia," a milder but often more protracted form of depression, or
from ordinary feelings of sadness. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 245-46; LEWIS
WOLPERT, MALIGNANT SADNESS: THE ANATOMY OF DEPRESSION, at x, 17-18 (1999).
211. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 228; Kessler et al., supra note 174, at
10, 12; Regier et al., supra note 174, at 88. Approximately 17 percent of the population has experienced
a major depressive episode at some point in their lifetime. See Kessler et al., supra note 174, at 10, 12.
212. Connecticut's hospitalization question, for example, is what forced Rose Gower to disclose
her depression. See supra Part I.C.2. Five to 10 percent of major depressive episodes require hospitaliza-
tion. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 258. Depression was the admission diagnosis
for about 20 percent of a large sample of persons hospitalized for mental health reasons examined in one
large recent study. See Henry J. Steadman et al., Violence by People Discharged from Acute Psychiatric
Inpatient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 393, 397
tbl. 1 (1998).
213. When asked by a reporter why the Connecticut Bar Examining Committee had recently
added clinical depression to the list of disorders it inquires about, the committee's chairperson
responded, "We believed there were enough instances of clinical depression that were identifiable to
make this relevant.... We want to know if the person who was suffering from clinical depression was
subsequently able to function." Hamilton, supra note 65. The counsel to Florida's Board of Bar
Examiners, in an article defending mental health inquiries, cited a disciplinary case in which an attorney
failed to prosecute a client's case, and the court found that chronic depression was a substantial cause of
the lawyer's inaction. See Thomas A. Pobjecky, Mental Health Inquiries: To Ask, or Not to Ask-That Is
the Question, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1992, at 31, 35.
enough, but cannot justify making depression a target for special scrutiny. As
discussed below, depression inquiries are difficult to distinguish in a princi-
pled way from numerous physical conditions that bar examiners do not ask
about. Depression questions also come with particularly high deterrence costs,
which negate any utility that can plausibly be claimed for them. Finally,
depression inquiries have a disparate impact on women and raise especially
sensitive privacy concerns.
A diagnosis of major depressive disorder is given when an individual
has experienced at least one major depressive episode.214 The primary features
of such an episode are depressed mood and/or a loss of interest or pleasure in
nearly all the activities of life. At least four other symptoms, drawn from the
following list, must also be present:
" a significant decrease or increase in appetite, with weight loss or weight
gain;
" insomnia or sleeping too much;
" noticeable agitation or slowing down of bodily movements;
* fatigue or loss of energy;
* feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt;
* diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness;
* recurrent thoughts of death or suicidal ideation, or a suicide attempt
or plan.
The symptoms must persist nearly every day, for most of the day, for at least
two weeks, and must be severe enough to cause significant distress or
impairment in social, occupational, or other types of basic functioning."5
214. If an individual has experienced manic or hypomanic episodes, in addition to one or more
episodes of major depression, a diagnosis of bipolar disorder, rather than of major depressive disorder,
will apply. Major depressive disorder is sometimes called unipolar depression, to distinguish it from
bipolar disorder. Bipolar disorder will be discussed in the Part III.B.2.
215. See DSM-IV, supra note 174, at 320-23, 327, 339, 344-45. The diagnostic criteria do not
adequately convey what severe depression can be like. Kay Redfield Jamison, a leading researcher on
mood disorders, gives this account of one of her own depressive episodes:
From the time I woke up in the morning until the time I went to bed at night, I was unbeara-
bly miserable and seemingly incapable of any kind of joy or enthusiasm. Everything-every
thought, word, movement-was an effort. Everything that once was sparkling was now flat. I
seemed to myself to be dull, boring, inadequate, thick brained, unlit, unresponsive, chill
skinned, bloodless, and sparrow drab. I doubted, completely, my ability to do anything well.
It seemed as though my mind had slowed down and burned out to the point of being virtually
useless.... The morbidity of my mind was astonishing .... I saw Death everywhere, and I saw
winding sheets and toe tags and body bags in my mind's eye .... And, always, everything was
an effort. Washing my hair took hours to do, and it drained me for hours afterward; filling the
ice-cube tray was beyond my capacity, and I occasionally slept in the same clothes I had worn
during the day because I was too exhausted to undress.
KAY REDFIELDJAMISON, AN UNQUIET MIND 110-11 (1995); see also WOLPERT, supra note 210, at 1,
2-9, 65-67 (providing similar accounts of the experience of depression).
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Depressive episodes tend to be self-limiting; even ifleft untreated, an episode of
depression will usually resolve itself within a period of months.216
Depression is associated with physical changes in brain functioning, and is
the product of complex interactions of genetic predisposition, thought pro-
cesses, and stressful life events.217 It is very responsive to treatment. Studies
have consistently shown that antidepressant medication is effective in improv-
ing symptoms about 65 percent of the time. Some forms of psychotherapy
show similar success rates, and drugs and psychotherapy together can be par-
ticularly effective." 8 With or without treatment, about 50 percent of people
who have gone through one major depressive episode will never have another.
Individuals who have had two or more prior episodes are much more likely
to experience another one in the future, although long-term preventive treat-
ment can reduce the risk of recurrence."'
Depression is an occupational hazard for lawyers. Several studies have
found rates of depression in the legal profession at least twice as high as
those in the general population.22 A study in Washington state found that
216. The average duration of an untreated episode of major depression is six to nine months. See
SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 246; WOLPERT, supra note 210, at 22.
217. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 251-57; WOLPERT, supra note 210, at
41-63, 84-128.
218. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 262-66; WOLPERT, supra note 210,
at 131, 161-62. The success rates for both medication and therapy compare well with the 30 percent
of patients who respond favorably to a placebo. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at
262-66. One recent study found that a combination of medication and cognitive-behavioral
psychotherapy produced significant improvement in 85 percent of chronically depressed patients, as
compared with about 50 percent who improved in response to either medication or therapy alone. See
Martin B. Keller et al., A Comparison of Nefazodone, the Cognitive Behavioral-Analysis System of
Psychotherapy, and Their Combination for the Treatment of Chronic Depression, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1462 (2000).
219. See INST. OF MED., REDUCING RISKS FOR MENTAL DISORDERS 87, 91 (Patricia J. Mrazek
& Robert J. Haggerty eds., 1994); SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 246, 267;
WOLPERT, supra note 210, at 22-23.
220. The most extensive occupational study estimated that 10 percent of lawyers met the diag-
nostic criteria for major depressive disorder at a given point in time, as compared with 3 to 5 percent
of the general population. After adjusting for other variables, in order to focus solely on the influence of
working in a particular occupation, the data indicated that lawyers were 3.6 times more likely than
persons employed full-time in other fields to suffer from depression. See William W. Eaton et al.,
Occupations and the Prevalence of Major Depressive Disorder, 32 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 1079, 1081,
1083 (1990). The data for this analysis was drawn from a study that assessed the prevalence of mental
disorders through structured, in-person interviews of approximately 20,000 individuals conducted at five
sites around the country during the early 1980s. See id. at 1079-80; see also Regier et al., supra note
174, at 86.
G. Andrew H. Benjamin and his colleagues have used survey instruments to study depression
levels among attorneys in Washington state, and among law students and new lawyers in Arizona.
Seventeen to 19 percent of their attorney respondents showed significantly elevated depression
levels. See Connie J.A. Beck et al., Lawyer Distress: Alcohol-Related Problems and Other Psychological
Concerns Among a Sample of Practicing Lawyers, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 18 (1995-1996); G. Andrew H.
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approximately 19 percent of lawyers reported significantly elevated depression
levels, and a majority of these were experiencing suicidal ideation.2
Depression may prevent a lawyer from getting work accomplished and
may interfere with his or her ability to meet responsibilities to clients and
courts.2 ' This will not necessarily be true; many people, during episodes of
major depression, manage to keep up with their work responsibilities, even if it
is in a joyless and trudging way.2 3 Still, from the perspective of the relaxed
scrutiny approach, what matters is that there is a logical link between the
symptoms of a major depressive episode and the risk of certain types of attor-
ney misconduct: missed deadlines, neglected client matters, and failures to
keep clients adequately informed.224
However, any debilitating condition poses similar risks. It is difficult tojustify singling out depression for scrutiny when bar examiners do not ask about
Benjamin et al., The Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse, and Cocaine Abuse Among United States
Lawyers, 13 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 233, 234, 236-41 (1990). But see Adam J. Krakowski, Stress and
the Practice of Medicine: Physicians Compared with Lawyers, 42 PSYCHOTHERAPY & PSYCHOSOMATICS
143, 146 (1984) (finding only a 6 percent rate of depressive illness through interviews of a sample of
fifty lawyers practicing in an upstate New York county).
221. See Benjamin et al., supra note 220, at 240-41; see also Maura Dolan, Miserable with the Legal
life, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 1995, at Al (reporting that 11 percent of lawyers polled in North Carolina
in 1991 admitted that they consider taking their lives at least once a month). Lawyers have one of
the higher occupational rates of suicide. In general, about one in ten people who suffer from severe
depression will kill themselves. See WOLPERT, supra note 210, at 64, 67.
222. Depression is one of the leading causes of occupational disability. See SURGEON GENERAL'S
REPORT, supra note 36, at 244.
223. For example, Kay Jamison, during the severe, eighteen-month-long depression described
supra note 215, managed to fulfill her demanding teaching, research, and patient care responsibilities as
a medical school faculty member. See JAMISON, supra note 215, at 110-25, 210. One notable attorney
who suffered from recurrent bouts of major depression, without apparent harm to his ability to serve
clients and constituents, was Abraham Lincoln. See DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 27, 57, 87-
88, 163-64, 371, 517 (1995).
224. Unlike mania and substance abuse, see infra text accompanying notes 246, 286, there is no
clear, commonsense link between the symptoms of depression and misappropriation of client funds.
Depression has been raised as a defense or mitigating factor in disciplinary cases involving thefts from
clients, but courts have been appropriately skeptical of the claim of causation. See In re Greenberg, 714
A.2d 243, 254 n.4 (N.J. 1998) (rejecting the claim that an attorney's depression explained stealing,
and noting that considering the high rate of depression among attorneys, "[the relatively small number
of misappropriation cases... suggests that very few of the attorneys who suffer from depression manifest
their mental illness by acts of theft"); In re Hunter, 704 A.2d 1154, 1157 (Vt. 1997) (finding that an
attorney's depression and attention deficit disorder may have contributed to his neglect of client
matters, but cannot explain his misappropriation of client funds). In cases in which depressed attorneys
are involved in acts of dishonesty, the circumstances often suggest causes other than depression. See,
e.g., In re Mann, 853 P.2d 1115, 1116, 1119 nn. 10, 13 (Alaska 1993) (considering a case in which an
attorney became acutely depressed and suicidal after stealing client funds to pay his own overdue
mortgage; substance abuse was also involved); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Colston, 777 P.2d 920,
921, 923 (Okla. 1989) (noting that the psychiatric evaluation of a depressed attorney involved in acts
of fraud and misrepresentation attributed his conduct to a "workaholic" personality and stress,
rather than to depression).
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numerous physical disabilities that can make it difficult or impossible for an
attorney to meet deadlines and get work done. Nor is there anything in the
characteristic symptoms of depression that justifies a departure from the usual
presumption that an applicant with a disability will respond appropriately if the
disability interferes with his or her ability to serve clients in the future.22
To be sure, some of the symptoms that may be present in depression, such as
fatigue and impaired concentration, can make it harder for a depressed attorney
to take the steps necessary to address an incapacity, such as requesting an
extension of time, finding another attorney to cover, or withdrawing from the
representation. But the same will often be true of an attorney who is not
meeting client responsibilities because of physical illness, personal crises, or
over-commitment. The symptoms of depression do not stand as an obstacle
to understanding and addressing the consequences of disability in the same
way, or to the same degree, as do the delusions that characterize mania or
psychosis, or the denial symptomatic of substance abuse.226
Deterrence concerns also weigh particularly heavily against depression
inquiries. A study of law students at one state law school found that 32 percent
displayed significantly elevated depression levels by the end of the first year; by
the spring of the third year, the number rose to 40 percent. 27 The knowledge
that a diagnosis of depression will have to be disclosed to the bar examiners is
likely to prevent a significant number of students from seeing a mental health
professional. Most people who are depressed do not obtain treatment, as
225. See supra Part III.A.2.
226. See infra text accompanying notes 249, 285-287. In extreme cases, depression can have
psychotic features, but these usually take the form of delusions that one is to blame for events beyond
one's control, or hearing voices emphasizing guilt. See DSM-IV, supra note 174, at 327, 377;
WOLPERT, supra note 210, at 16, 25.
227. See Benjamin et al., supra note 220, at 234; see also 0. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role
of Legal Education in Producing Psychological Distress Among Law Students and Lawyers, AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 225 (1986) (providing a fuller description of the study). The elevated depression level measured
by the survey instruments used in this study is "strongly correlated with clinical impairment, and sug-
gests the need for specific treatment," although it may not correspond to a diagnosis of major depressive
disorder. Benjamin et al., supra note 220, at 237.
Another study found that out of 161 law students who utilized a counseling service at the
University of Maryland over a four-year period, 46 percent were diagnosed with a depressive condition
(although most of these did not have full-blown major depression). See Dickerson, supra note 36, at 84.
At the time, Maryland's bar application form asked about hospitalizations for mental illness, but not
about other forms of treatment. Those who used the counseling service were told that treatment
would not be reported to professional authorities. See id. at 89-90; MD. STATE BAR ASS'N SECTION
ON LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MENTAL
HEALTH INQUIRIES ON THE MARYLAND BAR APPLICATION 19-20 (1995) [hereinafter MD. STATE
BAR ASS'N REPORT] (reprinting Maryland question). Law students' willingness to seek help under
these circumstances is not inconsistent with the existence of a deterrent effect when treatment for
depression must be disclosed to bar examiners.
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several studies have shown, and stigma is a major barrier to seeking help. 28
The costs of deterring treatment, both in terms of future lawyers' health
and the potential adverse effect on their performance as attorneys, easily
wipe out the benefits of any small gains in screening efficacy that might
be claimed for depression inquiries.229
Depression inquiries also raise troubling issues of sex discrimination
and privacy. The prevalence of major depressive disorder among women
is about twice as high as the rate for men. 3' The burdens of disclosure
and delays that arise from depression questions on bar application forms
are much more likely to fall on female bar applicants. In addition, major
depression is often associated with traumatic events of a personal or
humiliating nature, such as physical or sexual abuse, parental neglect
or the loss of a loved one, and with situations of chronic adversity such
as poverty and marital discord.' When bar examiners require bar
applicants to explain the circumstances of their treatment for depression
and release their counseling records, these highly sensitive personal
matters become part of the admissions process. Considering the weak
claims that can be made for the utility, let alone the necessity, of
depression inquiries, these considerations should weigh heavily against
their use.
228. See INST. OF MED., supra note 219, at 286; SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note
36, at 257, 454. The suicide of former White House counsel Vincent Foster is a case in point.
Four days before his death, he confided in his sister that he was depressed and did not know what
to do about it. She tried to set up an appointment with a psychiatrist for him, but he resisted
going because he feared that it would endanger his security clearance. See Lloyd Cutler, Editorial,
Psychotherapy: No Sign of a Security Risk, WASH. POST, July 12, 1994, at A17. There is a great
deal of anecdotal evidence that bar application questions have deterred law students from seeking
help for depression. See supra note 186.
229. Depression inquiries can be expected to uncover, at best, a very small number of
cases in which conditional admission or denial might be appropriate. See supra notes 167-170
and accompanying text, which discuss the low pay-off rate of inquiries that target mental
disorders.
230. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 244, 255-56; WOLPERT, supra
note 210, at 48-51; see also Richard Gater et al., Sex Differences in the Prevalence and Detection
of Depression and Anxiety Disorders in General Health Care Settings, 55 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 405 (1998) (finding the gender difference to be consistent across cultural
settings). The reasons for the difference are unclear. Biological factors, greater exposure of
women to sexual abuse and other traumas, and a greater tendency among women to ruminate
about problems instead of seeking distractions, may all play a role. See SURGEON GENERAL'S
REPORT, supra note 36, at 255-56; WOLPERT, supra note 210, at 49-50.
231. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 254; WOLPERT, supra note 210,
at 51-55.
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2. Bipolar Disorder
Bipolar disorder, also known as manic-depressive illness, affects fewer
applicants than unipolar major depression,232 but has been a major focus of
bar examiners' concern. The NCBE asks about it, as do nearly all of the
jurisdictions that list specific mental disorders in their questions.' Applicants
with bipolar disorder probably account for a majority of the hearings, condi-
tional admissions, and denials that result from non-substance abuse mental
health inquiries.' Courts in the relaxed scrutiny camp have had no trouble
concluding that examiners' inquiries about bipolar disorder are justified. The
decisions, however, pay insufficient attention to the specifics of the disease,
and particularly, to the danger of deterring treatment. Whether inquiries about
bipolar disorder should be allowed under the relaxed scrutiny framework is a
close call. At a minimum, courts should insist that the questions be narrowed
to focus only on particular forms of the illness that pose heightened dangers,
and should require safeguards designed to minimize deterrence.
Bipolar disorder is a recurrent condition that includes major depressive
episodes, like those found in clinical depression, as well as periods of highly
elevated mood, known as mania or hypomania. It is a distinct illness from
clinical depression, with causes that appear to be predominantly biochemical
232. The one-year prevalence of bipolar disorder in the U.S. population is between 1 and 2 per-
cent, as compared with 5 to 10 percent for major depression. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra
note 36, at 249; Kessler et al., supra note 174, at 12; Regier et al., supra note 174, at 88.
233. See NCBE CHARACTER REPORT, supra note 10, at 12. States that in recent years have
targeted bipolar disorder in their questionnaires include at least Connecticut, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Kentucky, New Jersey, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. See Roe # 2 v. Ogden, No. 99-M-
967, at 5 (D. Colo. July 7, 2000), rev'd, 253 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2001); O'Brien v. Va. Bd. of Bar
Exam'rs, No. 98-0009-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4344, at *8 (E.D. Va. 1998); Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar
Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 439-40 n.18 (E.D. Va. 1995); CONN. 2001 APPLICATION, supra note 19,
at 14; STATEWIDE PANEL OF THE [N.J.] SUP. CT.'S COMM. ON CHARACTER, REPORT ON THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND RELATED ISSUES (Jan. 25, 1995),
reprinted in N.J.L.J., Mar. 6, 1995, at 71 [hereinafter N.J. STATEWIDE PANEL REPORT]; Herr, supra
note 6, at 648 n.63, 649 n.69.
234. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kansas, 888 F. Supp. 1073, 1075-76 (D. Kan. 1995) (alleging
denial of admission based on plaintiff's bipolar disorder); Clark, 880 F. Supp. at 434 & n.6 (noting
that the only cases in which Virginia imposed additional screening requirements on applicants
who responded affirmatively to a broad mental health treatment question involved two applicants
with bipolar disorder); BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 204, at 73:6103 (quoting
Kentucky bar admission guidelines stating, "[a] person who is manic depressive or subject to psychotic
episodes may be unfit to practice law"); Thomas A. Pobjecky, Everything You Wanted to Know
About Bar Admissions and Psychiatric Problems but Were Too Paranoid to Ask, B. EXAMINER, Feb. 1989,
at 14, 20 (describing bipolar disorder controlled by medication as the paradigm case for conditional
admission); see also supra text accompanying notes 53-55, 84-90 (describing cases of denial and
conditional admission based on bipolar disorder in Connecticut).
and genetic, rather than social or psychological in nature.235 Episodes may last
for weeks or months, and will tend to recur every two to four years if the disease
is not successfully treated. A large majority of people with bipolar disorder are
fully functional between episodes, experiencing no occupational or interper-
sonal difficulties.236
There are two distinct forms of manic-depressive illness. Persons who
experience mania are diagnosed with bipolar I disorder. Bipolar II disorder is
the diagnosis for individuals who have periods of depression and hypomania,
but never become manic. 237 The characteristics of manic and hypomanic
episodes are described in the Surgeon General's Report:
Mania is ... [a] mood disturbance [that] can range from pure
euphoria or elation to irritability to a labile admixture that also
includes dysphoria. Thought content is usually grandiose but can
also be paranoid. Grandiosity usually takes the form both of overval-
ued ideas (for example, "My book is the best one ever written") and
of frank delusions .... Auditory and visual hallucinations complicate
more severe episodes. Speed of thought increases, and ideas typically
race through the manic person's consciousness. Nevertheless, dis-
tractibility and poor concentration commonly impair implementa-
tion. Judgment also can be severely compromised ....
By definition, an episode of hypomania is never psychotic nor
are hypomanic episodes associated with marked impairments in
judgment or performance. In fact, some people with bipolar disorder
long for the productive energy and heightened creativity of the
hypomanic phase. Hypomania can be a transitional state (that is,
early in an episode of mania), although at least 50% of those who
238have hypomanic episodes never become manic.
Long-term maintenance therapy with lithium or other mood-stabilizing
drugs effectively eliminates mania in many patients and lessens the effects of
depression.' However, even among individuals who have received treatment,
the recurrence rate for mania can be 40 percent or higher. Noncompliance
235. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 246, 249, 251, 256-57; WOLPERT,
supra note 210, at 26-30, 43, 47; David L. Dunner & G. Andrew H. Benjamin, Bipolar Affective
Disorder (Manic Depressive Illness), B. EXAMINER, Nov. 1994, at 25, 25-26.
236. See DSM-IV, supra note 174, at 353, 361; SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note
36, at 249; WOLPERT, supra note 210, at 29; Dunner & Benjamin, supra note 235, at 26-27.
237. See DSM-IV, supra note 174, at 350-63; SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36,
at 249; Dunner & Benjamin, supra note 235, at 27.
238. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 249; see also DSM-IV, supra note 174,
at 328-38.
239. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 266-68; Dunner & Benjamin,
supra note 235, at 29. Therapy is a valuable supplement to pharmacological treatment, but there
is no evidence that bipolar disorder can be effectively treated by therapy alone. See id.
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with medication is a major cause of relapse.24 This has a variety of causes:
some miss the experience of mania, which can be enormously pleasurable;
others may discontinue medication because of unpleasant side effects
or concern about fetal health during pregnancy."'
When untreated or uncontrolled, bipolar disorder takes a terrible toll.
Its manias can be terrifying as well as exhilarating, and its recurrent depres-
sions bleak. 4 About one-third of those with manic-depressive illness
attempt suicide, and 10 to 15 percent actually kill themselves.4 But it is
also an illness that also confers enormous benefits in energy and creativity.
There is strong evidence that manic-depressives make up a disproportionate
number of those who excel in the arts, and the same is probably true in
business and the professions.244 Attorneys with the illness not only function
well between episodes; hypomania often enhances their performance. Drs.
David Dunner and Andrew Benjamin, researchers and clinicians who
have also treated many bipolar lawyers, write that "most individuals with
this condition function quite well in their occupation .... Trial lawyers
with bipolar disorder are likely to experience hypomanic episodes before
and during trials. Their excess energy, decreased need for sleep, over
240. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 268; see also JAMISON, supra note
215, at 6 ("The major clinical problem in treating manic-depressive illness is not that there are
not effective medications-there are-but that patients so often refuse to take them.").
241. In her memoir An Unquiet Mind, psychologist Kay Redfield Jamison writes eloquently about
her own struggles with the illness, and why for many years she resisted medication. Here is how she
describes some of her manias:
When you're high it's tremendous. The ideas and feelings are fast and frequent like shooting
stars, and you follow them until you find better and brighter ones. Shyness goes, the right
words and gestures are suddenly there, the power to captivate others a felt ertainty.... Feelings
of ease, intensity, power, well-being, financial omnipotence, and euphoria pervade one's
marrow.
JAMISON, supra note 215, at 67. "Psychological issues," she writes, "ultimately proved far more
important than side effects in my prolonged resistance to lithium.... I had become addicted to my high
moods; I had become dependent upon their intensity, euphoria, assuredness, and their infectious
ability to induce high moods and enthusiasms in other people." Id. at 98; see also SURGEON GENERAL'S
REPORT, supra note 36, at 268 (describing risks during pregnancy).
242. Kay Redfield Jamison, once again, provides a compelling description. I quoted her account
of the euphoric feeling of a mania above in the previous footnote. Here is how she describes the rest:
But somewhere, this changes. The fast ideas are far too fast, and there are far too many;
overwhelming confusion replaces clarity. Memory goes. Humor and absorption on friends'
faces are replaced by fear and concern. Everything previously moving with the grain is now
against-you are irritable, angry, frightened, uncontrollable, and enmeshed totally in the
blackest caves of the mind.
JAMISON, supra note 215, at 67.
243. See DSM-IV, supra note 174, at 352, 360; Dunner & Benjamin, supra note 235, at 27.
244. See WOLPERT, supra note 210, at 30, 80-81 (summarizing studies showing high rates of
manic-depressive illness in successful writers and artists, past and present). See generally KAY REDFIELD
JAMISON, TOUCHED WITH FIRE: MANIC-DEPRESSIVE ILLNESS AND THE ARTISTIC TEMPERAMENT
(1993).
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talkativeness, and increase in ability to interact with others is very adaptive
for trial advocacy. ,
211
Still, the justifications for asking bar applicants about manic-depressive
illness, from the vantage point of the relaxed scrutiny framework, are relatively
strong. Mania can cause serious client-endangering behavior. Impaired judg-
ment, grandiosity, and loss of inhibitions may lead to excessive risk-taking
and misuse of client funds. As the DSM-IV notes in describing the associated
features of mania, "[e]thical concerns may be disregarded even by those who
are typically very conscientious (for example, a stockbroker inappropriately
buys and sells stock without the clients' knowledge or permission . . ).,211
Reported disciplinary cases include instances of attorneys who misappropri-
ated client funds during manic episodes.247 To be sure, there is no evidence
that such cases are common.24 But the point, for the relaxed scrutiny model,
is that the symptoms of the disease are reasonably likely to result in some
instances of misconduct.
Inquiries focused on mania are not subject to the underinclusiveness
objection. The nature and severity of the potential misconduct-stealing from
clients-distinguishes mania from physical disabilities. Mania also can inter-
fere with a lawyer's ability to recognize and deal with the effects of thedisability. During manic episodes, people frequently fail to understand that
they are acting inappropriately, do not recognize that they are ill, and resist
obtaining treatment. 49
However, asking applicants about all diagnosis or treatment for bipolardisorder is overbroad. The justification for the inquiry rests on the risks posedby mania, but mania appears only in one type of the illness, bipolar I disorder.
About one-third of those with manic-depressive illness are bipolar II, and
245. Dunner & Benjamin, supra note 235, at 28 (noting also that "such individuals also are likelyto experience a let down (depression) following the trial").
246. DSM-IV, supra note 174, at 330.
247. See In re Hoover, 745 P.2d 939 (Ariz. 1987); In re Larsen, 589 A.2d 400 (D.C. 1991); Fla.Bar v. Clement, 662 So. 2d 690, 693-98 (Fla. 1995); In re Carmany, 466 N.E.2d 16, 23 (Ind. 1984);Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Komarek, 702 N.E.2d 62, 66-68 (Ohio 1998); Carter v. Gonnella, 526A.2d 1279, 1280-82 (R.I. 1987); see also Scott Brede, F. Mac Buckley Pleads No Contest to LarcenyCharges, CONN. L. TRIB., Sept. 4, 2000, at 1, 3 (noting that a prominent Connecticut attorney's
misappropriation of client funds may have been related to bipolar disorder).248. See Deposition of Howard V. Zonana, M.D., at 46 (June 9,1994), Clark v. Va. Bd. of BarExam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1995) (No. 94-221-A) [hereinafter Zonana Deposition] ("Ihave a lot of [patients] who have a history of bipolar disorder that I've seen for fifteen or twenty years
who've never had a problem around work functioning, or, whenever a problem comes up, they take a
week off and deal with it like any other illness."); Dunner & Benjamin, supra note 235, at 31 (reporting
their experience that instances of lawyers committing ethical violations during uncontrolled manic
episodes are rare).
249. See WOLPERT, supra note 210, at 29; Dunner & Benjamin, supra note 235, at 27, 29.
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experience hypomanic, but not manic episodes.2"' Hypomania is not delu-
sional or client-endangering, and, as we have seen, it can be highly adaptive
to an attorney's work."' If examiners are to ask about bipolar disorder, the
inquiry should be phrased as follows: "Within the past [time frame], have you
been diagnosed with or have you been treated for mania or bipolar I
disorder?" '252
Even if the questions are appropriately narrowed, it is a close call whether
inquiries relating to bipolar disorder should be allowed under the relaxed
scrutiny framework. The questions may help identify a few cases in which
conditional admission is appropriate,5 but there is good reason to fear that
deterrence will cancel out any public protection gains. Stigma and fear of the
consequences of disclosure contribute to the fact that nearly 40 percent of peo-
ple with bipolar disorders fail to obtain treatment in any given year.254 Examin-
ers' inquiries come at a particularly sensitive time. The average age of onset for
bipolar disorders is the early to mid-twenties; thus, many with the illness
will experience their first episode during college or law school.255 Clearly, a
law student with bipolar illness who has not received treatment out of fear
that a diagnosis will imperil her bar admission poses at least as much risk to
future clients as one who has been on and off medication in the past.
At a minimum, courts that adhere to the relaxed scrutiny approach
should insist, before finding that any inquiries concerning bipolar illness are
necessary and justified, that the bar examining authorities communicate to
applicants, in word and deed, that disclosing bipolar illness will not endanger
their admission or enmesh them in an unduly burdensome process. An
appropriate program of conditional admissions must be in place, and the
application form should provide assurances that applicants who are receiv-
ing treatment have nothing worse than conditional admission to fear, and will
generally be admitted unconditionally. These steps would at least mitigate
250. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 249.
251. I do not mean to minimize the seriousness of bipolar II disorder. Some individuals with
bipolar II are prone to frequent depressive episodes, and the risk of suicide is equally high in both forms
of bipolar disorder. See DSM-IV, supra note 174, at 352, 360-61. As previously discussed, however, the
particular risks associated with depression do not justify singling out a mental disorder for scrutiny.
252. While bipolar I disorder is equally common in men and women, there is evidence that
bipolar 1I, like unipolar major depression, appears more frequently in women than men. See DSM-IV,
supra note 174, at 360; Dunner & Benjamin, supra note 235, at 27. Limiting the questions to bipolar I
disorder would have the additional advantage of avoiding a gender-based disparate impact.
253. These would be cases in which the applicant has had problems sticking with a treatment
regimen, or where there is reason to doubt whether treatment is effectively controlling manic
symptoms. An applicant who is currently receiving effective treatment should not be denied uncondi-
tional admission based on the speculative concern that if the applicant discontinues treatment,
there could be further manic episodes. See supra text accompanying notes 203-206.
254. See JAMISON, supra note 215, at 6; SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 257.
255. See WOLPERT, supra note 210, at 30, 47; Dunner & Benjamin, supra note 235, at 26, 30.
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the risk of deterrence, and provide firmer ground for believing (although it will
still be impossible to know) that the questions produce relevant information
more often than they drive applicants underground.256
3. Schizophrenia and Psychotic Disorders
The NCBE and all of the states that have tailored their mental health
questions to specific diagnoses ask about schizophrenia and other psychotic
disorders.257 These are the most serious of mental illnesses, and courts that
subscribe to the relaxed scrutiny approach have readily assumed that examin-
ers are justified in asking about them. Although exceedingly few bar applicants
suffer from these conditions, the case for asking, under the premises of relaxed
scrutiny, is defensible.
The term "psychotic disorders" describes a class of conditions in which
disturbances of perception and thought processes, such as hallucinations and
delusions, are the defining features.5 8 Schizophrenia, which affects about 1 per-
cent of the U.S. population, is by far the most common of these conditions." 9
256. Cf. JAMISON, supra note 215, at 204-09. Reflecting on a question about mental illness (of
the self-assessment type) that she faced on an application for clinical privileges, Jamison concludes thathospitals have a legitimate need to know about a staff member's bipolar disorder, but that such inquiries
need to be handled with great sensitivity, including "guidelines for safeguards and intelligent,
nonpaternalistic supervision," so that doctors will not be hesitant to seek treatment. Id. at 208.257. See supra note 233, for a list of jurisdictions. The NCBE and several states use the phrase
"schizophrenia, paranoia, or any other psychotic disorder." See NCBE CHARACTER REPORT, supra
note 10, at 12; CONN. 2001 APPLICATION, supra note 19, at 14; N.J. STATEWIDE PANEL REPORT, supra
note 233; see also Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 439-40 n.18 (E.D. Va. 1995)(quoting questions from Texas and Delaware). The insertion of "paranoia" is problematic. Conditions
classified as psychotic disorders do not include anything called "paranoia" as such, although there is aparanoid subtype of schizophrenia. See DSM-IV, supra note 174, at 286-87. There is also a diagnostic
category known as "paranoid personality disorder," but it is not a psychotic disorder. Instead, itdescribes a pervasive disposition of distrust and suspiciousness of others. See id. at 634-38. If the
reference to "paranoia" is intended to encompass this condition, the question is overbroad as well as
unclear. High levels of paranoid ideation have been found in lawyers and law students; as the
authors of one study commented, "[a]lthough these symptoms would be considered significantproblems for sufferers in the general population, perhaps these behaviors are adaptive for manylawyers in the adversarial legal system of the United States." Benjamin et al., supra note 220, at 244.
When hostility and paranoia rise to a level that might make an applicant unfit to practice law, theproblem should be easy to detect through behavioral questions: There is likely to be a trail of litigious-
ness, job and school problems, bad references, and the like. See Michael K. McChrystal, A StructuralAnalysis of the Good Moral Character Requiremnent for Bar Admission, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 67, 97-99(1984) (describing cases of applicants denied bar admission because of a pattern of hostile or paranoid
behavior).
258. See DSM-IV, supra note 174, at 273-74; SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36,
at 40-42.
259. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 273. Other, less common, types ofpsychotic disorders include schizoaffective disorder, delusional disorder and schizophreniform disorder.
See DSM-IV, supra note 174, at 290-315.
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Its symptoms can include disorganized speech and behavior, delusions (most
commonly of persecution), hallucinations, flattened affect, and a loss of
motivation and initiative that leads to decreased occupational and socialfu ' ' 260 cod
functioning. The condition generally lasts for a lifetime. Treatment can be
effective, and there is great individual variation in the course of the illness, but
a complete and permanent remission of symptoms is rare.61 Unemployment
among people with psychotic disorders is pervasive."'
Bar examiners encounter very few applicants with schizophrenia or other
psychotic disorders, because the illness's severe and chronic nature makes it
extraordinarily difficult for a person to make it through law school or pursue
legal employment. 63 On occasion, it happens, and with improvements in
treatment, such cases are likely to become more frequent. Michael Laudor,
who developed schizoaffective disorder in his mid-twenties and spent eight
months in a mental hospital, received national attention when he went on to
graduate from Yale Law School and was awarded a post-graduate research
fellowship there. Nonetheless, he decided that he could not handle the stress
and long hours of work in a law firm or a judicial clerkship, and decided to seek
academic jobs instead.26
260. See DSM-IV, supra note 174, at 274-78; SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36,
at 269-71.
261. See INST. OF MED., supra note 219, at 102-03; SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note
36, at 274-75, 279-85.
262. Studies have found that:
[Albout one third of schizophrenic patients have a relatively unremitting course requiring
constant or intermittent institutional care, one third function minimally in the community
and require continuous support, and one third function semiautonomously in the community
but rarely reach the level of functioning expected before the onset of schizophrenia.
INST. OF MED., supra note 219, at 102-03; see also SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at
42, 285, 293; Juan R. Bustillo et al., The Psychosocial Treatment of Schizophrenia: An Update, 158 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 163, 168 (2001) (estimating that fewer than 20 percent of persons with schizophrenia
hold regular community jobs).
263. See Zonana Deposition, supra note 248, at 60 (June 9, 1994) (noting that very few schizo-
phrenics will make it through law school); Dunner & Benjamin, supra note 235, at 30 (noting that
in contrast to bipolar disorder, the chronicity of schizophrenia "tends to prevent a productive
working life").
264. See Lisa W. Foderaro, A Voyage into Bedlam and Part Way Back, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,1995,
at B1. Courts have cited Michael Laudor's story as an example of the unjustified stigma that surrounds
mental illness. See Doe v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 906 F. Supp. 1534, 1542 (S.D. Fla. 1995);
R.I. Master Report, supra note 144, at 10. Ironically and tragically, he was back in the news several
years later when he killed his fiancee, after he stopped responding to medication and became severely
delusional. See Joseph Berger & Jane Gross, From Mental Illness to Yale to Murder Charge, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 1998, at B1; Lisa W. Foderaro, Man Who Killed Fiancee Is Sent to Mental Hospital, N.Y. TIMES,
May 12, 2000, at B6.
His story should not be viewed as evidence that schizophrenics, as a class, are violent, just as his
earlier achievements do not constitute proof that schizophrenia is irrelevant to a person's fitness to
practice law. See generally Bruce G. Link & Ann Steve, Commentary: New Evidence on the Violence Risk
Posed by People with Mental Illness, 55 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 403 (1998) (discussing studies
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A lawyer with schizophrenia or related illnesses may be fully capable of
practicing when symptoms are in remission. 265 However, the likelihood of
recurring psychotic episodes, with delusional symptoms that may interfere
with the lawyer's ability to provide competent representation and, at the same
time, deprive her of the insight needed to recognize and respond to the inca-
pacity, is sufficient to justify inquiries under the relaxed scrutiny approach. A
schizophrenic applicant should not be disqualified merely because psychotic
episodes may recur, but examiners may have a legitimate interest in gauging
whether the applicant is prepared to manage the illness in a way that will mini-
mize the risks, and conditional admission may sometimes be appropriate.266
There is some cause for concern about deterrence. The age of onset for
schizophrenia is usually in the early twenties for men and the later twenties
for women. Studies have shown that it is common for people to wait a year
261or more after the onset of psychotic symptoms before initiating treatment,
and the prospect of disclosure on a bar application form might, in some
cases, contribute to a delay in seeking treatment. However, someone who
experiences the onset of schizophrenia during college or law school and does
not get treatment is unlikely to graduate. The risks of deterrence are fairly
speculative here, and bar examiners could take steps, like those discussed in the
previous section, to minimize them. On balance, the premises of relaxed scru-
tiny can reasonably support the conclusion that asking about psychotic
disorders produces a real, albeit small, net gain in public protection.
showing that a year after release from hospitalization for acute mental illness, patients' violence levels
were no different from base levels in the community, although there may be modestly elevated violence
risks-no greater than the increased risk associated with factors of gender, age or educational
attainment-during acute episodes of certain disorders).
265. Dr. Howard Zonana, in his expert testimony in the Clark case, described the case of an attor-
ney diagnosed with schizophrenia who needed some ongoing treatment, but whose ability to function
remained quite good throughout his career. See Zonana Deposition, supra note 248, at 44 (June 9,
1994).
266. Frederick A. Elliston, an ethicist, put it this way:
If the stress of a courtroom situation... [may bring on] a schizophrenic attack, then it may be
averted by disqualifying such an applicant.... But if the candidate has no intention
of becoming a courtroom lawyer, disqualification is unnecessary. If he does have this aspira-
tion, disqualification is extreme: the candidate could be admitted with the stipulation (or
recommendation) that he select a less stressful type of practice.
Frederick A. Elliston, Character and Fitness Tests: An Ethical Perspective, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1982, at 8,
11. An applicant who is likely to have psychotic episodes could also be required to provide assurance
that he or she will practice in a setting whether others will be monitoring his or her work and can take
over in case of incapacity.
267. See INST. OF MED., supra note 219, at 104; SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36,
at 273. The causes of schizophrenia are not yet fully understood, but there is strong evidence thatboth genetic predisposition and environmental stress in early brain development play major roles. See
id. at 276-79.
268. See Jeffrey A. Lieberman & Wayne S. Fenton, Editorial, Delayed Detection of Psychosis:
Causes, Consequences, and the Effect on Public Health, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1727, 1727 (2000).
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4. Hospitalization
In the wake of the ADA, court challenges, and the ABA's "narrow tailor-
ing" resolution, the NCBE and most states have dropped questions requiring
applicants to disclose all hospitalizations or institutionalizations for mental
illness. 69 However, some jurisdictions continue to ask about hospitaliza-
tions, either in "have you ever" form or with a five- or ten-year time limit.70
The justification offered for such inquiries is that if a condition required
hospitalization, it must have been particularly serious, and may raise ques-
tions about the applicant's ability to function.'
Even under the relaxed scrutiny framework, hospitalization questions
cannot meet the ADA's requirements of necessity and narrow tailoring. With
or without a time limit, the inquiry is distinctly overbroad. Major depression
accounts for a significant proportion of mental health hospitalizations.72
Eating disorders, which seem clearly irrelevant to bar admission, are also fre-
quently treated in a hospital setting.2 73 A federal court that heartily endorsed
the relaxed scrutiny approach of Texas Applicants had no trouble concluding
that a hospitalization inquiry on a judicial selection form was impermissibly
269. See ABA Resolution, supra note 8, at 598 (citing "have you ever" questions about hospitaliza-
tion for mental illness as examples of inquiries that are overbroad, both in content and time-frame);
Herr, supra note 6, at 644-46, 652-53 (discussing the NCBE's decision to eliminate hospitalization
question in 1995, and the trend in the states to follow suit). Compare id. with Stone, supra note 5, at
331, 335-36 (stating that a 1994 survey of application forms showed that 96 percent asked about mental
health hospitalizations, and most such questions had an unlimited time frame, though some were lim-
ited to the past ten or five years).
270. See Roe # 2 v. Ogden, No. 99-M-967, at 5 (D. Colo. July 7, 2000), rev'd, 253 F.3d 1225
(10th Cir. 2001) (reprinting Colorado question asking about mental health hospitalizations in the
past five years); Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 438-39 n.16 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(listing eleven jurisdictions that, as of 1995, had dropped questions requiring applicants to disclose all
mental health treatment but continued to ask about hospitalizations); CONN. 2001 APPLICATION,
supra note 19, at 14 ("Have you ever been admitted to an institution or hospital because of a mental,
emotional or nervous disorder/condition?"); Herr, supra note 6, at 647-49 (discussing hospitalization
questions in Kansas and North Carolina).
271. See MD. STATE BAR ASS'N REPORT, supra note 227, at 21 (discussing why a stronger
argument can be made for the necessity of hospitalization questions than for questions about outpatient
counseling or treatment); Reischel, supra note 115, at 10, 21 (explaining a decision of the D.C.
Court of Appeals to retain a question about mental health hospitalizations within the past five years
because "[ilt does not seem unreasonable that a recent institutionalization should trigger close
scrutiny ... to insure that an applicant is capable and reliable").
272. See supra note 212.
273. Anorexia, bulimia, and other eating disorders are classified as mental illnesses. See DSM-IV,
supra note 174, at 539-50. About eight million people, mostly young women, suffer from eating
disorders. See Jane E. Brody, Exposing the Perils of Eating Disorders, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at F8.
A survey of female law students at the University of Southern California found that 11 percent had
anorexia or bulimia before entering law school. See Julie E. Buchwald, Confronting a Hazard: Do
Eating Disorders Plague Women in the Legal Profession?, 9 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 101,
135 (1999). Severe cases often require hospital treatment. See Brody, supra.
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overbroad; the court noted that the question would reach "hospitaliza-
tion ... resulting from personal traumas such as childhood sexual abuse or
loss of a loved one. '274
Hospitalization is not a particularly good indicator of the severity of a
condition, or of the existence of risks that might endanger clients. Whether
an individual is hospitalized or treated on an outpatient basis frequently
depends on whether alternatives to hospital treatment are available in the
particular geographic area, 275 and on what insurance will pay for.276 Often, it
is the risk of self-harm or suicide, rather than behavior endangering others,
that leads to a decision to hospitalize.27 ' Especially troubling is the role played
by race. Blacks and Native Americans are more than twice as likely as whites
to be hospitalized for mental illness. The discrepancy exists in both voluntary
hospitalizations and involuntary commitments, and persists even after adjust-
ments are made for group differences in the prevalence of mental disorders.278
Questions that focus on specific conditions such as bipolar I disorder
and schizophrenia provide a more narrowly focused alternative to hospitaliza-
tion inquiries. 279  Hospitalization questions therefore should be rejected as
unnecessary even under the relaxed version of Title II's necessity test.
274. Doe v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 906 F. Supp. 1534, 1544-45 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
275. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 288 (noting that mobile crisis services
and day programs to prevent hospitalization are available in many urban areas, but are not widely avail-
able in rural regions).
276. From the 1980s through the mid-1990s, rates of hospitalization for mental health problems
among children and adolescents rose dramatically, without any evidence of an increased need for
hospital treatment. See id. at 171. In part as a response to this phenomenon, insurers now often refuse
to pay for hospital treatment, even in situations where it may be warranted. See id. at 182; see also
MD. STATE BAR ASS'N REPORT, supra note 227, at 21-22. These circumstances highlight both the
overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of questions that focus on whether the applicant has been
hospitalized.
277. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 287-88. For this reason, restricting
the question to involuntary commitments only would not solve the overinclusiveness problem.
278. See id. at 84-86, 288; Lonnie R. Snowden & Freda K. Cheung, Use of Inpatient Mental
Health Services by Members of Ethnic Minority Groups, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 347 (1990). Possi-
ble explanations include clinician bias, limited access to outpatient services, or culturally rooted
delays in seeking treatment until hospitalization is necessary. See id.; see also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: CULTURE, RACE AND ETHNICITY 63-67 (2001), available
at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/cre.
279. Hospitalization might be used as an additional narrowing criterion for a diagnosis-based
question, as in the following question adopted by New Jersey: "Have you, within the past twelve
months, been admitted to a hospital or other institution for the treatment of bipolar disorder,
schizophrenia, paranoia, or any other psychotic disorder?" N.J. STATEWIDE PANEL REPORT, supra
note 233. The report accompanying the revised question argues that the limitation to hospitalization
serves as an indicator of severity, and ensures that applicants will not be deterred from seeking
counseling or outpatient treatment. See id. This approach may help somewhat with respect to deter-
rence, but it runs the risk of missing some cases in which an applicant's bipolar or psychotic disorder
did not result in hospitalization but would nonetheless provide a legitimate basis for imposing condi-
tional admission.
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5. Substance Abuse
In the early 1990s, nearly every American jurisdiction required bar appli-
cants to disclose whether they had ever been addicted to or dependent upon
alcohol or drugs, or had ever been treated or counseled for substance abuse
problems."' 0 A number of states that have narrowed or eliminated other types
of mental health questions continue to ask broad questions about substance
abuse, often going back several years or more.28 In the courts, challenges to
such questions have had mixed results. Two of the strict scrutiny decisions
state or strongly imply that all substance abuse questions are off limits except
for questions about current illegal use of drugs, which is not a protected
disability under the ADA."2 The only decision that has addressed a challenge
to substance abuse inquiries under the relaxed scrutiny framework held that
questions about past treatment for addiction are permissible, but must include
a reasonable time limitation."'
Alcohol is by far the most commonly abused drug, both in society at large
and in the legal profession.8 The following definition of alcoholism, devel-
oped by the American Society of Addiction Medicine and the National
Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence, is consistent with the DSM-
IV's diagnostic criteria for substance dependence:
280. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, supra note 5; Stone, supra note 5, at 338-39.
281. See Roe # 2 v. Ogden, No. 99-M-967, at 5 (D. Colo. July 7, 2000), rev'd, 253 F.3d 1225
(10th Cit. 2001) (reprinting Colorado question asking about treatment relating to use of drugs or
alcohol in past ten years); CONN. 2001 APPLICATION, supra note 19, at 14 ("Have you ever been
treated for or counseled for substance abuse, including prescription drugs, illegal substances or alco-
hol?"); Herr, supra note 6, at 650-51 & n.75 (listing states that are "sparing in the scope of [mental
health] questions asked, focusing primarily on substance abuse"). The NCBE is a notable exception:
It has eliminated a broad substance abuse inquiry and now relies on an approach that focuses on
whether the applicant has raised substance abuse as a defense to any misconduct charge. See infra
text accompanying note 296.
282. See Med. Soc'y of N.J. v. Jacobs, No. 93-3670, 1993 WL 413016, at *5-*7 (D.N.J. Oct. 5,
1993); In re Petition & Questionnaire for Admission to the R.I. Bar, 683 A.2d 1333, 1336-37 (R.I.
1996).
283. See Doe v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 906 F. Supp. 1534, 1545 (S.D. Fla. 1995). The
court expressed no view as to what a reasonable time limitation would be. See id.
284. According to the two major prevalence studies, alcohol dependence or abuse is present in
about 7.5 percent to 10 percent of the U.S. population in a given year, with about 3.5 percent of the
population addicted to or abusing other drugs. See Kessler et al., supra note 174, at 10, 12; Regier et al.,
supra note 174, at 88. Among lawyers, the rate of alcohol disorders is probably in the range of 15 to 20
percent, see infra note 288, but what evidence there is suggests that lawyers do not disproportionately
abuse other drugs. See Benjamin et al., supra note 220, at 241 (explaining that fewer than 1 percent of
lawyers in Washington state were abusing cocaine, as compared to the national average of about 2
percent); see also Report of the AALS Special Committee, supra note 185, at 41 (explaining that a survey
showed widespread use of alcohol by law students, but very few using any other drugs, except for mari-
juana, and only 2 percent said their use of marijuana was frequent).
Alcoholism is a primary, chronic disease with genetic, psychosocial, and
environmental factors influencing its development and manifestations.
The disease is often progressive and fatal. It is characterized by impaired
control over drinking, preoccupation with the drug alcohol, use of alco-
hol despite adverse consequences, and distortions in thinking, most
notably denial....
"Denial" is used in the definition ... to include a range of psy-
chologic maneuvers that decrease awareness of the fact that alcohol
use is the cause of a person's problems rather than the solution to those
problems. Denial becomes an integral part of the disease and is nearly
always a major obstacle to recovery.
That these symptoms pose a high potential for lawyer misconduct is fairly
obvious. Lawyers with substance disorders may suffer from impaired judgment,
neglect client matters, and engage in financial improprieties."' The denial that
characterizes addictive illness also stands as an obstacle to recognizing the
problem and avoiding client harm. As the Association of American Law
Schools report on substance abuse observes, "Frequently,... denial-one of
the hallmark symptoms of dependency-prevents the impaired lawyer or judge
from obtaining assistance until the progression of the disease leads to a profes-
sional mistake or misconduct."2"7
There is evidence to support the link between substance abuse and law-
yer misconduct. Studies suggest that the rate of alcohol abuse and depend-
ence among lawyers is in the range of 15 to 20 percent,288 yet alcohol problems
285. Robert M. Morse & Daniel K. Flavin, The Definition of Alcoholism, 268 J. AM. MED. ASS'N
1012, 1013 (1992). The DSM-IV recognizes two categories of substance use disorders, substance
dependence and substance abuse. Dependence is characterized by a pattern of compulsive use of a drug
despite significant problems caused by it, and is usually accompanied by increasing tolerance and
symptoms of withdrawal when use is curtailed. See DSM-IV, supra note 174, at 176-81. Substance
abuse is "a maladaptive pattern of substance use manifested by recurrent or significant adverse
consequences," but without the compulsive drug-taking, tolerance, and withdrawal characteristic of
dependence. Very often, although not always, abuse develops into dependence. Id. at 182-83,
189.
286. See In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321, 323, 326 (D.C. 1987) (finding alcoholism to be the but-
for cause of an attorney's extensive misconduct, including the misappropriation of client funds); Eric
Drogin, Alcoholism in the Legal Profession: Psychological and Legal Perspectives and Intervention, 15
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 117, 146-57 (1991) (describing attorney discipline cases involving alco-
holism); George H. Hettrick, Addiction to Alcohol and Other Drugs: Recognizing the Signs of Lawyer
Impairment, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1999, at 30, 33-34 (discussing how attorney alcoholism often
results in financial irresponsibility and "borrowing" client funds); see also Benjamin et al., supra note
220, at 234-35; Michael A. Bloom & Carol Lynn Wallinger, Lawyers and Alcoholism: Is It Time for a
New Approach?, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1409, 1410 (1988); Richard M. Marrano, Appropriate Discipline
for the Attorney-Addict, 68 CONN. B.J. 368 (1994).
287. Report of the AALS Special Committee, supra note 185, at 50.
288. The study conducted by G. Andrew H. Benjamin and his colleagues found that 18 per-
cent of a representative sample of attorneys in Washington state showed evidence of alcohol abuse or
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appear to account for an even higher percentage of disciplinary complaints
against attorneys: anywhere from 27 to 75 percent, according to estimates from
the ABA and state bars.289 Minnesota's retrospective study of the bar appli-
cations of attorneys who were later disciplined suggests that applicants with
substance abuse problems are more likely to commit disciplinary violations
as attorneys. Twenty-seven percent of the disciplined attorneys (fourteen out
of fifty-two) had indications of prior substance abuse-either DWI arrests or
treatment-on their application forms.29
What we have seen so far clearly satisfies the relaxed scrutiny approach's
criteria for allowing inquiries: a clear link between the symptoms of the
disability and potential lawyer misconduct, and a characteristic symptom-
denial-that justifies departing from the usual presumption that an attorney
will respond appropriately if a disability impairs his or her ability to provide
competent representation. 9 The progressive nature of addictive illness also
supports the need for bar examiners to identify applicants with active sub-
stance abuse problems: In contrast with an intermittent and self-limiting dis-
order like depression, an applicant's chemical dependency is likely to continue
and worsen if it is not addressed. Conditional admissions can serve a particu-
larly useful role here. For substance abusers who are not getting treatment,
dependency; for those practicing twenty years or more, the rate was 25 percent. See Benjamin et al.,
supra note 220, at 236-41. A study based on structured interviews of fifty lawyers in one upstate
New York county found alcohol abuse in 20 percent. See Krakowski, supra note 220, at 144, 146. In
a nationwide survey of over 3000 lawyers conducted by the ABA in 1990, 13 percent reported having
six or more drinks each day, and another 30 percent said that they consumed three to five drinks on
a daily basis. See Ted Rohrlich, Attorneys Report Big Jump in Drinking in ABA Survey, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 1990, at A5.
289. See ABA COMM'N ON IMPAIRED ATTORNEYS, AN OVERVIEW OF LAWYER ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1991) (stating that state bars estimate that 40 to 75 percent
of all disciplinary complaints stem from lawyer impairment); G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al.,
Comprehensive Lawyer Assistance Programs: Justification and Model, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 113,
118 (1992) (noting that ABA's Center for Professional Responsibility has reported that 27 percent
of disciplinary cases nationwide involved alcohol abuse, and that surveys in New York and California
showed 50 to 70 percent); Judith L. Maute, Balanced Lives in a Stressful Profession: An Impossible
Dream?, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 797, 813 (1992) (citing National Bar Council estimates that at least 50
to 60 percent of all client complaints are directly related to alcohol or substance abuse). It should be
noted that no information concerning the methodology or scope of these surveys of lawyer discipline
cases has ever been published.
290. See Baer & Corneille, supra note 153, at 6. Although the study is unclear on this point,
this 27 percent figure appears to have been significantly higher than the percentage of all bar appli-
cants who revealed preadmission substance abuse problems. The authors note that 20 percent of all
applications disclosed "Category 1 or Category 2 conduct"-classifications that included a wide variety
of problems (for example, arrests, academic misconduct, job terminations, loan defaults) in addition
to substance abuse. Id. at 7.
291. See supra Part Ill.A.2.
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the threat of license denial may be needed to overcome denial. 92 Monitoring
provides incentives to stick with treatment and maintain abstinence for a
period of time, which increases the likelihood of a successful recovery.
The problem with diagnosis or treatment-based questions about sub-
stance abuse is that they are practically useless in identifying applicants with
active, untreated substance abuse problems. Ask such a person whether he has,
or has been treated for, a substance abuse problem, and denial virtually guar-
antees a "no" answer."' Behavioral inquiries, in contrast, have proved quite
effective. Without asking a status-based substance abuse question, California
finds indications of substance abuse in hundreds of applications each year.
The director of its admissions board has reported that nearly 10 percent of
California bar applicants are subjected to further investigation on the basis
of incidents that come to the committee's attention through the applicant's
answers to behavioral questions and information provided by references, and
in most such cases, there is information suggesting that substance abuse, usually
of alcohol, was involved. Further screening results in some applicants being
292. See DSM-IV, supra note 174, at 189 (stating that when individuals with alcohol depend-
ence become permanently abstinent, it is usually following a severe life stress such as "the threat or
imposition of social or legal sanctions"); Bloom & Wallinger, supra note 286, at 1416-17 (noting that
external motivating factors are often "necessary to overcome the alcoholic's denial and ambivalence
towards treatment"); Braun, supra note 203, at 10 (arguing for conditional or deferred admission of
untreated alcoholics, because an outright denial of admission "does nothing to bring the applicant into
treatment," while an unconditional admission "encourages the applicant in denial to continue to ignore
his disease and to believe that he has no need for treatment").
293. Evaluations of monitoring programs for impaired professionals have shown promising results,
both in terms of treatment outcomes and public protection. See Benjamin et al., supra note 289, at
118 (according to a study of lawyers in Oregon's lawyer assistance program, while 60 percent had been
charged with malpractice and 61 percent with disciplinary violations before entering the program, after
one year of participation additional complaints dropped to 2 percent); John V. McShane, Disability
Probation and Monitoring Programs, 55 TEX. B.J. 273, 274 (1992) (describing studies showing that 90
percent or more of participants in probation programs for impaired physicians, dentists and airline pilots
avoided relapse, as compared with a 40 to 60 percent recovery rate for the general population); Braun,
supra note 201, at 13 (stating that four out of forty in California's probationary program failed to comply
with conditions); Marshall, supra note 169, at 36 (noting that twelve out of forty-nine bar applicants
in Texas who were granted two-year probationary licenses because of chemical dependency relapsed
during their probationary period); N.J. STATEWIDE PANEL REPORT, supra note 233 (stating that out
of fifty New Jersey bar applicants monitored under conditional admission, none were involved in attor-
ney discipline).
294. The Bar Examiners' Handbook acknowledges as much. See Jerome Braun, Organization and
Funding of a Character and Fitness Investigation, in BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 204, at
73:1101, :1105 ("You can certainly ask the applicant if [he is an abuser], but that is rarely productive
of a useful answer .... One must look to sources other than the applicant to determine whether he or
she is an abuser."). See also Marshall, supra note 169, at 31, 35, in which the Texas Law Examiners'
longtime director of screening advocates using behavioral signs, such as arrests, as a trigger for substance
abuse evaluation, and makes no claim for the efficacy of direct questions about substance abuse.
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referred for an evaluation by an addiction professional, and, if current depend-
ency is found, the imposition of conditions.2 95
The approach taken by the National Conference of Bar Examiners is also
revealing. Although the NCBE character form asks about past diagnosis or
treatment for certain mental illnesses, there is no comparable question about
substance abuse. Instead, the NCBE relies on the following question, which
focuses on behavior caused by alcohol or drug use:
Within the past five years, have you ever raised the issue of consumption
of drugs or alcohol or the issue of a mental, emotional, nervous, or
behavioral disorder or condition as a defense, mitigation, or expla-
nation for your actions in the course of any administrative or judicial
proceeding or investigation; any inquiry or other proceeding; or any
proposed termination by an educational institution, employer, govern-
ment agency, professional organization, or licensing authority? If you
answered yes, furnish a thorough explanation below..."6
If substance abuse is the disability that is most clearly relevant to bar admis-
sions, it also is the one most likely to produce behavioral manifestations that
can be picked up in other ways.
The applicants who are most likely to be missed by behavioral inquiries,
but identified through questions about diagnosis or treatment, are those who
have recognized a substance problem and sought help for it. Clearly, these are
not the people whom examiners need to be most concerned about. Bar exam-
iners may have a legitimate interest in identifying some applicants who are no
longer abusing alcohol or drugs. If the substance abuse ended recently, a period
of monitoring may be appropriate, because there is a high risk of relapse during
295. See Braun, supra note 201, at 11-12, 14. Sources of information that lead the committee
to investigate possible alcoholism include DWI convictions, other crimes or traffic violations in which
arrest or accident reports indicate signs of drinking, and employers who report problems that may be
substance-related. See id. at 12. After the screening process is completed, applicants who are found
to have current, unaddressed substance abuse problems may be offered the opportunity to participate
in California's abeyance program (deferred admission after a monitored probationary period). During
the program's first four years of operation, forty-two applicants were identified for inclusion in the abey-
ance program. See id. at 12-13.
296. NCBE CHARACTER REPORT, supra note 10, at 13. This is essentially a conduct-based
question, although from the strict scrutiny perspective it can be faulted for asking only about disability-
related defenses. Cf. Med. Soc'y of N.J. v. Jacobs, No. 93-3670, WL 413016, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 5,
1993) (holding that a question that asked only about terminations that stemmed from a disability
violated ADA). That problem, of course, could easily be fixed by broadening the question to cover
all defenses. In addition to this question, the NCBE uses a self-assessment question asking about any
condition, including substance abuse, that currently affects the applicant's ability to practice law. See
NCBE CHARACTER REPORT, supra note 10, at 12.
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the early stages of recovery.5 7 But it is the utility of uncovering this subset of
cases, and not the more crucial task of detecting untreated addiction, that
must be placed in the balance against the questions' potential for deterring
treatment.
The AALS's national survey of law students, as previously discussed,
shows that the prospect of disclosure to bar examiners significantly dampens
students' willingness to seek counseling for a substance abuse problem or to
refer their friends for help.298 This should be cause for great concern, because
patterns of problem drinking that develop in law school contribute to the legal
profession's high rate of alcoholism. For example, a study in Arizona found
that the percentage of law students who felt concerned about their recent use
of alcohol was 8 percent before entering law school, but rose to 15 percent
after the first year and to 24 percent by the end of the third year. 99 The legal
profession's approach to attorneys who develop chemical dependency prob-
lems is premised on the idea that public protection is better served by guaran-
teeing confidentiality than by requiring disclosure. Lawyer Assistance
Programs (LAPs), which have been established in every state, offer help to
those who self-refer and conduct confidential interventions with attorneys
whose impairment is reported to the LAP by a colleague. Their policy of
strict confidentiality is backed by a 1991 amendment to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which exempts lawyers and judges serving on an LAP
297. See Hettrick, supra note 286, at 34 (arguing that conditional admission with regular moni-
toring is warranted for applicants "in early or fragile recovery"). This justification can support only
time-limited inquiries, not "have you ever" type questions. See infra text accompanying notes 302-
305 (discussing appropriate time frame if inquiries are allowed).
298. See Report of the AALS Special Committee, supra note 185, at 55. Only 3.3 percent of the
surveyed law students acknowledged that they personally needed help with a substance abuse problem.
See id. at 43. However, it is reasonable to infer from the survey results that a significant number of those
students are held back from seeking help by confidentiality concerns, and there is a good deal of
anecdotal evidence indicating that such deterrence occurs with some frequency. See id. at 55; see also
Distelhorst, supra note 186, at 25; supra note 186 and accompanying text. The AALS survey also found
that 37 percent of law students knew of classmates whose performance was impaired by substance
abuse, and students reported that they are less likely to refer their peers for counseling because of
their concerns about bar officials' access to the information. See Report of the AALS Special Committee,
supra note 185, at 43, 55.
299. See Benjamin et al., supra note 220, at 238, 240. The AALS's national law student survey
also found significantly higher rates of frequent or recent alcohol use in third-year law students, as
compared with first- and second-years. Overall, 11.7 percent of law students said that they felt that
they had abused alcohol since entering law school, 13.2 percent said that substance abuse had affected
their class attendance, and 32.2 percent admitted to driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs
in the past year. See Report of the AALS Special Committee, supra note 185, at 41-43; see also John M.
Burman, Alcohol Abuse and Legal Education, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 39, 42-43 (1997) (discussing how
alcohol permeates law school culture, and describing results of a 1995 survey of students at fifteen law
schools showing widespread alcohol use and related problems).
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from the obligation of reporting professional misconduct."' It is difficult to
justify not offering the same assurances to law students."0
Status-based substance abuse questions probably achieve no net gain in
public protection. They fail to add in any appreciable way to the ability of bar
examiners to detect the untreated problems that pose the greatest risk. Such
questions may be helpful in identifying some applicants receiving treatment
who could benefit from continued monitoring, but come at the cost of pre-
venting some students with active substance abuse problems from getting
treatment in the first place. Even under the relaxed scrutiny version of the
ADA's necessity test, the case for the questions is doubtful. The burden should
be on the proponents of such questions to show that a substantial number of
cases of questionable fitness could not have been detected without them,
enough so that the benefits plausibly outweigh the costs of deterrence.
If questions about diagnosis or treatment for substance abuse can be jus-
tified, the issue of narrow tailoring remains. What is a reasonable time frame?
A question going back one year should be sufficient to identify applicants who
are in early, unstable recovery. The DSM-IV notes that the risk of relapse is
particularly high during the first twelve months after dependence, and applies
the designation "sustained full remission" to those who make it through a year
without any return to alcohol or drug abuse.02 The ADA's provisions on sub-
stance abuse also suggest the appropriateness of a one-year limitation. The
statute and regulations distinguish between individuals currently engaging
300. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(c) (1983); Benjamin et. at, supra note
289, at 118-24; Report of the AALS Special Committee, supra note 185, at 46-47, 53-54; Hettrick,
supra note 286, at 34.
The confidentiality premise also underlies national policy on substance abuse treatment. Federal
law provides confidentiality protections for alcohol and drug abuse treatment information that are
more stringent than most healthcare privacy protections, in order to encourage people to seek treat-
ment. See 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (1994); 42 C.F.R. § 2.3(b)(2) (2000) (stating that regulations are
"intended to insure that an alcohol or drug abuse patient ... is not made more vulnerable by reason
of the availability of his or her patient record than an individual who has an alcohol or drug problem
and who does not seek treatment"); see also Richard C. Boldt, A Study in Regulatory Method, Local
Political Cultures, and Jurisprudential Voice: The Application of Federal Confidentiality Law to Project Head
Start, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2325, 2330-34 (1995) (discussing the history, purposes and scope of the
confidentiality law).
301. See Report of the AALS Special Committee, supra note 185, at 56; Distelhorst, supra note 186,
at 24-25; Linda J. Haynes, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Ethical Obligation of a Law School
Professor or Dean to Report Substance Abuse Problems of a Student Versus the Need to Help the Student, B.
EXAMINER, May 1994, at 35, 40-41; Ken Myers, Dilemma of Drugs on Campus, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 22,
1993, at 1.
302. DSM-IV, supra note 174, at 179-80, 189. Relapses are common, even after a period of
sustained full remission. See id. But bar examiners do not purport to deny admission, or even to impose
conditional admission, on applicants who are in stable recovery, simply based on the statistical
likelihood of future relapse, nor would it be appropriate to do so. See supra notes 204-205 and accom-
panying text.
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in the illegal use of drugs, who are not protected, and those who have been
abstaining long enough so that drug use cannot reasonably be viewed as an
ongoing problem.0 3 Legislative history and court decisions interpreting these
provisions indicate that drug use in the prior days, weeks or months can sup-
port an inference of current, ongoing use, but never suggest a period longer
than one year. 4 A one-year time frame would lessen, although not elimi-
nate entirely, the effects of deterrence; students who address a substance
abuse problem early enough in their law school careers would not have to
disclose. If such questions are to be allowed, it is also essential-for the reasons
previously discussed in connection with bipolar disorder-that applicants
be informed that a finding of recent substance abuse is likely to result in a
conditional admission rather than rejection.30
IV. THE DANGERS OF PROCESS DISCRIMINATION: WHY THE BAR
ADMISSION PROCESS NEEDS TO BE REFORMED IF DISABILITY
INQUIRIES ARE TO BE ALLOWED
Courts, bar examiners and critics of disability questions have generally
treated the ADA's implications for bar application inquiries in either/or terms:
Either the ADA allows certain questions on the forms, or it does not. If a ques-
303. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,210 (1994) (defining "individual with a disability" to protect a person
who is no longer using drugs and is participating in or has completed a rehabilitation program, or who is
otherwise rehabilitated, but the definition does not extend to a person "who is currently engaging in
the illegal use of drugs"); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2000) (defining "current illegal use of drugs" as "illegal
use of drugs that occurred recently enough to justify a reasonable belief that a person's drug use is cur-
rent or that continuing use is a real and ongoing problem").
304. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-596, at 64 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 565, 573
(stating that the term "currently engaging" is not intended to be limited to use of drugs "on the day
of, or within a matter of days or weeks before, the.., action in question"); Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare
Sys., 176 F.3d 847, 856 (5th Cit. 1999) (stating that current use may be inferred from use in the prior
"weeks and months"); Shafer v. Preston Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 278 (4th Cir. 1997)
(same); Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); Quigley v. Austeel
Lemont Co., 79 F. Supp. 2d 941, 946 (N.D. III. 2000) (finding that one month is not sufficient to
establish rehabilitation); Baustian v. Louisiana, 910 F. Supp. 274, 276-77 (E.D. La. 1996) (finding
that seven weeks is not sufficient); McDaniel v. Miss. Baptist Med. Ctr., 877 F. Supp. 321, 327-28
(S.D. Miss. 1995) (finding that two to three weeks is not sufficient). Largely for this reason, New
Jersey opted for a one-year time limit when it narrowed its substance abuse inquiry in 1995. See N.J.
STATEWIDE PANEL REPORT, supra note 233.
305. See Report of the AALS Special Committee, supra note 185, at 78 (urging examiners to limit
inquiries to recent information, and to promulgate and publicize policies of admitting recovering
substance abusers, to lessen disincentives to seeking treatment); Distelhorst, supra note 186, at 26
(noting that putting a three-year time limit on inquiries would not accomplish the goal of encourag-
ing law students to seek treatment, and urging bar examiners to publish clear policies explaining how
recovering abusers will be treated).
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tion passes the necessity test and is permissible, the ADA is seen as regulating
the ultimate outcome-decisions to deny admission or to impose conditions
must not be discriminatory-but not the process by which bar examiners reach
those decisions. In this part, I argue that the ADA in fact has a great deal to
say about how the bar admissions process must be structured when disability
inquiries are used. The ADA's employment title allows disability inquiries
under certain circumstances, but only if the selection process is designed in a
way that minimizes stigma and the danger that people with disabilities,
regardless of the outcome, will be demeaned by the process.
I start, in Part IV.A, with an analysis of the provisions in Title I of the
ADA regulating disability inquiries by employers. The next section explains
why Title 1I should be construed to incorporate Title I's basic safeguards when
a public entity conducts a licensing process that is functionally similar to
employment screening. (Part IV.B.) Part IV.C examines the dangers of stigma
and discriminatory process in bar admissions proceedings, and concludes that
these dangers are sufficiently acute, and comparable in nature to the evils
addressed by Title I's inquiry provisions, to warrant the application of Title I's
process protections. In the final section, I consider how the mechanisms that
Title I mandates to minimize the risks of process discrimination in employment
can be adapted to the functionally similar, but not identical, setting of bar
admissions. I outline what a nondiscriminatory bar admissions process would
look like, and address some practical problems in the implementation.
A. Title I and Employment Inquiries
Title I of the ADA, which covers employers, employment agencies,
and unions,30 6 provides that the statute's "prohibition against discrimina-
tion... shall include medical examinations and inquiries."3 7 It then goes
on to detail what kinds of examinations or inquiries are acceptable or
barred. Pre-employment medical examinations and inquiries relating to the
existence, nature, or severity of a disability are prohibited."' However, an
employer may require new hires to undergo a medical examination after
an offer of employment has been extended, but before the employee starts
306. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(2) (1994).
307. Id. § 12,112(d)(1).
308. See id. § 12,112(d)(2)(A). Prior to an offer of employment, an employer may approach
the subject of disability-related limitations only by asking applicants whether they are capable of
performing job-related functions, or by requiring them to describe or demonstrate how they would
perform tasks required for the job. See id. § 12,112(d)(2)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a) (2000).
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work.9  The statute does not limit the scope of such examinations, but pro-
vides that the results must be used in a manner that comports with the ADA:
The job offer cannot be withdrawn unless the medical examination shows that
the applicant is incapable of performing essential job functions.31'
Once an employee has started working, the employer is prohibited from
asking any disability-related questions or requiring a medical examination,
"unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent
with business necessity." ' If an employer observes job performance problems
and has reasonable grounds for believing that they are attributable to a medical
condition, or has reason to believe that an employee has a condition which
will affect her ability to do the job or endanger the safety of others, the
employer may request medical documentation or require an examination.
313
Title I also regulates the manner in which disability information is gath-
ered, maintained and disseminated. The statute conditions its allowance
of some medical examinations and inquiries on the requirement that "infor-
mation obtained regarding the medical condition or history of the applicant
[or employee] is collected and maintained on separate forms and in separate
309. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(3) (1994).
310. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3) (2000) (stating that employment entrance medical examina-
tions "do not have to be job-related and consistent with business necessity"). In contrast, only neces-
sary and job-related inquiries or examinations are allowed for incumbent employees. See infra text
accompanying note 312. The difference is the product of political compromise. An earlier version of
the statute would have required employers to show that any criteria used to identify individuals with
disabilities are necessary and substantially related to job performance. The business community was
concerned with the expense and difficulty of "job-validating" all medical examinations and inquiries,
but ultimately were willing to accept the concept for incumbent employees. See Chai Feldblum, Medical
Examinations and Inquiries Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: A View from the Inside, 64 TEMP.
L. REV. 521, 535-37 (1991).
311. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(3)(C) (1994); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.14(b) (2000).
312. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(4)(A) (1994); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.14(c)
(2000) (stating that disability inquiries and medical examinations are allowed "when there is a need
to determine whether an employee is still able to perform the essential functions of his or her job").
As with pre-employment inquiries, employers are also permitted to ask employees questions that
focus on "the ability of an employee to perform job-related functions" rather than on the existence,
nature or severity of a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(4)(B) (1994). The statute also authorizes
employers to offer voluntary medical examinations as part of an employee health program. See id.
313. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related
Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees Under the ADA (July 26, 2000), reprinted in Fair Empl.
Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:7701, 7708-11. For example, an employer may: request an employee whose
excessive absenteeism has resulted in poor job performance to submit to a medical examination,
see Yin v. California, 95 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1996); require medical documentation of an
employee's functional abilities before allowing him to return to work after a back injury, see Porter
v. U.S. Alumoweld Co., 125 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 1997); refer a police officer who displays hostile
and paranoid behavior on the job for a psychiatric evaluation, see Watson v. City of Miami Beach,
177 F.3d 932, 935 (1 1th Cir. 1999); or seek confirmation of an employee's medical condition after
a coworker has provided reliable information that the employee may have a contagious airborne
disease, see Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, supra, at 405:7710.
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medical files and is treated as a confidential medical record .... ,314 The avail-
ability of this information to nonmedical personnel is strictly limited. Title I
authorizes only three exceptions to the confidentiality rule: "supervisors and
managers may be informed regarding necessary restrictions on the work or
duties of the employee and necessary accommodations;" first aid and safety
personnel may be given information about conditions that may require emer-
gency treatment; and information may be provided to government officials
investigating ADA compliance.315 Thus, when an employer requires an
employee to undergo a medical examination, the employer cannot demand
access to the employee's entire medical history; only the physician's assess-
ment of whether the individual is currently capable of performing job duties,
and the medical information directly relevant to that assessment, should
make it to the employer's desk. 16 Similarly, medical information gathered
from job applicants may be disclosed to decisionmakers in the hiring process
only on a need-to-know basis.317
314. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(3)(B) (1994); see also id. § 12,112(d)(4)(C); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c)(1)
(2000) (requiring medical information obtained from employees to be subject to the same record-
maintenance and confidentiality requirements that the statute sets forth for applicants).
315. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(3)(B)(i) (1994); see Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F.3d
964, 967-70 (8th Cit. 1999) (stating that a supervisor's disclosure of information obtained through an
employee medical examination to the employee's coworkers and a prospective employer may violate
Title l's confidentiality provisions); Downs v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 13 F. Supp. 2d 130, 141-
42 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding that an employer violated ADA's confidentiality provisions by giving
its workers' compensation claims representative unlimited access to documents in a job applicant's
medical file). Other provisions of the ADA, located outside of Title I but applicable to the entire
statute, may be read to authorize certain disclosures for insurance or workers compensation purposes.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12,201 (1994); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.14(b) (2000); Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n, supra note 127, at 405:7217-:7218.
316. See Riechmann v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 1171, 1185-86 (D. Kan. 2000)
(holding that although an employer was within its rights when it required an employee who was
returning from an extended leave under medical restrictions to undergo a medical examination, it
violated the ADA by seeking unnecessary information from the doctor, including what medication
the employee was taking and whether she was receiving counseling); Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, supra note 313, at 405:7701, :7715 (stating that an employer generally "cannot request
an employee's complete medical records because they are likely to contain information unrelated to
whether the employee can perform his/her essential functions or work without posing a direct threat").
317. The section on "Confidentiality" in the EEOC's Enforcement Guidance on Pre-Employment
Inquiries provides:
Medical information obtained in the course of a post-offer medical examination or inquiry
may be provided to and used by appropriate decision-makers involved in the hiring process in
order to make employment decisions consistent with the ADA.... The employer may only
share the medical information with individuals involved in the hiring process who need to
know the information.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, supra note 127, at 405:7216-:7217. The statutory require-
ments that the information be contained in a "confidential medical record," and that supervisors
or managers be informed only of relevant work restrictions or accommodation needs, support the
EEOC's interpretation. See supra text accompanying notes 314-315. It is also significant that the
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The purposes of these restrictions, and the nature of the discrimination
they are designed to combat, are illuminated by the ADA's legislative history
and reflected in the statute's structure. Congress was concerned both with
discriminatory outcomes and discriminatory processes. The prohibition of pre-
employment inquiries was designed in part as a safeguard against pretextual
denials of employment:
Historically, employment application forms and employment interviews
requested information concerning an applicant's physical or mental
condition. This information was often used to exclude applicants with
disabilities-particularly those with so-called hidden disabilities such as
epilepsy, diabetes, emotional illness, heart disease and cancer-before
their ability to perform the job was even evaluated.
In order to assure that misconceptions do not bias the employment
selection process, the legislation sets forth a process which begins with a
prohibition on pre-offer medical examinations or inquiries.
3 18
At the same time, Congress recognized that medical examinations may legiti-
mately serve "the employer's need to discover possible disabilities that do,
in fact, limit the person's ability to do the job."319 Title I's deferral of disability
inquiries until after an offer has been made lessens the risk that conscious or
unconscious bias will taint the selection decision. The two-stage process also
ensures that an employer will not be able to hide the fact that it is rejecting an
applicant for medical reasons.3 2 0
ADA's inquiry provisions authorize only a "medical examination" for new hires. For incumbent
employees, the statute allows both examinations and inquiries. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(3) & (4)
(1994). The statutory requirement that the assessment of applicants be conducted through a "medi-
cal examination" suggests that Congress intended that any general medical information gathered
through this process remain in the hands of medical personnel who are competent to assess it. See H.R.
REP. No. 101-485(1), at 73-74 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 355-56 (assuming, in
ADA committee report's discussion of employment entrance medical examinations, that any fitness
determination will be made by an "examining physician").
318. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1), at 72-73 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 355;
see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 42-43 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 465;
S. REP. No. 101-116, at39 (1989).
319. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 73 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,355.
320. The EEOC notes in its Enforcement Guidance that
applicants have in the past been asked about their medical conditions at the same time they
were completing other parts of the application process, such as submission of a written applica-
tion or resume. If an applicant who disclosed a disability was then rejected, s/he would not
necessarily have known whether the rejection was due to the disability, or due to some other
criterion (e.g., insufficient skills or experience). Accordingly, Congress established a process
within the ADA to isolate an employer's consideration of an applicant's non-medical qualifi-
cations from any consideration of the applicant's medical conditions.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, supra note 127, at 405:7194; see also Feldblum, supra note
310, at 531-32.
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The stigmatizing effect of disclosure is the second concern that underlies
Congress's decision to treat disability inquiries as a form of discrimination.
The ADA's committee reports discuss the example of an employer requiring a
test for cancer when an employee starts losing his hair: "While the employer
might argue that it does not intend to penalize the individual, the individ-
ual with cancer might object merely to being identified, independent of the
consequences. As was made abundantly clear before the Committee, being
identified as disabled often carries both blatant and subtle stigma. ' '32
Unwanted disclosure, whether of the existence of a disability or of the details
contained in medical records, can be intrinsically embarrassing; it can also
affect the way in which an applicant or employee is treated, even if she is not
denied employment. An interviewer may become uncomfortable, or make
patronizing or ignorant comments. Coworkers may avoid the individual or
treat her condescendingly.322 When Congress determined that a "prohibi-
tion against inquiries regarding disabilities is critical to assure that bias does
not enter into the selection process, '  it was as much concerned with dis-
crimination in the process as it was with discriminatory exclusions.
A large part of Title I's restrictions on examinations and inquiries are
aimed at process discrimination. The ban on pre-employment inquiries is not
only a prophylactic against pretextual decisions to deny employment; it helps
to ensure that applicants will not be stigmatized or demeaned during inter-
views or on job application forms. The provisions authorizing examinations
and inquiries were crafted to minimize stigma and embarrassment by placing
the process in the hands of medical personnel, with strict limitations on the
availability of the information to others in the employer's organization. After
hiring, the business necessity requirement safeguards against unwanted disclo-
sures by ensuring that disability will become an issue only if the employee
raises it (for example, by seeking an accommodation) or if performance con-
cerns bring fitness into question.
321. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1), at 75 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 357-58;
see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 39-40 (1989). Several courts have recognized that combating the
stigmatic effect of inquiries and examinations was an important part of the Congressional purpose
in enacting these provisions. See Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 804, 812 (6th Cir.
1999); Griffin v. Steeltek, Inc., 160 F.3d 591, 594 (10th Cir. 1998); EEOC v. Prevo's Family Market,
Inc., 135 F.3d 1089, 1094 n.8 (6th Cir. 1998).
322. See, e.g., Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 967 (8th Cir. 1999) (describing
plaintiffs allegations that her coworkers treated her in a patronizing way after her supervisor told them
that she had a back impairment that required lifting restrictions and had been tested for dyslexia).
323. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1), at 73 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 355.
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B. The Relevance of the Title I Inquiry Provisions
to the Interpretation of Title II
What impact should Title I's detailed regulation of employment
inquiries have on the legality of licensing disability questions under Title
II? As discussed earlier in this Article, courts have rejected the argument
that the absence of a specific prohibition on inquiries from Title II means
that the ADA allows licensing boards to ask whatever they want.124  The
statute and its legislative history provide strong support for just the
opposite inference: that Title II to some degree incorporates Title I's
approach to disability inquiries.3 25  The committee reports on the ADA
indicate that Congress intended the undefined term "discrimination" in
Title II to reach all forms of discrimination that are "identical" or
"comparable" to the discriminatory practices listed in other titles.12' Title
324. See supra Part II.A.2.
325. If one were writing on a clean slate, a strong argument could be made that Title I, by its
own terms, applies to the screening conducted by bar examiners. Title I applies to any "employer" or
"employment agency," 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(2) & (5) (1994), terms imported from Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. See id. § 2000e(b) & (c). Early Title VII cases broadly construed these terms to
reach any kind of entity that exercises significant control over access to employment opportunities.
See, e.g., Sibley Mem'l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1340-41 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (regarding a hospital
that controls patient referrals to a nonemployee nurse); Puntolillo v. N.H. Racing Comm'n, 375
F. Supp. 1089, 1091-92 (D.N.H. 1974) (regarding a state board that confers license needed by driver-
trainers to race).
Although bar examiners control access to employment as a lawyer, courts, with little analysis, have
refused to extend the logic of the Sibley line of cases to race discrimination claims brought against bar
examining boards. See Woodard v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 598 F.2d 1345, 1346 (4th Cir. 1979);
Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F. 2d 1089, 1096 (5th Cir. 1975); Delgado v. McTighe, 442 F. Supp. 725, 729-
30 (E.D. Pa. 1977). It has been suggested that "the real, but usually undisclosed, reason that courts
have refused to apply Title VII to state bar examination boards is the fear that Title VII would invaria-
bly require the invalidation of all bar examinations." W. Sherman Rogers, The ADA, Title VII, and
the Bar Examination: The Nature and Extent of the ADA's Coverage of Bar Examinations and an Analysis of
the Applicability of Title VII to Such Tests, 36 How. L.J. 1, 2 (1993). The decisions are well-entrenched,
and have been relied on by federal appeals courts to defeat Title VII claims against a variety of state
professional licensing boards. See Fields v. Hallsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 906 F.2d 1017, 1019-20 (5th
Cir. 1990); George v. N.J. Bd. of Veterinary Med. Exam'rs, 794 F.2d 462, 463-64 (3d Cir. 1986);
Haddock v. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs of Cal., 777 F.2d 462, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Ass'n of
Mexican-Am. Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 579-84 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that
Title VII applies to state certification exam for teachers, but only because the state exercises substan-
tial control over the operation of local schools as well as controlling licensing). Given these prece-
dents, it is unlikely that any court would find that Title I of the ADA directly applies to bar examining
committees.
326. The report of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee states: "The forms of
discrimination prohibited by [title II] are comparable to those set out in the applicable provisions of
titles I and III of this legislation." S. REP. No. iOl-116, at 44 (1989). The House Judiciary
Committee's report provides, "Title I1 should be read to incorporate provisions of titles I and III
which are not inconsistent with the regulations implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
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I expressly states that medical examinations and inquiries are a form of
"discrimination.
327
In two of the licensing inquiry cases, courts have addressed a version of
the incorporation argument raised by the licensing agency defendants.3"' The
argument runs like this: If Title II is read to incorporate Title I's require-
ments, then Title I's allowance of medical examinations of unlimited scope
after a conditional job offer has been extended should translate into an
entitlement for licensing agencies to ask any disability questions they want-
as long as they defer them until after they made an initial decision about
the applicant's fitness. Rejecting this argument; the court in Medical Society
of New Jersey v. Jacobs noted that the legislative history is unclear about the
extent of incorporation, and gives a court "little guidance in how to structure
its meaning. '  Because Title I's more detailed provisions are geared specifi-
cally to the employment setting, and cannot be mechanically applied to the
wide range of government activities covered by Title II, many of which
have nothing to do with employment, the court found it better to rest its
analysis entirely on Title II and its implementing regulations. "
Act of 1973 .... H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111), at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
474. A similar passage appears in the report of the House Education and Labor Committee:
The Committee has not chosen to list all types of actions that are included within the term
"discrimination", as was done in titles I and III, because [title II] essentially simply extends
the anti-discrimination prohibition embodied in section 504 to all actions of state and local
governments. The Committee intends, however, that the forms of discrimination prohibited
by [title II] be identical to those set out in the applicable provisions of titles I and III of this
legislation.
H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1), at 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367.
327. The section of Title I with the heading Discrimination, begins with a subsection entitled
General rule, which contains a broad prohibition of "discriminat[ion] against a qualified individual
with a disability" in matters relating to employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(a) (1994). Subsection (d),
which addresses medical examinations and inquiries, begins as follows:
(1) In general
The prohibition against discrimination as referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall
include medical examinations and inquiries.
Id. § 12,112(d)(1).
328. See Med. Soc'y of N.J. v. Jacobs, No. 93-3670, 1993 WL 413016, at *9-*10 (D.N.J. Oct. 5,
1993); Ellen S. v. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 859 F. Supp. 1489, 1493 n.5 (agreeing with analysis of the
Jacobs court).
329. Jacobs, 1993 WL 413016, at *9-'*10.
330. In rejecting the licensing board's argument, the court also pointed to a sentence in the
House Education and Labor Committee report that immediately follows its statement about incorpo-
ration: "Thus, for example, the construction of 'discrimination' set forth in [42 U.S.C. § 12,1121(b) and
(c) ... should be incorporated into the regulations implementing [Title II]." H.R. REP. No. 101-
485(11), at 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367. The court cited the absence of subsec-
tion (d)-Title l's inquiry provision-from this cross-reference as evidence that inquiries may not have
been one of the forms of discrimination that Congress had in mind. The court also thought that the
language of this sentence suggests that any incorporation of Title I is to be accomplished through
the Title II regulations. Neither of these points is particularly convincing. The committee's list of
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The Jacobs court was right in concluding that not every requirement of
Title I can be applied to every Title II situation. It would make little sense,
for example, to prohibit disability-based questions on an application form for
disability benefits. Moreover, with regard to the particular argument advanced
by the licensing board, to allow post-offer medical inquiries of unlimited
scope would conflict with the Title II regulations, which "prohibit the impo-
sition of extra burdens on qualified individuals with disabilities when those
burdens are unnecessary. '3 1 Title II clearly cannot incorporate any aspect of
Title I that is inconsistent with its own requirements.
Title I, however, should not be ignored as an important guide for
assessing what discrimination means in a setting that is closely analogous to
employment: occupational licensing. As the Rhode Island Supreme Court
noted in its decision invalidating disability-based bar application questions,
"the procedures required for admission to the bar are the functional
equivalent of a hiring process and ... the committee operates as the equiva-
lent of an employer when it screens applicants.""' 2 The ADA's legislative
history is clear and consistent in stating that the undefined term "dis-
criminate" in Title 1I is meant to address the basic forms of discrimination
identified in other titles, even if the precise contours of incorporation are
left unclear.3  Title I defines inquiries and examinations relating to disabilities
as discriminatory unless they are accompanied by adequate safeguards
designed to minimize stigma and discriminatory treatment. The particular
safeguards that are needed may vary in different settings, but that is no reason
to read one of the central messages of Title I's definition of "discrimination"
out of Title II entirely. The determination of whether the use of disability
examples from Title I did not purport to be exclusive. Although the committee did state that the
Title II regulations should incorporate provisions from other titles, the main thrust of the statements
about incorporation in this committee report, as well as in the reports of two other committees, was
that the general term "discrimination" in Title II should be read to encompass the basic forms of dis-
crimination set forth elsewhere in the ADA. See supra note 326 (quoting the reports).
331. Jacobs, 1993 WL 413016, at *7 (summarizing the requirements of the Title II regulations).
In this regard, it is also significant that the absence of any limitation on the scope of post-offer
examinations under Title I is the result of political compromise; it can be regarded as an exception
to, rather than an application of, Title l's general principles. See supra note 310.
332. In re Petition & Questionnaire for Admission to the R.I. Bar, 683 A.2d 1333, 1336 (R.I.
1996). Although the court made this observation after noting Title I's requirements in the employ-
ment setting, its decision appeared to rest on the Title II regulations rather than on Title I. To assess
the legality of the bar examiners' questions, the court articulated a test to determine whether such
inquiries are necessary. See supra text accompanying note 145. If the court thought that Title I applied,
it could simply have held that disability questions are never permissible at the application stage.
But see Diane M. Jeffers, Professional Responsibility-Questions on Rhode Island Bar Application Violate
Americans with Disabilities Act, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 779, 786-87 (1998) (noting that the court's
decision did not clearly state whether the questions constituted a violation under Title I or under
the Title II regulations).
333. See supra note 326 (quoting statements from three committee reports).
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inquiries in a nonemployment selection process is discriminatory should
depend on an assessment of whether the process involves dangers of
discrimination similar to those at which Title I's inquiry provisions are
aimed. If so, safeguards analogous (although not necessarily identical) to
Title I's employment-specific procedures should be required."'
Some commentators have argued that Title I's policy of prohibiting all
pre-employment inquiries about disability supports an interpretation of
Title I1 that would ban all disability-based questions in the licensing
application process.335 The problem with this argument is that Title I allows
employers to use medical examinations as part of the screening process
as long as certain safeguards are in place, and its legislative history acknowl-
edges that employers may have a legitimate need to probe into disabili-
ties.336 The policy of Title I is not inconsistent with a Title IL approach that
allows some disability-based inquiries by licensing agencies. But Title I's
acceptance of disability-based questions is coupled with a second, crucial
insight: The use of disability-based inquiries is discriminatory unless the
selection process is structured in a manner that minimizes stigma and the
risk of discriminatory treatment. The courts that have allowed disability
questions in bar admissions under the relaxed scrutiny approach have
ignored what Title I has to say about the meaning of discrimination.
C. Are Title I-Type Procedures Appropriate to Bar Admissions?
Some of the concerns that led Congress to restrict employment
inquiries under Title I may be less of a problem when it comes to bar
334. There has been some judicial recognition that Title I's inquiry provisions should inform
interpretation of Title II. In a case that arose before Title I's effective date, a federal district court
held that Title l's medical examination and inquiry rules were fully applicable to a public
employer's hiring by virtue of Title II. (Title II went into effect six months before Title 1; both titles
apply to the employment activities of public entities.) See Downs v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 13
F. Supp. 2d 130, 134-35 (D. Mass. 1998). A federal magistrate judge refused to dismiss a claim
challenging an agency's refusal to provide vocational rehabilitation services to an applicant who
refused to take a psychological examination, finding that medical examinations defined as dis-
criminatory under Title I "may well be considered discrimination by entities providing services
[under Title II]." Kent v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 792 F. Supp. 59, 61
(E.D. Mo. 1992). The Jacobs court, while rejecting the particular incorporation argument raised
by the defendant in that case, suggested that a reading of Title II that incorporates aspects of Title
I's inquiry provisions but adapts them to different settings might be appropriate. "[Ihf the inquiry
provision is incorporated at all," the court wrote, "it does not function in the same way under
Title II as under Title I." Jacobs, 1993 WL 413016, at *10.
335. See Coleman & Shellow, supra note 135, at 174-76; Carol J. Banta, Note, The Impact of the
Americans with Disabilities Act on State Bar Examiners' Inquiries into the Psychologica History of Bar
Applicants, 94 MICH. L. REV. 167,175-77 (1995).
336. See supra text accompanying note 319.
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admission.13 ' Bar examiners, unlike employers, do not have a history of reject-
ing large numbers of applicants with disabilities-it is rare for them to deny
admission to anyone."' On those occasions when admission is denied, or a
conditional admission imposed, examiners are less likely to hide the true
reasons for their decisions. Unlike employers, bar examiners are required to
justify their decisions, and they can't offer easy excuses like "you don't have
enough experience" or "another applicant was better qualified." These factors
limit the risk of one of the evils that Congress was concerned with-pretextual
denials-and may affect what kinds of prophylactic procedures are needed.339
As we have seen, though, Title I is as much concerned with discriminatory
process as with discriminatory outcomes.
The following sections examine the impact on the bar admissions pro-
cess when bar examiners are allowed to ask questions about mental disabili-
ties. The structure, functions, and history of bar examining boards, combined
with the nature of the particular disabilities that have been singled out for
scrutiny, pose dangers of stigma and discriminatory treatment that are similar
to, and in some respects worse than, the harms that Title I is designed to guard
against in the employment setting. Safeguards analogous to Title I's process
protections are needed before disability inquiries can be considered nondis-
criminatory in the bar admissions setting.
1. Stigma
Stigmatization of people with mental disorders has persisted throughout history.
It is manifested by bias, distrust, stereotyping, fear, embarrassment, anger,
and/or avoidance. Stigma leads others to avoid living, socializing or working
with, renting to, or employing people with mental disorders, especially severe
disorders such as schizophrenia.... It reduces patients' access to resources and
opportunities (for example, housing, jobs) and leads to low self-esteem, isola-
tion, and hopelessness. It deters the public from seeking, and wanting to pay
for, care. In its most overt and egregious form, stigma results in outright dis-
crimination and abuse. More tragically, it deprives people of their dignity and
interferes with their full participation in society.340
337. See Fedo & Brown, supra note 106, at 41-42; Reischel, supra note 115, at 19 (arguing that
differences between employment screening and bar examiners' character and fitness assessments make
the policies underlying Title I's ban on inquiries inapplicable to bar admissions).
338. See supra note 170.
339. However, in some circumstances there is a significant risk of pretextual treatment in the
bar admissions setting. If bar examiners are aware of an applicant's mental disability, they may react
more negatively to other problems disclosed on the application form. See infra text accompanying
notes 405-409.
340. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 6 (citation omitted).
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Recall the words that Kathleen Flaherty heard muttered by a member of
her character and fitness panel: "Are you violent?"34' Widespread and deeply
rooted societal prejudices about mental illness and substance abuse intensify
the embarrassment that applicants feel when they are forced to identify them-
selves, and such prejudices enhance the risk that applicants will encounter
discrimination or demeaning treatment as they go through the process. The
narrowing of mental health inquiries on bar application forms to hone in on
"serious" mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder has, if any-
thing, increased the stigma for applicants who answer "yes. '
The idea of mental illness stirs up some if the deepest fears of human
beings: the loss of reason and self-control.343 From the earliest times, mental
illness has been associated with violence, divine punishment, and demonic
possession."' By the late nineteenth century, these were joined by notions of
degeneracy, defective character, and deviance.345 Surveys tracking public atti-
tudes over the last fifty years have shown some significant increases in public
understanding of mental illness, but at the same time reveal a remarkable
persistence in misconceptions and social stigma.346 Surveys conducted in the
1990s showed that 70 percent of the public felt that there was a stigma
attached to admitting a mental illness.347 The percentage of respondents who
341. See supra text following note 87. The comment was off-the-record and is not reflected in the
transcript of the hearing. Undoubtedly, the member of the committee would deny having made it,
although Ms. Flaherty is sure that she heard it. It is possible, of course, that she misheard. The mere fact
that the applicant thought that she heard it reflects the reality of stigma: Anyone with a serious mental
disorder has good reason to fear that people will view her through the lens of societal prejudices and
react with fear, aversion, or discomfort.
342. In striking down a broad question about 'all mental health treatment during the past five
years, the Clark court actually suggested that applicants receiving outpatient counseling were being
stigmatized by their association, on the application form, with mental hospital patients and addicts! See
Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 445 (E.D. Va. 1995) ("Requiring applicants to answer
[the counseling question], especially considered in relation to the preceding and succeeding questions
regarding drug or alcohol addiction and hospitalization for mental illness, suggests that those answering
affirmatively are somehow deficient or inferior applicants.").
343. See Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 389 (1992) (quoting SANDER
L. GILMAN, DIFFERENCE AND PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY, RACE AND MADNESS
23-24 (1985)).
344. See id. at 388-89; John Monahan, Mental Disorder and Violent Behavior: Perceptions and
Evidence, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511, 512 (1992).
345. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 6; see also Perlin, supra note 343, at
393-96 (describing stereotypes about mental illness that have become entrenched in social discourse).
346. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 7, 289; see also Frank Rich, The Last
Taboo, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1997, at A19 (arguing that Bruce Babbitt's admonition, "[d]on't go near
a psychiatrist-it's the kiss of death," remains the rule for politicians).
347. Peggy R. Mastroianni & Carol R. Miaskoff, Coverage of Psychiatric Disorders Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 723, 723 n.2 (1997) (describing results of a 1993 poll
sponsored by Parade Magazine). In another survey, only 19 percent of respondents reported being
"very comfortable" meeting someone with a mental illness, as compared with 47 percent for someone
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associated serious mental illness with violence was much higher in 1996
than in the 195 Os.1 41 Media portrayals of mental illness reinforce prevailing
stereotypes and mirror their persistence. The EEOC's Guidance on Psychiatric
Disabilities and the ADA, 349 a generally cautious document,35  nonetheless
attracted a firestorm of media criticism and ridicule when it was released in
1997. Late for Work: Plead Insanity, read a typical headline.35' Television por-
trayals of ADA plaintiffs routinely depict them as malingerers demanding
special treatment,"2 and images of homelessness and violence predominate
when people with mental illnesses are portrayed in the news and on televi-
sion dramas.3"3
Substance disorders carry their own set of negative associations. The
medical model of addiction remains in tension with longstanding views of
alcoholism and drug abuse as vices, the product of the addict's own moral
failings and lack of willpower. Public attitudes and policy have been marked
who is blind and 59 percent for someone in a wheelchair. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
U.S. CONGRESS, PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT 35 (1994); see Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior
and the Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345, 390 n.225
(1997) (describing results of Louis Harris survey); see also SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note
36, at 7 (describing a 1996 survey in which respondents showed a greater desire for social distance
from a person with schizophrenia, less for someone with depression, and still less for someone who was
worried and unhappy but not mentally ill).
348. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 36, at 7. Among those respondents who
defined mental illness to include psychosis, the percentage who mentioned violence when describing
mental illness rose from 13 percent during the 1950s to 31 percent in 1996. See id.
349. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities (Mar. 25, 1997), reprinted in Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA),
supra note 127, at 405:7461.
350. The EEOC made it clear that employers are not required to tolerate poor performance or
misconduct, even if caused by a disability. See id. at 405:7476-:7478.
351. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and
Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 9-10 (2000) (quoting the
above headline from the Chicago Sun-Times and similar ones from other newspapers, and reprinting
an editorial cartoon depicting the EEOC coming to an employer's office to explain the new rules-
using stock "lunatic" figures to portray the EEOC: a person wielding an axe, another with huge open-
mouthed grin and lolling tongue, a figure dressed as an admiral, another totally naked).
352. See id. at 10 (describing television accounts of the ADA, including a King of the Hill epi-
sode in which an addict-employee and his advocate demand the right to come in late and do no
work). See generally Cary LaCheen, Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumber Lung, and Juggler's Despair: The
Portrayal of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Television and Radio, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
223 (2000).
353. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 347, at 32, 34; Monahan, supra
note 344, at 513; see also James Endrst, "Wonderland" Worries Advocates, HARTFORD COURANT,
Mar. 30, 2000, at D1 (including a comment by Laurie Flynn, Executive Director of the National
Alliance for the Mentally Ill, criticizing a television network for airing a new series set in a psy-
chiatric hospital for "focusing on 'the most extreme hopeless cases' who are depicted as 'killers,
crazies and freaks"').
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by harshly punitive approaches alternating with periods of relative tolerance."4
Stereotypes that link substance use and addiction to African Americans and
other ethnic minorities have played a significant role in the periodic crusades
against drugs and alcohol. 55
The lawyers and judges who serve on bar admissions committees can-
not be expected to be immune from the pervasive stereotypes that surround
mental illness and substance abuse. As Michael Perlin has documented in his
writings on "sanism," myths and prejudices about mental illness, and the
deindividualization of persons with mental disabilities, remain deeply
entrenched in the legal system and in the practices of courts and lawyers.356
Bar applicants who are forced to disclose mental disabilities to those who will
pass on their fitness to practice the profession are acutely aware of the "bla-
tant and subtle stigma" that these conditions carry; to an even greater degree
than the employee with cancer discussed in Title I's legislative history, they
have good reason to "object merely to being identified, independent of the
consequences. 357
2. Moral Character
The structure of the bar admissions process compounds the stigma by
associating mental disability with issues of moral character. Mental health
and substance abuse inquiries on bar application forms appear amidst a sea of
questions that are overwhelmingly focused on uncovering evidence of
354. See MICHAEL MASSING, THE Fix 85-226 (1998); DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN
DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL (expanded ed. 1987); Tim Edwards, Constitutional
Limits on an Employer's Right to Dictate the Terms of an Addict's Recovery Under the ADA: Some
Sobering Concerns, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1679, 1684-90 (1999) (reviewing the history of social and
legal attitudes towards addiction).
355. See MUSTO, supra note 354, at 5-8, 244-45 & passim. As David Musto has written,
The most passionate support for legal prohibition ... has been associated with fear of a
given drug's effect on a specific minority. Certain drugs were dreaded because they
seemed to undermine essential social restrictions which kept these groups under control:
cocaine was supposed to enable blacks to withstand bullets ... and to stimulate sexual
assault.... Alcohol was associated with immigrants crowding into large and corrupt
cities.
Id. at 244-45. See generally MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
IN AMERICA (1995) (describing policymakers' indifference to the foreseeable disparate impact on
African Americans in pursuing failed strategies in the contemporary War on Drugs).
356. See Perlin, supra note 343, at 373-75, 393-97, 400-05; see also Michael L. Perlin,
"Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth:" Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability
Law Developed as It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3 (1999); Perlin, supra note 177, at 30-34;
Michael L. Perlin & Keri K. Gould, Rashomon and the Criminal Law: Mental Disability and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 431, 442-46 (1995).
357. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 75 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 358; see
supra text accompanying notes 321-323 (discussing Title I's legislative history).
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dishonesty, irresponsibility, or bad behavior. Connecticut's twenty-four-page,
fifty-nine-question bar application form is typical. The questions cover
criminal convictions; academic expulsion, probation, or discipline; discharges
or forced resignations from employment; evictions; denials or removals of
any occupational license; military discharge or discipline; default or arrearage
on student loans; judgments entered in favor of creditors; problems relating
to surety or fidelity bonds; motor vehicle violations and license suspensions;
involvement as plaintiff or defendant in litigation; default or arrearage on any
court-ordered obligation, including child support; and grievances filed against
attorneys and judges.35 And, in the middle, a few questions about diagnosis
or treatment for mental disorders or substance abuse. As State Senate
President Kevin Sullivan put it in his letter to Connecticut's bar examiners,
"Are these mental health-based questions now the equivalent of other ques-
tions asked about criminality, dishonesty, or moral turpitude?"'3 9
Historically, formally, and functionally, certification of "good moral
character" has been, and remains, central to the fitness screening performed
by bar committees. The requirement of "good moral character" as a pre-
condition to bar admission is universal in American jurisdictions and dates
back to the early years of the Republic.36° A wave of bar admissions reforms
that unfolded over a period extending from the late nineteenth century
through the 1930s produced three central components that continue to be
358. See CONN. 2001 APPLICATION, supra note 19; see also NCBE CHARACTER REPORT,
supra note 10 (covering a similar range of topics). In addition to the questions posed to applicants,
questionnaires are sent to prior employers and personal references listed by the applicant, covering
(albeit more concisely) the same general ground.
359. See Sullivan Letter, supra note 61. Applicants with disabilities certainly experience the
questions, and the proceedings triggered by affirmative answers, as a questioning of their moral char-
acter. At Connecticut's public hearings on mental health inquiries, an applicant testified, "What
I found particularly upsetting about the [mental health treatment] question was its underlying
implication that ... therapy ... called into question one's moral character." Conn. Bar Examining
Comm., supra note 48, at 4-5 (Sept. 28, 1994). James Roe similarly described his feelings about
being summoned to a hearing after he disclosed his past hospitalization on the application form: "I
became extremely angry that ... a group of strangers had the audacity to question my fitness and
moral character. I could not understand how there could be any logical link between one's moral
character and mental health problems." Roe Testimony, supra note 73, at 2.
360. See 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
102 (1795); Rhode, supra note 17, at 493, 496-97. Through most of the ninteenth century, admis-
sions screening in general, and the administration of the moral character requirement, was a casual
affair. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 317-18, 652-53 (2d ed.
1985); THE JUDICIAL AND CIVIL HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT 186 (Dwight Loomis & J. Gilbert
Calhoun eds., 1895). An attorney reminiscing about his examination in Illinois around 1858
recalled that the examiner had asked him a few desultory questions, regaled him stories about prac-
tice, and then scribbled out a note which read: "My dear Judge:-The bearer of this is a young man
who thinks he can be a lawyer. Examine him if you want to. I have done so and am satisfied. He's a
good deal smarter than he looks to be. Yours, Lincoln." Len Young Smith, Abraham Lincoln as a Bar
Examiner, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1982, at 35, 37.
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the pillars of the system: strict educational prerequisites, written bar exami-
nations administered by centralized state boards, and the active investigation
of applicants' moral character through questionnaires and interviews.36' In
the 1970s and 1980s, when bar examiners began to pay attention to mental
health issues, they incorporated these subjects into the existing machinery
of moral character screening.362 The same panels that scrutinize the fitness of
applicants with mental disabilities simultaneously conduct hearings on moral
fitness.363
That there is an essential difference between the admissions issues raised
by disabilities and "moral character" concerns has not gone unnoticed by
bar examiners. When the Code of Recommended Standards for Bar Examiners
was revised in 1987, the drafters were careful to refer to this component of
the process as "character and fitness screening."3  A member of Indiana's
361. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 46-73 (1989); Rhode, supra note 17, at
499. Starting in the late nineteenth century, newly organized bar organizations at both the state and
national levels began to promote stricter admissions standards in reaction to threats to the pro-
fession's prestige arising from the proliferation of undemanding law schools, the entrance of immigrants
into the profession, and corruption scandals. See ABEL, supra, at 44-46; THERON G. STRONG,
LANDMARKS OF A LAWYER'S LIFETIME 159-61 (1914); see also infra note 403. Connecticut was at
the forefront of this trend. One of the founding purposes of the State Bar Association, organized
in 1875 by an elite group of Connecticut attorneys, was to make the admissions process uniform and
more stringent. Simeon E. Baldwin, who led the association's efforts on bar admission, was also the
principal organizer of the American Bar Association, founded in 1878. See A History of the First One
Hundred Years of the Connecticut Bar Association: 1875-1975, 49 CONN. B.J. 201, 203-25 (1975).
One of the concerns that drove him can be seen from this 1872 entry in his diary: "This constant
contact at the Bar on terms of equality with boors and rogues, I hate." CHARLES C. GOETSCH, ESSAYS
ON SIMEON BALDWIN 16 (1981) (quoting Baldwin's diary).
362. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also Baude, supra note 153, at 655-56.
363. In all areas other than mental health and morals, educational prerequisites and the bar
exam are the mechanisms for ensuring that applicants have the ability to perform competently as
lawyers.
364. Am. Bar Ass'n et al., supra note 188, § III. Earlier versions of the code had referred to the
process as "moral character" investigation. See Sheldon D. Elliott, Report on Standards for Bar
Examiners, 28 B. EXAMINER 59, 61-62 (1959). The distinction between moral and mental fitness
found its first official expression in 1969, in the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility: "An appli-
cant for admission to the bar or a lawyer may be unqualified, temporarily or permanently, for other
than moral and educational reasons, such as mental or emotional instability." MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-6 (1981); see Place & Bloom, supra note 29, at 580.
The term "fitness" had currency among bar examiners long before the 1980s, but it was not yet
associated with issues of mental or emotional fitness that were distinct from moral character. New
York, for example, defined the "general fitness" component of its requirement that applicants possess
the "character and general fitness requisite for an attorney" as having to do "with a man's general
experience in life, his family, his associates, his business or other experience, and his general
reputation, and the like." Frederick A. Keck, Remarks of Frederick A. Keck, in 20 B. EXAMINER 238,
241-43 (1951).
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admissions board, describing the hearing of a candidate with alcohol problems,
explains the distinction these two words are supposed to express:
I started to see where this hearing was headed. We weren't talking
about character. We were talking about fitness. The two are related
but distinctly different. Good moral character generally connotes
honesty, trustworthiness, integrity. Fitness to practice law, however,
addresses the physical and mental suitability of an applicant to practice
law. Does he have the emotional stability to function adequately as alawyer.P"
Nonetheless, the laws, regulations and terminology under which exam-
iners operate continue to label applicants with mental disabilities as deficient
in "morals" or "character." The regulations that govern character and fitness
screening in Connecticut are a good example.366 All hearings, including
those in which the sole concern is the applicant's mental illness or sub-
stance abuse, are conducted pursuant to procedural rules that characterize
the issue to be decided by the committee as a determination of the appli-
cant's "good moral character." '367 Under the heading Conduct that Creates a
Rebuttable Presumption of Lack of Good Moral Character, "[s]ubstance abuse
not under control" is listed alongside of felony convictions and other bad
acts.36 Similar regulatory labeling can be found in other states. In some juris-
dictions, the committee's very name conveys the message of a moral characterjudgment: In California, it is the Subcommittee on Moral Character; in New
Jersey and Maryland, the Character Committee.369
365. Jerome L. Withered, Judging Fitness, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1991, at 15, 16; see also Baude,
supra note 153, at 655-56.
366. See CBEC REGS., supra note 20, art. VI. These guidelines were drafted in 1990 by a
Subcommittee on Character and Fitness, headed by a state court judge, and drew on the practices
of other jurisdictions and the CODE OF RECOMMENDED STANDARDS FOR BAR EXAMINERS, supra
note 189. See Conn. Bar Examining Comm., Report of the Subcommittee on Character and
Fitness (1990).
367. CBEC REGS., supra note 20, arts. VI-3 & VI-5. The administrative director of the
Connecticut Bar Examining Committee acknowledged in a 1994 deposition that the committee's
"lack of good moral character" rules apply to applicants who are scrutinized solely on the basis of
mental health issues. See Stamm Deposition, supra note 30, at 124-31 (June 8, 1994), at 239-40 (June
9, 1994). Seven years later, the same rules remain in place.
368. CBEC REGS., supra note 20, art. VI-11.
369. In California, the Application for Determination of Moral Character includes questions
about mental illness. See COMM. OF BAR EXAM'RS OF THE STATE BAR OF CAL., OFFICE OF
ADMISSIONS, APPLICATION FOR DETERMINATION OF MORAL CHARACTER 10 (Sept. 2000); see
also Statement on Moral Character Requirement for Admission to Practice Law in California, at
http://www.calbar.org/shared/2adm-rl.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2001) (including a policy statement
treating alcohol and drug dependency as an aspect of the good moral character requirement).
Colorado's bar admission rules include a provision that reads as follows: "Applicants must demon-
strate that they are mentally stable and morally and ethically qualified for admission. Fingerprints
may be required of all applicants." COLO. R. CIV. P. 201.6(1). Georgia's rules and policies treat all
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There is more going on here than the inertial persistence of outdated
terminology in regulatory language. Fitness hearings are firmly linked with
the "good moral character" standard in bar examiners' minds. A recent issue
of the Bar Examiner leads off with a ringing defense of character and fitness
screening from the NCBE's chairperson. "What is good character and fitness?"
she asks.37 The answer she gives is devoid of any no-fault concept of fitness;
instead, it is all about good moral character, the applicant's "honesty, fairness
and respect for the rights of others and for the laws," and "transgressions or
misconduct" that may place these in doubt.371 Articles written by bar exam-
iners about the character and fitness screening process, even when expressing
"enlightened" views about mental illness or addiction, often lapse into refer-
ring to such matters as "moral character" problems.372 Moral character is the
fitness issues, including those involving mental illness and substance abuse, as falling under the require-
ment that applicants possess the "integrity and character" requisite for lawyers. See GA. SUP. Cr. R.
GOVERNING ADMISSION TO PRACTICE OF LAW §§ 1, 6, 12; Policy Statement of the Board to Determine
Fitness of Bar Applicants Regarding Character and Fitness Reviews, at http://www2.state.ga.us/Courts/
bar/barpolcy.htm. In three of New York's four Judicial Departments, the only regulatory authority
for Character and Fitness Committees to investigate applicants with fitness issues stemming from
mental illness or substance abuse comes from court rules authorizing committee members to require
candidates "to furnish such additional proofs of good character as the commit-
tee ... member. . . may consider pertinent." 22 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 602.1(d), 805.1(d), 1022.34(d).
Virginia evaluates fitness issues for applicants with disabilities under a set of rules entitled Character
Requirements. See Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 432 (E.D. Va. 1995); see also N.J.
STATEWIDE PANEL REPORT, supra note 233 (stating that the Committee on Character is responsible
for determining the fitness of candidates who disclose mental health or substance abuse problems);
Herr, supra note 6, at 695 (reprinting Maryland form authorizing release of information relating to
applicant fitness to the court's "Character Committees"). For an example of a court rule that is careful
to distinguish mental fitness from moral character, see KY. SUP. CT. R. 2.012.
370. Kathryn E. Ressel, Letter from the Chair, B. EXAMINER, May 1998, at 2.
371. Id. at 2-3. The Code of Recommended Standards for Bar Examiners similarly defines the
character and fitness concept solely by reference to conduct and character deficiencies:
Standard of Character and Fitness. A lawyer should be one whose record of conduct justifies
the trust of clients, adversaries, courts and others with respect to the professional duties
owed to them. A record manifesting a significant deficiency in the honesty, trustworthi-
ness, diligence or reliability of an applicant may constitute a basis for denial of admission.
Am. Bar Ass'n et al., supra note 188, at standard 12. See also CBEC REGS., supra note 20, art. VI-
2, VI-4 (using similar language to define the "standard of character and fitness" applied by the
Committee).
372. See McChrystal, supra note 257, at 96 (noting that boards may deny admission "on moral
character grounds" based on an applicant's "mental or emotional instability"); C. Graham Carothers,
Character and Fitness: A Need for Increased Perception, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1982, at 25 (discussing
"good moral character" as the principle underlying all of the Florida board's fitness screening);
Lawrence B. Custer, Georgia's Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants, B. EXAMINER, Aug.
1982, at 17, 20 (describing Georgia's fitness board's work, including cases involving mental illness
or alcoholism, as "applying contemporary community standards of morality and character"); R.J.
Gerber, Moral Character: Inquiries Without Character, B. EXAMINER, May 1988, at 13 (interchangeably
using the terms "moral character," "moral fitness" and "character and fitness" to refer to the matters
considered by bar committees, including mental health); Pobjecky, supra note 213, at 31, 36-37
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paradigm that shapes bar examiners' understanding of their fitness screening
function, and the theoretical distinction between pure "fitness" issues and the
moral character concerns that dominate their proceedings is easily blurred or
forgotten.3
The moral character paradigm has given rise to certain kinds of behavior
and expectations on the part of bar examiners during character and fitness
proceedings, which have been noted by observers and participants. Appli-
cants are expected to appear before the committee in a posture of deference.
As the rules and guidelines that govern these proceedings emphasize, the
burden of proof is on the applicant to establish good moral character and
fitness.375 Any question posed by a committee member must receive a candid,
complete, and respectful response; a candidate can get into serious trouble
by coming across as argumentative, evasive, or glib, or by suggesting that cer-
tain things are none of the committee's business.3 76 The applicant is expected
to take responsibility for past mistakes and misbehavior, express remorse,
and assure the committee that he or she has learned from the experience and
can be trusted not behave similarly if admitted to the bar.377Questioning at these hearings can be harsh. 78 This serves in part as a
test of whether the applicant displays the expected attitudes (that is, shows
(arguing that mental health inquiries are essential "[in determining whether applicants have estab-
lished good moral character sufficient to demonstrate their fitness").
373. Even when examiners are careful to distinguish fitness from character, their conception
of "fitness" may encompass moral outlook as well as mental health. The same bar examiner who so
carefully distinguished fitness from moral character in his discussion of the alcoholic applicant, see
supra text accompanying note 365, in another article attempted to give separate definitions for the
terms "good moral character" and "fitness." His "fitness" definition included "respect for the rule of law
and our judicial system" and "an absolute willingness to abide by the ... code of ethics," in addition to
"the psychological makeup necessary to function adequately as a lawyer." Jerome L. Withered, Some
Thoughts on Character and Fitness, B. EXAMINER, Nov. 1986, at 21, 23.
374. Deborah Rhode noted many of these features of character and fitness screening in her 1985
study of the process, which was based on interviews with bar examiners in all fifty states as well as courtdecisions and secondary materials. See Rhode, supra note 17, at 493, 543-45. My description is alsoinformed by discussions that I have had with many bar applicants who have gone through character
hearings, my representation of a few, and conversations with attorneys who frequently represent appli-
cants before bar committees.
375. See BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 204, at 73:3001 (noting that the applicant's
burden of proof is well-established); see also, e.g., Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430,432 (E.D. Va. 1995) (citing Virginia rule placing the burden on applicant); CBEC REGS., supra note
20, art. VI-3 (placing the burden of proof on the applicant).
376. See Richard C. McFarlain, Character & Fitness Process Before the Florida Board of BarExaminers, B. EXAMINER, Nov. 1989, at 4, 7 (advising applicants and their counsel that they are
"supplicants" with "no leverage" at investigative hearings, and must not come across as abrasive).
377. See Rhode, supra note 17, at 543-45; Gerber, supra note 372, at 19.378. See McFarlain, supra note 376, at 7 ("Character and fitness proceedings tend to be per-
sonal and highly charged" because "[a]pplicants feel totally exposed to strangers whom they feel are
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"good moral character") in responding. By making the proceedings unpleas-
ant, examiners also hope to foster good behavior in the future. The counsel
to one state's admissions board observed:
I cannot count the times that a decision has been made by the Board
to require an applicant to appear for an investigative hearing, knowing
full well that the panel will ultimately recommend his admission.
However, applicants whose conduct may not warrant preparation of
formal charges ought to be confronted with the unmistakable fact
that their conduct is unacceptable.... Numerous conversations with
applicants over the years have persuaded me that, despite the "trauma"
associated with investigative hearings, a positive, therapeutic effect was
accomplished .... 79
Another bar examiner's article about character and fitness screening was
entitled A Rite of Passage,"' and there are elements of a hazing or initiation
to these proceedings, an ordeal that purges past sin and makes the applicant
worthy of his or her new status as an attorney."'
When mental health issues are what brings an applicant before a fitness
board, the cluster of examiner behaviors and expectations that I have described
above are inappropriate, and justifiably perceived as demeaning and discrimi-
natory. The experiences of bar applicants described in Part I of this Article
suggest that the routines of moral character examination inevitably spill over
into the treatment of applicants with mental disabilities. Examiners generally
act in good faith and show some sensitivity to the mental health/moral
character distinction, but habits of distrust and accusation often creep into
their questioning. The applicant with a disability distinctly gets the message
that she bears the burden of proving her fitness and must deferentially submit
to all questions, no matter how ignorant or intrusive, and that her candor and
responsibility are always in doubt.382
not trying to help them but, instead, are intent on dwelling on the most embarrassing moments in
their lives.").
379. Carothers, supra note 372, at 31; cf. Baude, supra note 153, at 657-58 (suggesting that the
bar admissions process should focus on the "construction of character"). At a panel discussion for
law students concerning bar admissions and legal ethics for law students held in April 2000 at the
University of Connecticut School of Law, a lawyer who frequently represents applicants before the
state bar examining committee suggested that the committee sometimes gives applicants a hard
time, and delays their admission, just to teach them a lesson. A bar examiner on the panel, with the
proverbial nod and wink, said that he could not comment on that observation.
380. Philip T. Sciortino, A Rite of Passage, B. EXAMINER, Nov. 1989, at 14.
381. See Rhode, supra note 17, at 509-10; cf. ABEL, supra note 361, at 36 (discussing theories
of the professions in structural functionalist sociology that emphasize the idea of profession as com-
munity, in which "[mlembership is attained only after a long and painful initiation rite").
382. See supra Part I.C.
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Ian F. Haney L6pez, in a recent study of the practices of California
state judges in nominating grand jurors, draws on the insights of organiza-
tional sociology and institutional analysis to explain how judges uninten-
tionally discriminate by selecting their social acquaintances, resulting in the
nearly complete exclusion of Mexican Americans.383 Sociologists such as
Harold Garfinkle have shown that people, and especially actors in organized
settings, perform many of their functions through widely accepted, stan-
dardized routines that are deployed with little conscious thought. These
can be thought of as "scripts" that are triggered by "sets of cues used to
identify types of situations readily." '384 Thus, judges, as they interacted with
other judges and observed how things are done, came to associate grand jury
nomination with the "pick your friend" '385 script, saw this mode of behavior
as routine and natural, and tended to ignore information that might render
it problematic." 6 I believe that something like this is at work in bar admis-
sions. Certain cues-affirmative answers to an application form question,
the scheduling of a "character and fitness" hearing by the staff-set in motion
the scripts that bar examiners have internalized for dealing with applicants
who present moral character issues. Examiners, even with the best of inten-
tions, may find it difficult to depart from their usual ways of doing things in
such hearings when the issue is disability rather than bad behavior.
Employment inquiries concerning disability do not generally carry the
same moral character associations that are present in bar admissions. The
stigma concerns that underlie Title I's prophylactic measures exist even
more powerfully in the bar admissions context, and support a requirement of
similar safeguards.3 7
3. Professional Image
Some say that pirates steal, and should be feared and hated.
I say we're victims of bad press, it's all exaggerated.
We'd never stab you in the back, we'd never lie or cheat.
We're just about the nicest guys you'd ever want to meet
383. See Ian F. Haney L6pez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial
Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000).
384. Id. at 1781-83, 1794.
385. Id. at 1795.
386. See id. at 1785-1806.
387. One need not accept all that I have said concerning the influence of the "moral char-
acter" paradigm on how bar examiners behave towards applicants with disabilities in order to reachthis conclusion. As previously discussed, the very placement of the questions on an applicationform dominated by moral character issues, the persistence of the moral character label in rules and
official nomenclature, and the fact that the same panels that pursue moral character issues are
responsible for assessing mental fitness, all have a strong stigmatizing effect.
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And when you're a professional pirate-
You'll be honest, brave and free, the soul of decency,
You'll be loyal and fair and on the square and most importantly:
When you're a professional pirate-you're always in the best of
company ! 388
So sings Long John Silver (played by Tim Curry in a wonderfully over-
the-top performance) to young Jim Hawkins in the movie Muppet Treasure
Islatd,389 as part of a song-and-dance number welcoming Jim into the "noble
brotherhood" of piracy. This anthem to professionalism captures an impor-
tant aspect of the impulse that lies behind bar admissions proceedings. The
officially acknowledged rationale for character and fitness screening is the
protection of the public and of the system of justice.39 However, as courts
and examiners sometimes admit, upholding the public image of the profes-
sion, and the profession's image of itself, are also powerful motivating con-
cems. 9' Deborah Rhode discusses some of the reasons for this in her study
of character screening, Moral Character as a Professional Credential:
In both its instrumental and symbolic dimensions, the certification
process provides an opportunity for affirming shared values. As soci-
ologists since Durkheim have argued, the concept of a profession pre-
supposes some sense of common identity. Excluding certain candidates
on character grounds serves to designate deviance, thus establishing
the boundaries of a moral community.... Weeding out the unworthy
also helps to legitimate a status in which practitioners have strong
psychological as well as economic stakes. An overriding objective of
any organized profession is to enhance its members' social standing,
and the bar is scarcely an exception .... The public's "low regard for
the profession," reflected in recent public opinion polls, is a matter of
388. BARRY MANN & CYNTHIA WEIL, A Professional Pirate, on MUPPET TREASURE ISLAND
(Angel Records 1996).
389. MUPPET TREASURE ISLAND (Walt Disney Pictures 1996).
390. See Am. Bar Ass'n et al., supra note 188, at standard 7 ("The primary purpose of character
and fitness screening before admission to the bar is the protection of the public and the system of
justice."). The commentary to this standard in The Bar Examiners' Handbook notes that protecting
the public image of the profession is frequently invoked as an additional purpose, but disavows this
goal as "too dangerous and uncertain a reason for denying admission to the bar." BAR EXAMINERS'
HANDBOOK, supra note 204, at 73:3 (quoting Michael K. McChrystal, Resuscitating Character and
Fitness Standards, B. EXAMINER, Nov. 1986, at 13, 15).
391. See Rhode, supra note 17, at 509-11; Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character: The Personal
and the Political, 20 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 3 (1988); M.A. Cunningham, Comment, The Professional
Image Standard: An Untold Standard of Admission to the Bar, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1015, 1026-28 (1992);
Mitchell S. Bierman, Applying to the Bar: The Broad Inquiry, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1991, at 21; Norman
Krivosha, The Matter of Character and Fitness, B. EXAMINER, May 1986, at 4, 6; Sciortino, supra note
380, at 15.
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acute concern to practicing lawyers; ABA members have ranked it as
the most urgent issue facing the bar, and ABA presidents have repeat-
edly pledged to make improving lawyers' image one of their highest
priorities. How exactly that improvement can be secured is a matter
of dispute, but bar examiners frequently present character certification
as part of the general campaign. 39
2
It is telling that even when courts and examiners invoke public protection
as the justification for excluding unfit bar applicants, they frequently speak
of the need to ensure that clients will feel confident when they hire a lawyer. 9
Client and public perceptions may, of course, be affected by much more than
the actual fitness of attorneys.
What clients and the public might think has been a significant source
of anxiety to bar examiners and to courts when it comes to applicants with
mental disabilities. In 1994, the ABA Journal ran pro and con opinion
pieces on the subject of mental health questions on bar application forms.
Erica Moeser, the NCBE's president, began her essay with the following
remarkable sentence: "The public, already wary of lawyers, would be incredu-
lous if bar admissions were to take a miserably wrong turn by prohibiting
inquiry into subject areas bearing on the current mental fitness of applicants
to the bar." '394 The judge in the Texas Applicants case complained in his deci-
sion that "a negative light is often cast upon the legal profession in the infor-
mation that the general public receives and hears," just before he launched
into a string of rhetorical questions asking whether it is necessary for bar
examiners to ask about serious mental illnesses before licensing individuals
to handle all the vital and sensitive tasks that clients entrust to their
392. Rhode, supra note 17, at 509-11 (footnotes and paragraph breaks omitted).393. Thus, the Code of Recommended Standards for Bar Examiners, after setting forth protection
of the public and the court system as the justification for character and fitness screening, adds thatthe public must "be secure in its expectation that those who are admitted to the bar are worthy of the
trust and confidence clients may reasonably place in their lawyers." Am. Bar Ass'n et al., supra
note 188, at standard 7; see also Ressel, supra note 371, at 2. Bar admissions decisions by state supreme
courts express similar ideas. See Scott v. State Bar Examining Comm., 601 A.2d 1021, 1026 (Conn.1992) ("It is not enough for an attorney that he be honest. He must be that, and more. He must bebelieved to be honest." (citation omitted)); In re Eimers, 358 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. 1978) ("The layman
must have confidence that he has employed an attorney who will protect his interests."); In reMatthews, 462 A.2d 165, 176 (N.J. 1983) (including a reference to "admission to a profession whose
members must stand free from all suspicion"). Such formulations suggest that public perceptionhas an independent significance; as M.A. Cunningham observes, "if a court defines moral fitnessin relation to an applicant's ability to act as an ethical attorney, the applicant's potential impact
on professional appearances would be irrelevant." Cunningham, supra note 391, at 1027.394. Moeser, supra note 126, at 36. Erica Moeser has also served as the chairperson of the ABA's
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar.
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lawyers.39 According to an article by a member of Florida's admissions board,
bar examiners need to scrutinize "preadmission behaviors such as disrespect for
the law, psychological problems, and severe financial irresponsibility" because
clients may not want to be represented by these people, and the appearance of
fitness is as important as the substance.396 In Connecticut, as discussed in Part
I, the bar examiners added mental health questions in response to some highly
publicized incidents of lawyer misconduct that had nothing to do with mental
health issues; the goal was to reassure the public that something was being
done.397
The public relations function of bar admissions screening greatly increases
the risk that societal prejudices about mental illness and substance abuse will
have an impact on how bar examiners treat applicants with mental disabilities.
Examiners will tend to err on the side of intrusiveness, so that the public can
be reassured that no stone has been left unturned. Hostility towards the idea
of attorneys with highly stigmatized conditions representing clients may color
their questioning during hearings. Concern about how it will look if an appli-
cant with past mental health or substance abuse problems later engages in
misconduct will exert a pull to resolve close cases in favor of conditional
admission, or even denial.
4. Subjectivity
The subjective nature of the character and fitness standard is openly
acknowledged by bar examiners and courts.398 Justice Felix Frankfurter, in one
395. Applicants v. Tex. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, No. A-93-CA-740-SS, 1994 WL 923404, at
*28 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1994).
396. Sciortino, supra note 380, at 15.
397. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32. After approving Kathleen Flaherty's conditional
admission, the judge who presided at her swearing-in ceremony mused on the profession's public image.
See supra text accompanying note 90. The judge's remarks bear more than a passing resemblance to
Long John Silver's song:
Criticisms of our profession-and indeed, it is still a profession, and a noble one-have
abounded for centuries. Some have been, and are, justified, but time and again members
of our bar have demonstrated, by their acts and activities, that most of these criticisms
are exaggerated or false and are based more in resentment than in fact.
Transcript of Swearing-In Ceremony: Kathleen Maura Flaherty (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 1997) (on
file with author).
398. See BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 204, at 73:5002 ("No definition of what
constitutes grounds for denial of admission on the basis of faulty character exists."); Rhode, supra
note 17, at 529-31; Krivosha, supra note 391, at 6 (likening character and fitness to Justice Potter
Stewart's standard for pornography); Withered, supra note 373, at 22 ("[T]he inquiry made by the
board of law examiners into the character and fitness of a prospective lawyer is predominantly
subjective.").
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of the several cases to reach the United States Supreme Court as a result of bar
examiners' efforts to keep communists out of the profession, put it this way:
No doubt satisfaction of the requirement of moral character involves
an exercise of delicate judgment on the part of those who reach a
conclusion, having heard and seen the applicant for admission, ajudgment of which it may be said.., that it expresses "an intuition
of experience which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed
and tangled impressions; impressions which may lie beneath con-
sciousness without losing their worth.,
399
The "fitness" standard used by bar committees-to the extent that it has
meant something different than "moral character"-has been equally inde-
terminate in application. "Of all the standards and prerequisites," the Bar
Examiners' Handbook notes, "this is perhaps the most nebulous and difficult
to define.""4 '
The subjectivity of the character and fitness inquiry opens the door to
conscious or unconscious bias, and increases the risk that bar examiners'
treatment of applicants with mental disabilities will be affected by societal
prejudices and concerns about the profession's image. As Justice Hugo Black
wrote in another of the U.S. Supreme Court's bar admissions cases, the
administration of this "vague qualification" will inevitably "reflect the atti-
tudes, experiences and prejudices of the definer," and can be a "dangerous
instrument" for discrimination.4"' The history of character screening provides
ample grounds for concern. During the nineteenth century, character stan-
dards were used to exclude women.4"2 The legal profession's anxieties about
the influx of eastern and southern European immigrants, and particularly
Jews, provided much of the impetus for the adoption of formalized character
and fitness screening mechanisms during the early decades of the twentieth
century, and those groups felt the brunt of the character committees'
399. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam., 353 U.S. 232, 248 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)(quoting Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 598 (1907) (Holmes, J.)).
400. BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 204, at 73:5005. One factor that contributes
to the elasticity of the fitness concept is the view taken by many bar examiners that the unlimited
nature of a law license requires a broad notion of fitness. See Withered, supra note 373, at 22. This out-
look makes it possible to find reasons to question the fitness of virtually any bar applicant. An in-house
attorney providing advice and legal analysis for a corporation or government agency might later
decide to become a solo practitioner doing trial work. Quite apart from any issues of mental
health, few prospective lawyers have the necessary abilities and temperament for every kind of law
practice.
401. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1957).
402. See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (discussing how
women's "natural and proper timidity and delicacy" make them unsuited for forensic strife); Rhode,
supra note 17, at 497.
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hostility.4 3 In later decades, suspected communists faced harassment, delays,
and the occasional denial of admission.4"4 The presence or absence of elite
social credentials also appears to play a role in determining which applicants
will be given a hard time over past indiscretions. A survey of more than fifty
judicial opinions reviewing moral character determinations published from
1980 to 1991 found that none of the excluded applicants had attended a top-
ranked law school.
405
Vague and subjective standards provide ample scope for bias to operate
in hidden ways. These dangers are compounded in a process in which the
same entity simultaneously considers mental health information and moral
character issues. Bar examiners' knowledge that an applicant has a mental
disability may lead them to make harsher judgments about other (and possibly
unrelated) problematic information disclosed on the bar application form-
for example, a prior credit problem or eviction. Social science research on
perception and social judgment indicates that people "tend ... to assess other
individuals on the basis of one salient quality," and that "once individuals have
formed a judgment, they tend to selectively assimilate information that will
confirm their original impression.
40 6
403. See ABEL, supra note 361, at 46-73; JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 95-129
(1976); Jerold S. Auerbach, Enmity and Amity: Law Teachers and Practitioners, 1900-1922, in 5
PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 551, 584-85 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds.,
1971); Rhode, supra note 17, at 499-502.
The threat that prospective attorneys of foreign birth or parentage posed to the "finer profes-
sional spirit and feeling" of American lawyers was a matter of intense interest to Connecticut's
organized bar in the 1920s and 1930s. See A History of the First One Hundred Years of the Connecticut
Bar Association, supra note 361, at 234 (quoting speaker at the CBA's 1922 annual dinner). Concerns
about a decline in the moral standards of lawyers, attributed in large part to the "very rapidly
changing social conditions" in Connecticut's cities, led to more stringent scrutiny of bar candidates'
moral qualifications by at least some of the county standing committees on admissions. Proceedings at the
Annual Meeting, 4 CONN. B.J. 151, 189-91 (1930). In 1932, the association approved a resolution
urging Connecticut's bar admissions authorities to use a detailed character questionnaire modeled
on Pennsylvania's. A sponsoring attorney would be required to vouch for the applicant on a form
that included questions like: "Are the applicant's parents native or foreign born? If foreign born, are
they naturalized? What is the reputation of the parents in the community in which they reside?"
Id. at 185-91. When Pennsylvania adopted this screening system in the 1920s, bar leaders there were
quite open about their objective of limiting the admission of foreigners and Jews, and it resulted in
a 16 percent drop in the proportion of applicants who were Jewish. See ABEL, supra note 361, at 69;
AUERBACH, supra, at 125-28.
404. See Debran Rowland, The Difficulty of Defining an Effective Requirement of Fitness of
Character, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1995, at 36, 41-42.
405. See Cunningham, supra note 391, at 1037-39.
406. Rhode, supra note 17, at 561 (summarizing findings of studies); see also Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186-1211 (1995) (discussing findings of cogni-
tive psychology concerning how categorization of individuals as belonging to a socially defined
group leads to biased judgment and decision making). Social science research on the powerful
role that unconscious stereotyping and prejudice plays in evaluating the qualifications of others
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Applicants who object to examiners' probing of mental health issues
also run the risk that their opposition will be perceived as evidence of a bad
attitude, and that it will be held against them.4"7 In Connecticut, for exam-
ple, "Anonymous," the bar applicant who sued the examiners over the lack
of a conditional admission procedure, was initially denied admission in 1991,
solely because the bar examining committee concluded that his bipolar
disorder rendered him unfit."' He was granted a new hearing several years
later; this time, the committee turned him down on moral character
grounds, in part because he had sent a memo to Connecticut's Chief Court
Administrator complaining that the bar examining committee was engaged
in a discriminatory cover-up. The committee reasoned that the memo was
''made 'for purposes of intimidating the [committee] into recommending'''
the applicant, and thus provided additional evidence of his "lack of good
moral character.,
40 9
5. Confidentiality
The bar admissions process compromises the confidentiality of sensi-
tive mental health information in ways that magnify the stigma involved in
disclosure. The boards that conduct character and fitness screening are
made up of practicing lawyers and judges from the same jurisdiction in which
the applicant will be practicing law.40 The Connecticut Bar Examining
Committee, for example, includes eighteen attorneys and five judges, all of
whom have unlimited access to the file of any bar applicant.4"' An applicant
has recently been summarized in Ann C. McGinley, iViva La Evoluci6n!: Recognizing Unconscious
Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 421-46 (2000).
407. Cf. Rhode, supra note 391, at 11 ("Those who refuse to be intimidated [by intrusive
inquiries in character proceedings] may be subject to harassment, delay, and occasionally to
denial.").
408. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
409. Scheffey, supra note 55, at 8 (quoting from panel's decision). The hearing panel also
rested its moral character determination on Anonymous's failure to make child support payments.
Whether the committee's assessment of the child support issue would have been any different if
it had not been aware of the applicant's bipolar disorder and discrimination suit is, of course, hard
to know.
410. Deborah Rhode's national survey of bar admissions procedures found that in all juris-
dictions, attorneys make up the bulk of the membership of the boards or committees that conduct
character and fitness screening. In about a quarter of the states, a small number of non-lawyers also
serve. See Rhode, supra note 17, at 505.
411. See CONN. R. SUPER. CT. §§ 2-3, 2-50; CONN. BAR EXAMINING COMM., 2001
INFORMATION BOOKLET 3-5 (revised Sept. 2000) (listing committee members). If a hearing is held,
members of a county standing committee on recommendations to the bar (consisting of three to
seven attorneys) will also gain access to the information. See CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 2-12. All
of the application forms are available to the chairperson of the applicable county committee. See
CBEC REGS., supra note 20, art. 111-4.
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who discloses a mental disability on the application form, even if admitted
without incident, still faces the extremely embarrassing prospect of encoun-
tering committee members who are aware of her condition as opposing
counsel, colleagues in the same law firm, or as the judge presiding over a
412
case.
There is the potential for further disclosures as well. Most states have
rules that protect the confidentiality of bar admissions information to some
degree, but there are exceptions. Connecticut's rule, for example, gives
the statewide grievance committee and any superior court judge access to a
bar applicant's records.413 Most significantly, applicants are generally required
to release all records relating to prior bar applications when they apply for
admission in a new jurisdiction.414 Thus, a bar application disclosing, say,
bipolar disorder or past substance abuse treatment, may wind up in the hands
of the attorneys who serve on the admissions board in a second state, even
if the second state does not inquire about these disabilities on its own appli-
cation form.
The broad scope of examiners' requests for medical records compounds
the problem. The NCBE and many states require all applicants who respond
affirmatively to disability questions to execute an authorization consenting
to the release of all "records, concerning advice, care or treatment provided
412. The judge in the Clark case noted that a Virginia statute prohibiting public disclosure of
bar admissions records did not solve applicants' confidentiality concerns: "[A]s the Board is made
up of practicing attorneys, applicants may be reluctant to disclose mental or emotional problems
to a group who, at some level, comprise the applicants' peers and colleagues." Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar
Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 438 n.13 (E.D. Va. 1995).
413. See CONN. R. SUPER. Cr. § 2-50. Significant loopholes can be found in the confidentiality
rules of other states. See, e.g., Wis. SuP. Cr. R. 40.12 (providing the court and bar admissions board
with discretion to authorize the release of confidential bar applicant information to "other persons
or agencies"). In addition, there is always the possibility of inadvertent disclosures. As Senator
Sullivan put it in his letter protesting Connecticut's mental health inquiries, "[p]rivate information is
disclosed in writing and becomes a waiting hazard in yet another dubiously secure personal file."
Sullivan Letter, supra note 61, at 1.
414. The Code of Recommended Standards for Bar Examiners states that each jurisdiction should
adopt a rule concerning confidentiality that "[m]inimally ... should provide confidentiality of records
and sources for purposes other than cooperation with another bar examining authority." Am. Bar
Ass'n et al., supra note 188, at standard 11. Bar application forms generally require applicants to
submit copies of prior applications and/or authorize other jurisdictions to release their records.
See, e.g., CONN. 2001 APPLICATION, supra note 19, at 10; NCBE CHARACTER REPORT, supra note
10, at 4 & attachment titled Authorization and Release. The Authorization and Release that bar applicants
sign in Connecticut states:
I agree that all information provided by this application and all other information received
by the Connecticut Bar Examining Committee may be released by said Committee at any
time and without liability to ... the National Conference of Bar Examiners or other bar
admitting authority in connection with any further inquiry relating to my eligibility to engage
in the practice of law.
CONN. 2001 APPLICATION, supra note 19, at 23.
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to me without limitation relating to mental illness, use of drugs or alco-
hol."4 I Some jurisdictions routinely request the complete records from
any hospitalization or outpatient treatment disclosed on the application
form. This can cause substantial delays in admission, as in the case of Rose
Gower, where it took months to locate and obtain records from a nine-year-
old hospitalization."6 Moreover, such records often contain highly personal
information. One attorney who testified at Connecticut's 1994 public hear-
ings on mental health questions described how she felt when she was
required, on the bar application form, to authorize the bar examiners to
examine all of her treatment records:
I was.., dismayed to realize that in answering the question [about
mental health treatment] truthfully, I would be required to waive all
my expectations of privacy in regard to my years in therapy, something
which had never occurred to me as a possibility.... [F]ew things could
be more intensely personal than.., the details about my family life,
my childhood, my parents, my siblings, my marriage and the end of my
marriage, all very personal, and even more significant, all completely
irrelevant to the question of my fitness to practice law.
41 7
The inherently stigmatizing disclosure of mental illness or addiction is made
more humiliating when the details of personal relationships and traumas are
subjected to the gaze of the lawyers and judges of an admissions board (and
those beyond) who may get access to the information. s
415. NCBE CHARACTER REPORT, supra note 10, Form 16; see also CONN. 2001 APPLICATION,
supra note 19, Form 7 (copying the language of the NCBE's medical release authorization).
When bar examiners use these consent forms to request records from substance abuse treatment
programs, they are in violation of the federal regulations governing the confidentiality of drug and
alcohol abuse patient records. Those regulations specify nine elements that must be present for a
consent form to be valid. Two of them-a statement of the patient's right to revoke consent and a
time frame in which the consent will expire-are missing from the bar examiners' form. The consent
forms that bar examiners use to authorize redisclosure of such information to other jurisdictions,
see supra note 414, are similarly deficient under federal law. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.31, 2.32 (2000).
Broad requests for "all records" are also inappropriate under the regulations. Treatment programs
are required to limit their disclosures to the minimum information that is necessary to carry out the
purpose of the disclosure (for example, in this context, information bearing on the duration and
stability of recovery would be appropriate, while releasing counseling notes would be overbroad).
See id. § 2.13(a).
416. See supra Part I.C.2.
417. Conn. Bar Examining Comm., Transcript of Public Hearing on Mental Health 5 (Sept.
28, 1994) (on file with author).
418. Professor Stanley Herr has argued that respect for applicants' privacy rights requires that
bar examiners avoid making unlimited requests for records and instead, in consultation with the
candidate, frame an appropriately narrow release in cases in which there is a genuine issue about the
candidate's current fitness. See Herr, supra note 6, at 675-77 & 677 n.184. New Jersey's Character
Committee has recognized the legitimacy of criticism that broad demands for medical documentation
"is an intrusive invasion of privacy into a very sensitive area." N.J. STATEWIDE PANEL REPORT,
supra note 233. It has responded by limiting the records it will request in substance abuse cases to "only
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The stigmatic harms arising from disclosure that Title I is concerned
with are amply present in the bar admissions setting. Title I's mechanisms for
addressing these dangers-collecting medical information on separate forms,
limiting the scope of information available to nonmedical personnel, strict
confidentiality protections-are equally important here.
6. Lack of Expertise
When bar applicants with mental disabilities describe what it is about
the process that makes them feel humiliated and discriminated against, they
often point to the fact that the people responsible for investigating, ques-
tioning and making decisions about them have no training or expertise in
mental health issues. As a result, they feel that the questions and demands
for information that they encounter are rooted in ignorance, and that the com-
mittees are incapable of fairly evaluating the information. This theme was
central to James Roe's account of his character and fitness hearing in the
testimony he presented at Connecticut's 1994 public hearings:
I was asked [by the hearing panel] to relate my entire mental health
history. I was asked to detail the diagnoses that had been made
about me and describe any medications I had taken. I was subject to
detailed questioning about this very intensely personal aspect of my
life. Furthermore, I could tell from the questions that were being
asked and from the questions that followed from these responses that
the two lawyers who were interviewing me had no training,
experience or knowledge about mental illness or emotional disorders.
I expected that at least one of the members of the panel who
interviewed me would be a psychologist or psychiatrist, but that did
419
not occur.
information to confirm that a person is in recovery." Id. When an applicant has been hospitalized for
mental illness within the prior twelve months, the Committee will request all of the hospital
records, but employs other mechanisms to safeguard privacy. "The supporting documentation may
be sent to an [sic] medical expert, retained by the Committee, for examination and a report of diag-
nosis and prognosis findings to the committee. This should eliminate the concern that sensitive
information is being placed in the hands of laymen." Id. These approaches are similar to the Title I-
based mechanisms that I advocate.
419. Roe Testimony, supra note 73, at 2. In another submission to the public hearing record,
the President of the Mental Health Association of Connecticut listed, as the first of several reasons
why her group was opposed to any inquiries by the bar examining concerning the mental health
history of applicants, that "the committee has neither the training nor the expertise to draw the
proper conclusions from the responses to the inquiries." Letter from Beverly A. Walton, to Conn.
Bar Examining Comm. (Oct. 4, 1994) (on file with author).
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Six years later, Kathleen Flaherty focused on the same issue when she
described her experience with the bar examiners in public testimony to a fed-
eral task force:
I had to have two meetings with a local committee and one with a
statewide committee. I had to answer questions that I believe delved
unnecessarily into very painful personal matters... People who by their
own admission did not understand the diagnosis or the illness asked
me to explain it to them. These committees are made up of lawyers
who very generously donate their time; there are no psychiatrists or
psychologists or anyone with medical training on the committees. 42
Mental health professionals voice similar concerns. Several times, I have
spoken with therapists who received letters from the bar examining com-
mittee requesting a report on a past or current patient and "all medical records
such as intake/admission report, progress notes and discharge papers."42 ' The
therapists have been extremely reluctant to turn over the complete patient file;
they fear that the committee lacks the expertise to properly interpret medical
records, and is likely to misunderstand or take out of context information about
diagnoses, medication, treatment, and the details of counseling sessions.422
Application of the Title I framework to bar admissions would do much
to address these problems. It would place the primary responsibility for review-
ing applicants' answers to mental health questions, making follow-up
inquiries, and evaluating medical fitness in the hands of medical personnel,
and would limit the information that would reach the lawyers and judges on
the committee. Applicants are likely to feel more comfortable disclosing
mental health information to a trained professional. Although expertise is no
panacea, by and large one can expect that a psychologist or psychiatrist will
handle the questioning of an applicant with some sensitivity, and will be
better suited than an untrained examiner to tailor information requests to seek
only relevant information.423 A medical expert will not be invested to the
same degree as lawyers and judges in upholding the legal profession's image,
and is less likely to be influenced by misconceptions or prejudice about
mental illness and addiction.
420; Testimony of Kathleen M. Flaherty Submitted to the Presidential Task Force on Employ-
ment of People with Psychiatric Disabilities 2 (May 24, 2000) (on file with author).
421. Letters from Conn. Bar Examining Comm., to therapists (on file with author, with names
and identifying information redacted).
422. Additionally, they are concerned that the scope of the requested disclosures unnecessarily
invades their patients' privacy, and may have a disruptive effect on the therapist-patient relationship.
423. Professor Stanley Herr, in his article about disability inquiries in bar admissions, urges for
similar reasons that if inquiries into an applicant's mental health or substance abuse history are to be
allowed at all, they should be handled by an individual with an understanding of disability and treat-
ment issues, "perhaps with credentials in law and medicine." Herr, supra note 6, at 677.
D. Reforming the Process
What would a nondiscriminatory bar admissions process for applicants
with disabilities, one that incorporates protections equivalent to Title I's
requirements for employment screening, look like? For purposes of this dis-
cussion, let us assume that the following disability-based inquiries would
be upheld by courts as necessary and narrowly tailored under a "relaxed scru-
tiny" approach to Title 1I:
1. Have you within the past twelve months engaged in, or been treated
for, the abuse of drugs or intoxicating substances, including alcohol?
2. Have you within the past [time frame] been diagnosed with or treated
for schizophrenia or any psychotic disorder?
3. Have you within the past [time frame] been diagnosed with or treated
for bipolar I disorder or mania, or experienced any manic episode?
4. Do you currently have any disorder or condition that impairs your
judgment or would otherwise adversely affect your ability to practice
law?
5. If your answer to any of these questions is yes, describe the condition
or problem and any treatment that you received, and provide the
dates of treatment, the name and address of your physician or other
treatment provider, and the name and address of any hospital, pro-
144
gram or institution at which you received treatment.
The disability-based questions would not appear on the regular bar appli-
cation form that applicants submit to the bar examining committee.425 Instead,
the questions would be contained in a separate medical questionnaire. The
committee would be required to set up a separate medical office, staffed by a
psychiatrist or other mental health professional. Applicants would send the
medical questionnaire directly to that office.426 The records of the medical
office would be confidential and separate from those of the bar examining
424. As discussed in Part Ill, supra, the above questions approach the outer limit of what can
reasonably be justified under the relaxed scrutiny approach. Nonetheless, the questions that many
jurisdictions currently ask, and some courts have been willing to uphold, are broader. To the extent
that broader disability-based inquiries are allowed under Title II, the application of Title I-type pro-
tections becomes even more important.
425. 1 will use the terms "bar examining committee" or "committee" to refer to the entity
responsible for making character and fitness determinations. In some states, that role will be played
by the statewide bar examining committee; in others, it may be a character committee that is a sub-
entity or a separate entity from the overall bar admissions board.
426. Applicants would also provide the medical office with a copy of the regular bar appli-
cation form. As part of its screening, the medical office may need to investigate in some cases
whether behaviors reported on the bar application form are related to a disability.
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committee."7 Members of the bar examining committee and the committee's
regular staff would not have access to applicants' medical information, except
under circumstances that I will later describe.
After receiving an applicant's medical questionnaire, the medical office
would first determine whether additional information is needed to assess
whether the applicant's disability affects her current fitness to practice law. If
so, the medical officer428 can pose follow-up questions to the applicant, consult
with treatment providers, review treatment records,429 and, if necessary, arrange
a full-scale psychiatric or substance abuse evaluation. The medical officer then
would determine either (a) that the applicant is medically fit, or (b) that there
is a serious issue concerning the applicant's current fitness to function as a
lawyer.
While this medical screening process is taking place, the bar examining
committee can conduct a character and fitness review based on the conduct-
and performance-based questions on the bar application form, and on the
information provided by references. The committee will not know, at this
juncture, whether the applicant has disclosed a disability on the medical ques-
tionnaire. 430 At the conclusion of the committee's screening-for example,
after the committee clears the applicant based on a paper review or decides
after a hearing that some past misconduct should not be disqualifying-the
committee can ask the medical office for its determination.43" ' If the medical
427. The medical file should not be available to others who may have access to the bar exam-
ining committee's files, such as judges, grievance committees, and admitting authorities in other
jurisdictions.
428. 1 will use the term "medical officer" to refer to the psychiatrist or other mental health
professional in charge of the medical office.
429. The applicant would need to authorize treatment providers to release information to
the medical office. Applicants could be required to sign an information release form as part of the
medical questionnaire, authorizing the medical office to request any medical information that it
deems relevant to the fitness determination. The consent form should be drafted to comply with
federal confidentiality laws. See supra note 415.
430. Allowing medical inquiries and nonmedical screening to proceed on simultaneous tracks
is a departure from Title I, which requires employers to defer medical inquiries until all other aspects of
screening have been completed. See supra text accompanying notes 307-312. For bar applicants
with disabilities, delay in admission has been one of the most common and serious forms of discrimi-
natory burden. Deferring medical screening until the end of the process would contribute to this
problem. The purpose of Title I's two-stage process-to keep disability information out of the
hands of decisionmakers while they are considering the nonmedical aspects of eligibility-can be
served by a strict separation of the medical office from the rest of the bar examining committee's
operation.
431. The timing of the bar examiners' request for information from the medical office raises
some logistical problems. If the bar examining committee asks for the~results of medical screening
too soon-before the medical office has had time to investigate and reach conclusions in most
cases-the result will be an implicit disclosure to the committee of the identities of applicants(many of whom ultimately will receive a medical clearance) who have disclosed disabilities on their
medical questionnaires. This is because the medical office would have to respond "determination
office has cleared the applicant, it will simply report that fact. The committee
will not know whether the applicant has a disability but was medically
cleared, or has no disability at all. If, on the other hand, the applicant has
not been medically cleared, the medical office will provide the committee
with an evaluation or report that includes all of the relevant medical infor-
mation. A hearing would then be held before the committee to determine
whether admission should be denied, granted, or granted with conditions.
Consider how the process would work in the case of B, a hypothetical bar
applicant. B was diagnosed with bipolar disorder five years ago and continues
to receive treatment for the illness. He does not have any other adverse
information to report on his bar application form: no criminal offenses, defaults
of responsibility, or allegations of academic or employment misconduct. B
provides information about his disability and treatment on the medical ques-
tionnaire and submits it to the medical office. He simultaneously submits his
regular bar application form to the bar examining committee.
The medical officer interviews B, and with B's consent, also speaks with
B's treating psychiatrist and requests certain medical records. The medical
officer learns that B experienced several episodes of depression starting in
high school. During his junior year in college, he had his first manic episode.
It was characterized by racing and confused thoughts, nonstop talking, overly
ambitious academic projects, and lack of sleep. Frightened by the episode, B
went to see a psychiatrist, who gave a diagnosis of bipolar I disorder and pre-
scribed lithium. Since that time, B has remained on medication and has seen
a therapist on a regular basis. He continues to experience mood swings, but
no uncontrolled manias or disabling depressions. Based on this information,
the medical officer concludes that B's bipolar disorder is currently under
control, and that there is no serious issue regarding his current fitness to
function as a lawyer.
In the meantime, the bar examining committee, which does not know
about B's bipolar disorder, is reviewing his regular bar application. The appli-
cation form answers and the information provided by references contain
nothing problematic, so the committee informs B that his character and fitness
have been approved, pending the outcome of medical screening. When the
pending" for applicants who disclosed disabilities, while it could report "medically cleared" for those
who did not. Therefore, the bar examining committee should allow enough time for the medical
office to complete the bulk of its medical screening before it sends the medical office a list of
applicants who have been found otherwise eligible for admission and asks for their medical results.
(Of course, it cannot wait so long that the result would be a delay in bar admission for everyone.)
An early start to the medical screening process would help to avoid this problem. Many jurisdic-
tions wait to see who has passed the bar examination before scheduling any character hearings. The
medical office could start its screening process well before then.
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committee obtains the results from the medical office, B's name appears on
the list of those who were medically cleared. He is admitted.
432
Let's vary the hypothetical slightly. Suppose that B, instead of presenting
a spotless record on his bar application form, has a misdemeanor conviction
for disorderly conduct that dates from his junior year in college. He is sum-
moned to a character interview, where he explains to members of the bar
examining committee that he was arrested at a demonstration against the
reopening of a nuclear power plant. The protesters were trespassing on pri-
vate property and many were arrested. B expresses appropriate regret for the
unlawful aspects of his behavior, and the committee certifies his good charac-
ter. When the bar examiners check with the medical office, they are informed
that B is among the applicants who have been medically cleared, and he is
admitted.
The above examples represent the situations where Title I-type proce-
dures most clearly and cleanly serve their purposes. The use of a separate
medical questionnaire and medical screening procedure disassociates disability
from the issues of moral character that dominate the regular application form
and process. Although B has been forced to reveal sensitive information
about his disorder, disclosing it to a trained medical professional probably has
been less embarrassing and demeaning to him than revealing the same infor-
mation to a group of attorneys. The information will remain in a confidential
medical file, separate from the bar examining committee's records. The attor-
neys and judges on the bar examining committee, whom B may encounter
later on in his practice, do not know that he has bipolar disorder. If B later
applies for admission in another state, information about his disability will not
follow him around. When the bar examiners conducted an inquiry into a
character problem unrelated to B's disability, their attitude towards him was
not contaminated by the knowledge that B has a serious mental illness.
432. A substance abuse case could follow the same process, with identical results. Consider, for
example, applicant C, who must respond affirmatively to the substance abuse question on the medical
questionnaire because she spent six weeks in an inpatient facility for alcoholism treatment the summer
after her first year of law school, and then continued with an outpatient program for another year.
Her treatment ended eight months before she applied to the bar. The medical officer speaks with
C's counselor at the substance abuse treatment program, who reports that C showed no signs of sub-
stance abuse after the first few months of treatment and "graduated" from the program with every
indication that she is in stable recovery. The medical officer requests a copy of the discharge summary,
which confirms the counselor's assessment. Applicant C herself tells the medical officer that she
is regularly attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and is not drinking. Based on all this infor-
mation, the medical officer concludes that C is in stable recovery and that there is no serious question
of her current fitness to function as a lawyer. The bar examining committee, in the meantime, has
found no problems based on its review of the regular bar application form. C is admitted, and the bar
examining committee never learns of her alcoholism.
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Let's vary the hypothetical again. Suppose that the information that the
medical officer obtains from B's treating psychiatrist indicates that B has
discontinued his medication several times, against medical advice. Without
lithium maintenance, the risk of manic episodes is high. Although B is cur-
rently taking his medication, the medical officer, after talking with B, is
concerned that he rationalizes his nonadherence to treatment and does not
fully recognize the importance of staying on medication. Under these circum-
stances, the medical officer might well conclude that there is a serious issue
regarding his current fitness to practice law.
Under this scenario, as with the prior examples, the bar examining com-
mittee would conduct its nonmedical processing of the application without
knowledge of B's disability. After an initial review of the application, or after
holding an interview or hearing on the conviction issue, the bar examiners
will certify him as meeting the character standards for admission. Only at
this point do the bar examiners learn that there is a serious issue of medical
fitness. The medical office provides the committee with an evaluation and
report, and a hearing is scheduled before the committee.433 At this hearing, B
might contest the accuracy of the information that he has failed to comply
with treatment recommendations, or might explain his discontinuance of
medication and argue that it is unlikely to recur. The examiners may find B's
ability or willingness to stick with a treatment regimen to be sufficiently
in doubt that conditional admission is warranted; or, if they find B's version
convincing, they may admit him unconditionally.
In this situation, information about the applicant's disability does ulti-
mately wind up in the hands of the bar examiners.434 Still, the application
of Title I-type procedures has served to lessen the stigma of the process. The
433. One could imagine a system in which the medical office would have the final say, and
could reject or impose conditions on the applicant, rather than referring such issues to the bar
examining committee. Due process, however, requires giving the applicant a hearing to contest
any adverse determination. See Willner v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103-06
(1963). Putting the medical office in charge of a hearing process would make applicants' dealings
with that office more formal and potentially more stigmatizing. A system that lets the medical
officer focus on gathering information and making a nonadversarial assessment of fitness makes
the best use of his or her medical expertise. The lawyers who serve on bar examining committees
are relatively well-suited to an adjudicatory role. To be sure, they are not experts, but input from
the medical office, along with any expert testimony that the applicant may present, can help to
make their decisions reasonably well-informed. Having some people with mental health expertise
serve on bar examining committees might also help.
434. Once disability information has reached the committee, it will be subject to possible
further disclosures in situations when the release of committee records is authorized; for example,
if the applicant applies to another jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes 413-414. There
should be a procedure for "sealing" the medical information, so that it would not be subject to further
disclosures, at least in those cases in which the committee ultimately finds that the applicant's
disability does not impair fitness, and grants unconditional admission.
initial inquiry and investigation of B's disability was not entangled with issues
of moral character. The threshold determination made by the medical office
adds legitimacy to the process by helping to ensure that disability information
reaches the decisionmakers only when necessary. The risk of pretextual treat-
ment also has been reduced. The manner in which the examiners handled
the conviction issue was unaffected by knowledge that B has a disability.
During the hearing on medical fitness, the examiners, having already found the
conviction non-disqualifying, are less likely to give him a hard time about it.435
The separation between medical and nonmedical issues cannot always be
maintained quite so neatly. In two situations, bar examiners should be per-
mitted to request disability information before completing the character
screening process. These exceptions are justified by necessity-they are situa-
tions in which prohibiting a committee-initiated inquiry would undermine the
basic goals of fitness screening or result in pointless proceedings." 6
The first situation can be illustrated by the facts of Campbell v.
Greisberger.37 Campbell, the applicant, revealed on his New York bar appli-
cation form that he had been arrested twice within the past several years, once
for assault and once for causing a disturbance, and had defaulted on a student
loan. He explained this conduct as having resulted from "schizophrenia
bipolar disorder," from which he had subsequently recovered."' The character
and fitness committee scheduled a hearing, and Campbell sought a preliminary
injunction to bar the fitness committee from inquiring further into his mental
illness.439 In response, the New York committee took the position that it did
not intend to initiate discussion of Campbell's mental illness during the
hearing, although Campbell was free to raise it "by way of mitigation or
435. There is one potential disadvantage to deferring the examiners' consideration of medical
information in cases in which there is an independent character issue. Suppose that B's criminal con-
viction leads to protracted admissions proceedings: an informal hearing, followed by a formal hearing,
stretching out over weeks or months. If the committee does not learn of the medical fitness issue until
after the conviction issue has been resolved, and then has to schedule another hearing, B may face a
significant delay in admission. He might prefer to have the committee receive the medical report
sooner, and address all issues in a single hearing. The applicant should have that option.
436. Under Title II, "necessity" can justify imposing discriminatory burdens on applicants with
disabilities. See supra text accompanying notes 133-134. As I have argued, requiring applicants for a
license to disclose disability information, in the absence of Title I-type safeguards to minimize stigma
and related harms, is a form of discrimination. Just as Title II allows the asking of disability questions
to the extent necessary, it should allow necessity-based exceptions to restrictions concerning the
manner in which such questions must be asked and how the information must be handled. The excep-
tions that I will describe are also analogous to the circumstances in which Title I authorizes employers
to initiate inquiries into an employee's medical condition that are "job-related and consistent with
business necessity." See supra notes 312-313 and accompanying text.
437. 865 F. Supp. 115 (W.D.N.Y. 1994), aff d, 80 F.3d 703 (2d Cir. 1996).
438. Id. at 117.
439. See id. at 116-19.
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explanation. ""4  The court refused to grant the injunction, reasoning,
"[Sihould Campbell raise the issue of his mental illness to explain some of his
conduct, then, inquiry by the Committee into his mental illness as it is rele-
vant to that conduct (that is, his arrests and his default on his student loan), is
appropriate."'
In a situation like this, when an applicant discloses past behavior that
raises genuine fitness concerns and attributes it to a mental disability that
is now under control, the committee cannot assess the validity of that expla-
nation, and whether the conduct is likely to recur, unless it has access to
medical information. It would be pointless to go through a hearing with
disability questions off-limits. On the other hand, the committee should not
have carte blanche to conduct an inquisition into the applicant's medical
history and examine all medical records. The most appropriate way to handle
this situation, in a bar admissions system that conforms to Title I principles,
is to have the committee suspend its processing of the character issue, and
refer the applicant to the medical office for an evaluation.442 After receiving
the medical office's report,443 the committee can proceed with a hearing that
addresses both the conduct and the medical fitness issues. Having the medical
office first investigate the disability issue, and provide the examiners with a
report that distills the relevant medical information, helps to minimize the
risk of uninformed or insensitive questioning by the bar examiners, and
prevents them from having unnecessarily broad access to medical records.
Bar examiners should not be allowed to seize upon this exception as a
backdoor way of making broad disability inquiries. Bar applications typically
require the applicant to list all prior employment and the reasons for leaving
each job, and to account for periods of unemployment. In response to this
question, an applicant might have to disclose that she left a job and remained
out of work for a period of time because she was ill and needed to be hospital-
ized. Bar examiners should not be allowed to refer the applicant for a medical
evaluation, demand details about the nature of the disability, or request
copies of medical records on the basis of such a response, any more than
they should be allowed to ask, "Have you ever been hospitalized for mental
440. Id. at 119.
441. Id. at 121.
442. If the disability is one that the applicant was required to disclose on the medical ques-
tionnaire, the medical office's evaluation may already have been completed, or may be underway.
443. The medical office's report would address whether the past behavior is actually attributable
to a disability, whether the condition is currently under control, and the present likelihood of
behavior similar to the past incidents. In this situation, unlike the previous scenarios, the medical
office would need to furnish the results of its evaluation to the bar examiners, even if its conclusion is
favorable to the applicant.
illness?""4 The necessity and legitimacy of inquiries triggered by the appli-
cant's explanations of past conduct depends on the conduct being of a sort
that would raise character concerns for any applicant (for example, criminal
behavior, discharge or discipline for misconduct, defaults of responsibility),
independent of any connection to a disability.
The second situation in which bar examiners should be allowed to initiate
an inquiry into an applicant's disability can be illustrated by these cases:
John Doe's application form shows that he has been arrested twice
in the past two years, once for drunk driving and once for assault. The
police report from the latter arrest indicates that he had been drinking
before getting into a fight. At a character and fitness hearing, Doe
tells the bar examiners that he does not drink frequently and has no
problem with alcohol. The two incidents resulted from errors in judg-
ment, for which he is very sorry.
On an employment reference form, a partner at the law firm Sally
Poe worked at last summer tells the bar examiners that Poe sent him
a rambling, incoherent, and somewhat threatening letter after she
was not offered a job at the firm. Poe's bar application form indicates
that she was brought up on academic discipline charges for disruptive
behavior during an examination. At a character and fitness hearing
scheduled to deal with these issues, Poe addresses the panel in an agi-
tated, disorganized manner, and claims that her law school and former
law firm are involved in a conspiracy against her. She does not attribute
any of her problems to illness.
In both cases, bar examiners would have reasonable grounds for believing that
a disability that is not acknowledged by the applicant may be the underlying
cause of problematic behavior that raises legitimate character and fitness
questions. It would be appropriate to refer the applicant to the medical office
for an evaluation before proceeding further.445 This is not without its problems;
444. Edwards v. Illinois Board of Admissions to the Bar, No. 99-C-6792, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5869 (N.D. 1I. Mar. 29, 2000), provides another good example. Suzanne Edwards was forced to dis-
close her treatment for major depressive disorder in response to the bar examiners' question as to why
she had left a prior job as an air traffic controller. She responded that she had to leave the job because
her antidepressant medication made her ineligible for an Federal Aviation Administration medical
certificate. The bar examiners then requested all her medical records, and Edwards sought a federal
court injunction under the ADA. See id. at *2-*5. The court dismissed on federal abstention
grounds without reaching the merits. See id. at *5-* 11. Illinois did not ask about treatment for
depression on the bar application form, nor can such a question be justified under the ADA. See
supra Part II1.B. 1. To launch a full-scale investigation of an applicant's medical history based on her
disclosure of treatment for depression, in the absence of any evidence of behavior or performance
problems, is the functional equivalent of asking a depression question on the application form. See
Gibeaut, supra note 2, at 24 (discussing Edwards case).
445. This is consistent with the current practices of bar committees, which often refer candidates
for dependency evaluations based on alcohol-related convictions or other possible signs of addiction.
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examiners may make inappropriate referrals and some applicants may be
unfairly stigmatized by the suggestion of mental illness or substance abuse.446
Still, it is hard to quarrel with the necessity of allowing bar examiners
to require a medical evaluation when there are reasonable grounds to believe
that serious conduct problems are disability-related.447 Without the ability
to do this, the kinds of conditions that are most likely to impair a lawyer's
performance-substance abuse or mental illness that is active, untreated and
perhaps not even recognized by the applicant-cannot be addressed.44 s
Two general objections might be raised to this framework for adapting
Title I's procedural mechanisms to bar admissions. One relates to the allo-
cation of decision-making authority. Under my proposal, if the medical
officer concludes that there is no serious issue regarding the fitness of an
applicant who answers "yes" to a disability question, the examiners will be
told only that the applicant has been medically certified; they will not learn
that the applicant disclosed a disability, and will not receive any informa-
tion about it. Why should the medical office have the final say in such
cases? To evaluate an applicant's fitness requires a detailed understanding
of what lawyers do in addition to medical expertise. The capabilities required
of a lawyer are not like the stamina or lifting abilities needed for, say, a dock-
worker's job, which can easily be translated into a set of determinate medical
standards. A medical expert may be able to describe a bar applicant's condi-
tion, treatment and prognosis, but is less well suited to say what the impact on
law practice will be.449 Arguably, it should be the bar examiners who always
have the final word on fitness, taking into account the medical officer's
assessment and the information on which it is based.
See Braun, supra note 201 (describing practices in California); Marshall, supra note 169 (describing
practices in Texas).
446. Limiting such referrals to situations in which the behavior problems have been serious, and
providing examiners with appropriate training, can help to control the risks inherent in discretion. See
Braun, supra note 201, at 12 (noting that members of the California character committee, although not
qualified to make a diagnosis, have been trained to recognize signs of dependency that warrant a referral
for a professional evaluation).
447. In the employment context, decisions interpreting Title I recognize the necessity of allowing
employers to require a medical examination when the employer observes a performance problem and
has reasonable grounds for believing that it may be disability-related. See supra note 313 and accom-
panying text.
448. Such cases usually will not be uncovered through the medical screening process; the appli-
cant would answer "no" to questions about diagnosis or treatment. The applicant, too, may benefit from
being referred for an evaluation. The result may be treatment and conditional admission in a case in
which admission might be denied if the bar examiners were forced to make a decision solely on the
basis of the behavior.
449. When Georgia's bar admissions board asked a psychiatrist about the fitness of a bar applicant
with schizophrenia, it received the following response: "[The applicant] is acutely schizophrenic;
however, I do not know how schizophrenic one must be before he should be disqualified from prac-
ticing law." Custer, supra note 372, at 20.
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My response to this critique is that medical evaluators, working together
with the bar examiners, can develop workable and reasonably concrete and
consistent standards for deciding which cases raise serious fitness issues that
warrant the bar examiners' attention. The basic capabilities that are required
of an attorney should not be a professional mystery; they can be defined in
terms that will be meaningful to a mental health expert."' Principles that
bar examiners have already developed to flesh out the meaning of "fitness"
in the disability context can be used as the basis for medical office guidelines
for determining when there is a serious fitness question.45" ' The risk that a
medical office would clear applicants in any significant number of cases in
which the examiners could reasonably reach a contrary conclusion would
be small. On the other hand, if a medical report went to the examiners in
every case in which the applicant answered a disability question affirmatively,
the purposes that underlie Title I's procedural protections would be severely
undermined. The examiners would frequently gain access to highly confiden-
tial medical information in cases in which the disability has no bearing on
the applicant's fitness.
A second objection is the expense. Bar committees have limited
resources and must screen large numbers of applicants. Charles Reischel, a
member of the Washington, D.C. bar admissions committee, argued against
450. An example can be found on Rhode Island's bar application form, which contains the
following definition in connection with a question that asks about the existence of any conditions
that would impair the applicant's ability to practice law:
"Ability to practice law" is to be construed to include the following:
(a) The cognitive capacity to undertake fundamental lawyering skills such as problem
solving, legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, factual investigation, organization and
management of legal work, making appropriate reasoned legal judgments, and recognizing
and resolving ethical dilemmas, for example[;]
(b) The ability to communicate legal judgments and legal information to clients, other
attorneys, judicial and regulatory authorities, with or without the use of aids or devices;
and
(c) The capability to perform legal tasks in a timely manner.
In re Petition & Questionnaire for Admission to the R.I. Bar, 683 A.2d 1333, 1337 (R.I. 1996).
451. Bar examiners generally agree that current fitness is the issue when it comes to disabilities.
In substance abuse cases, applicants in stable recovery are considered fit, even though there is always
a high statistical probability of future relapse. Similarly, with serious mental disorders, the key issues
tend to be the stability of the applicant's participation in treatment, and whether treatment is effec-
tively controlling symptoms. See supra notes 204-205 and accompanying text.
Medical evaluation criteria based on these general principles might provide that there is a serious
fitness issue when an applicant shows signs of continuing substance abuse or less than a year of stable
recovery from a substance abuse problem; when an applicant's treatment for mental illness is not effec-
tively controlling serious manic or psychotic episodes; or when an applicant has not been cooperative
or consistent in complying with a necessary treatment regimen.
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the applicability of Title I on these grounds in an article analyzing the ADA's
implications for mental health questions:
An employer has both greater means and a greater incentive to test each
applicant post-offer than a licensing body has concerning applicants
for licensure. An employer will establish a continuing relationship
with those it hires, and will derive benefits or suffer detriments from
the employee's performance. A licensing body deals with many appli-
cants, always on a strictly limited basis, and is not directly affected, if
at all, by their post-license performance.452
The flaw in this analysis is that licensing boards, unlike employers, are
not independent, freestanding entities. Bar admissions authorities are an arm
of the judiciary, a branch of state government. If disability-based inquiries
are necessary for the sake of public protection, as bar examiners contend, the
state has ample incentive, as well as the means, to pay the cost of ensuring
that the inquiry-is handled in a nondiscriminatory way."'
To not apply Title I's safeguards to a licensing screening process also
has its costs. It imposes the burdens of a discriminatory process on applicants
with disabilities. There is no good reason why the state, unlike employers,
should be exempt from the law's requirement that disability-based screening
must be conducted in a manner that avoids discrimination against applicants
with disabilities.
452. Reischel, supra note 115, at 19.
453. The expense should not be great. If the inquiries on medical questionnaires comply with
Title Il's requirements of necessity and narrow tailoring, only a very small percentage of bar applicants
will respond affirmatively. Conducting the medical screening would be a part-time job for a mental
health professional. Cf. Herr, supra note 6, at 677-78 (arguing that, given the small number of
applicants who respond affirmatively to mental health questions, it would not be unduly burdensome
for bar committees to utilize an interviewer with medical qualifications).
To shift this expense to applicants with disabilities, by charging an additional fee for the medical
questionnaire or making the applicant pay the costs of an evaluation, should not be permissible.
The U.S. Department of Justice's Title II regulations prohibit a public entity from placing a surcharge
on any individual with a disability to cover the costs of measures required to provide nondiscrimi-
natory treatment. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(0 (2000). Some courts have questioned the validity of this
regulation when it is applied to prohibit states from charging a fee for special services provided to
individuals with disabilities, such as handicapped parking permits. See Neinast v. Texas, 217 F.3d
275, 280-82 (5th Cir. 2000); Brown v. N.C. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698, 703-08 (4th Cir.
1999) (dismissing suits on Eleventh Amendment grounds, but with reasoning suggesting that these
courts might find the regulation to be an arbitrary and irrational interpretation of statute). But see
Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167, 1176 (9th Cit. 1999) (upholding regulation). However, requiring
a person with a disability to pay for a burden that is imposed by the state, solely because of the
applicant's disability, in order to determine eligibility for a general professional license, should stand
on a different footing than requiring payment for a service or benefit that is available only to persons
with disabilities and is designed to assist them. The former is a straightforward form of discrimi-
nation-treating people differently on the basis of their disability status--that should be prohibited
under Title II's statutory prohibition of discrimination, regardless of the validity of the U.S. Department
of Justice regulation.

